28 ideas
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A problem for resemblance nominalism is that in saying that two particulars 'resemble' one another, it is necessary to specify in what respect they do so (e.g. colour, shape, size), and this threatens to reintroduce what appears to be talk of universals. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: We see resemblance between faces instantly, long before we can specify the 'respects' of the resemblance. This supports the Humean hard-wired view of resemblance, rather than some appeal to Platonic universals. |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Later philosophers emphasised different strands of Aristotle's concept of substances: Leibniz (in his theory of monads) emphasised their unity; Spinoza emphasised their ontological independence; Locke emphasised their role in relation to qualities. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Note that this Aristotelian idea had not been jettisoned in the late seventeenth century, unlike other Aristotelianisms. I think it is only with the success of atomism in chemistry that the idea of substance is forced to recede. |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
Full Idea: According to one school of thought, perception is simply a mode of belief-acquisition,and there is no reason to suppose that any element of sensation is literally involved in perception. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Blindsight would be an obvious supporting case for this view. I think this point is crucial in understanding what is wrong with Jackson's 'knowledge argument' (involving Mary, see Idea 7377). Sensation gives knowledge, so it can't be knowledge. |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Only a causal theory of perception will respect the facts of physiology and physics ...meaning a theory which maintains that for a subject to perceive a physical object the subject should enjoy some appropriate perceptual experience caused by the object. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: If I hallucinate an object, then presumably I am not allowed to say that I 'perceive' it, but that seems to make the causal theory an idle tautology. If we are in virtual reality then there aren't any objects. |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
Full Idea: There is the question of the identity of a person over or across time ('diachronic' personal identity), and there is also the question of what makes for personal identity at a time ('synchronic' personal identity). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be the first and most important distinction in the philosophy of personal identity, and they regularly get run together. Locke, for example, has an account of synchronic identity, which is often ignored. It applies to objects too. |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
Full Idea: 'Mentalese' would be neither conventional nor a means of public communication so that even to call it a language is seriously misleading. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: It is, however, supposed to contain symbolic representations which are then used as tokens for computation, so it seems close to a language, if (for example) symbolic logic or mathematics were accepted as languages. But who understands it? |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If meaning is a private mental picture, what does 'the cat is NOT on the mat' mean, and how does it differ from 'the dog is not on the mat?'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Not insurmountable. We picture an empty mat, combined with a cat (or whatever) located somewhere else. A mental 'picture' of something shouldn't be contrued as a single image in a neat black frame. |
20761 | If existence is absurd it can never have a meaning [Beauvoir] |
Full Idea: To declare that existence is absurd is to deny that it can ever be given a meaning; to say that it is ambiguous is to assert that its meaning is never fixed. | |
From: Simone de Beauvoir (Ethics of Ambiguity [1948], p.129), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 6 'Bad' | |
A reaction: Absurdity precludes meaning, but being meaningless doesn't entail absurdity. Asteroids are meaningless. Presumably if existence is meaningless now (as in a depression), but it might possibly become meaningful, then it can't qualify as 'absurd'. |
21181 | Relativity and Quantum theory give very different accounts of forces [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: General Relativity and quantum mechanics are the two great theories in physics today but they give two very different ideas for how forces work. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 01) | |
A reaction: Relativity says it is space curvature, and quantum theory says it is particle exchange? But is there a Relativity account of the strong nuclear force? |
21183 | Thermodynamics introduced work and entropy, to understand steam engine efficiency [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: The Laws of Thermodynamics introduced the concepts of entropy and work; put simply, how much useful energy you can really get out of a steam engine. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 03) | |
A reaction: The point of science by this stage was to introduce measurable and quantifiable concepts |
21191 | Photons are B and W° bosons, linked by the Higgs mechanism [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: The photon is actually a mix of two deeper things, the B and the W°, tied together by the Higgs mechanism. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 06) | |
A reaction: The B (for 'Boson') transmits a force associated with the 'winding symmetry'. (I record this without properly understanding it.) |
21199 | Spinning electric charge produces magnetism, so all fermions are magnets [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: The muon, like all fermions, spins - and because a spinning electric charge generates a magnetic field all fermions act like tiny bar magnets. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 11) |
21180 | Electrons are fundamental and are not made of anything; they are properties without size [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: As far as we can tell, electrons (and quarks) are fundamental. They are not small lumps of material, because we could always ask what the material is. The electron just ...is. They are collections of properties, with no apparent size. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 01) | |
A reaction: This idea from physics HAS to be of interest to philosophers! The bundle theory is discredited for normal objects and for minds, and so is the substrate idea for supporting properties. But rigorous physics accepts a bundle theory. |
21189 | Electrons may have smaller components, bound by a new force [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Quarks, leptons or bosons may actually be made up of something even smaller, bound together by a conjectural new force. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 05) | |
A reaction: Electrons are a type of lepton. Compare Idea 21180, from the same book. If electrons are not fundamental, what matters is not some 'stuff' they are made of, but a different force that would bind the ingredients. |
21184 | Physics was rewritten to explain stable electron orbits [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Explaining the stable electron orbits would require a complete rewriting of the physics of subatomic particles. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 03) | |
A reaction: This really looks like a simple and major landmark moment. You can ignore a single anomaly, but not a central feature of your entire theory. |
21182 | Quantum mechanics is our only theory, and is very precise, and repeatedly confirmed [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Quantum mechanics is the only working description of the universe that we have. It is amazingly precise, and so far every experimental test has verified its predictions. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 02) | |
A reaction: I take it from this that quantum mechanics is simply TRUE. Get over it! It will never turn out to be wrong, but may be subsumed within some more fine-grained or extensive theory. |
21187 | Virtual particles can't be measured, and can ignore the laws of physics [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: We can never measure these virtual (transitory) particles directly, and it turns out that they don't even have to obey the laws of physics. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 05) | |
A reaction: These seems to be the real significance of the Uncertainty Principle. Such particles 'borrow' huge amounts of energy for very short times. |
21185 | Colour charge is positive or negative, and also has red, green or blue direction [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Colour charge is 'three-dimensional'. As well as the charge having a positive or negative sign, it can also have a direction, and for convenience these three different directions (pointing like a weather vane) are labelled 'red', 'green' and 'blue'. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 04) |
21194 | The Standard Model omits gravity, because there are no particles involved [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Gravity is not included in the Standard Model because we simply cannot study it using particles. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 09) | |
A reaction: I'm guessing that Einstein describes how gravity behaves, but not what it is. |
21195 | In Supersymmetry the Standard Model simplifies at high energies [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Supersymmetry suggest that the Standard Model becomes much simpler at high energies. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10) |
21197 | Standard Model forces are one- two- and three-dimensional [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: The forces in the Standard Model are built on gauge symmetries, with a one-dimensional charge (like electromagnetism), a two-dimensional charge (the weak force), and a three dimensional charge (the strong force). | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10) | |
A reaction: See also Idea 21185. |
21188 | Quarks and leptons have a weak charge, for the weak force [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: For the weak force there must be a corresponding 'weak charge', and all the fermions, all the quarks and leptons carry it. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 05) | |
A reaction: So electrons carry a weak charge, as well as an electromagnetic charge. Like owning several passports. |
21186 | Quarks rush wildly around in protons, restrained by the gluons [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Inside a proton the quarks are rushing around like caged animals, free to move until they push against the bars to try to escape, when the gluons pull them back in. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 04) |
21192 | Neutrinos only interact with the weak force, but decays produce them in huge numbers [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: Neutrinos only interact with the weak force, which means they barely interact at all, but because the weak force is crucial in the decays of so many other particles, neutrinos are still produced in huge numbers. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 08) | |
A reaction: They only interact with the W and Z bosons. |
21196 | To combine the forces, they must all be the same strength at some point [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: If all the forces are to combine, at some point they must all be the same strength, and Supersymmetry (SuSy) makes this happen. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10) | |
A reaction: This sounds like an impressive reason for favouring supersymmetry - as long as you have an a priori preference for everything combining. |
21190 | 'Space' in physics just means location [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: 'Space' in physics really just means location. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 06) | |
A reaction: Location can, of course, only be specified relative to something else. Space is really an abstraction, but at least it means there is some sort of background to locate all the fundamental fields. |
21193 | The universe is 68% dark energy, 27% dark matter, 5% regular matter [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: The most precise surveys of the stars and galaxies tell us that the universe is made up of 68% dark energy, 27% dark matter, and just 5% regular matter (the stuff of the Standard Model of particle physics). | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 09) | |
A reaction: Regular matter - that's me, that is. |
21198 | If a cosmic theory relies a great deal on fine-tuning basic values, it is probably wrong [Hesketh] |
Full Idea: If a theory has to rely on excessive 'fine-tuning', a series of extremely unlikely events in order to produce the universe we see around us, then it is extremely unlikely that this theory is correct. | |
From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10) | |
A reaction: He says the Standard Model has 26 parameters which are only known by experiment, rather than by theory. So instead of saying '...so there is a God', we should say '...so our theory isn't very good'. |