8251
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The logical space of reasons is a natural phenomenon, and it is the realm of freedom [McDowell]
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Full Idea:
The logical space of reasons is just part of the logical space of nature. ...And, in a Kantian slogan, the space of reasons is the realm of freedom.
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From:
John McDowell (Mind and World [1994], Intro 7)
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A reaction:
[second half on p.5] This is a modern have-your-cake-and-eat-it view of which I am becoming very suspicious. The modern Kantians (Davidson, Nagel, McDowell) are struggling to naturalise free will, but it won't work. Just dump it!
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7720
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Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
A problem for resemblance nominalism is that in saying that two particulars 'resemble' one another, it is necessary to specify in what respect they do so (e.g. colour, shape, size), and this threatens to reintroduce what appears to be talk of universals.
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
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A reaction:
We see resemblance between faces instantly, long before we can specify the 'respects' of the resemblance. This supports the Humean hard-wired view of resemblance, rather than some appeal to Platonic universals.
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19092
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There is no pure Given, but it is cultured, rather than entirely relative [McDowell, by Macbeth]
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Full Idea:
McDowell argues that the Myth of the Given shows not that there is no content to a concept that is not a matter of its inferential relations to other concepts but only that awareness of the sort that we enjoy ...is acquired in the course of acculturation.
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From:
report of John McDowell (Mind and World [1994]) by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.185
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A reaction:
The first view is of Wilfred Sellars, who derives pragmatic relativism from his rejection of the Myth. This idea is helpful is seeing why McDowell has a good proposal. As I look out of my window, my immediate experience seems 'cultured'.
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7714
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Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
There is the question of the identity of a person over or across time ('diachronic' personal identity), and there is also the question of what makes for personal identity at a time ('synchronic' personal identity).
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
This seems to me to be the first and most important distinction in the philosophy of personal identity, and they regularly get run together. Locke, for example, has an account of synchronic identity, which is often ignored. It applies to objects too.
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7715
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Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
'Mentalese' would be neither conventional nor a means of public communication so that even to call it a language is seriously misleading.
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
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A reaction:
It is, however, supposed to contain symbolic representations which are then used as tokens for computation, so it seems close to a language, if (for example) symbolic logic or mathematics were accepted as languages. But who understands it?
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21947
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Power is localised, so we either have totalitarian centralisation, or local politics [Foucault, by Gutting]
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Full Idea:
Foucault's analysis suggests that meaningful revolution, hence genuine liberation, is impossible: the only alternative to the modern net of micro-centres of power is totalitatian domination. Hence his politics, even when revolutionary, is always local.
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From:
report of Michel Foucault (Discipline and Punish [1977]) by Gary Gutting - Foucault: a very short introduction 8
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A reaction:
It is hard to disagree with this.
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21946
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Prisons gradually became our models for schools, hospitals and factories [Foucault, by Gutting]
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Full Idea:
Foucault's thesis is that disciplinary techniques introduced for criminals became the model for other modern sites of control (schools, hospitals, factories), so that prison discipline pervades all of society.
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From:
report of Michel Foucault (Discipline and Punish [1977]) by Gary Gutting - Foucault: a very short introduction 8
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A reaction:
Someone recently designed Foucault Monopoly, where every location is a prison. All tightly controlled organisations, such as a medieval monastery, or the Roman army, will inevitably share many features.
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