17 ideas
3798 | An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett] |
Full Idea: The unexamined life may not be worth living, but the overexamined life is nothing to write home about either. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §4.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably he means a life which is all theory and no practice. Compare Idea 343. |
13917 | Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The central task of metaphysics is to chart the possibilities of existence by identifying the categories of being and the relations of ontological dependency in which beings of different categories stand to one another. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: I am beginning to think that he is right about the second one, and that dependency and grounding relations are the name of the game. I don't have Lowe's confidence that philosophers can parcel up reality in neat and true ways. |
13919 | Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The central task of philosophy is the cultivation of insights into natures or essences, and not the 'analysis of concepts', with which it is apt to be confused. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: This immediately strikes me as a false dichotomy. I like the idea of trying to understand the true natures of things, but how are we going to do it in our armchairs? |
3801 | Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett] |
Full Idea: We must assume that something matters - that some things are for better and some things are for worse, for without that our assumed rationality would have nothing on which to get a purchase. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §7.1) | |
A reaction: It does seem that rationality wouldn't exist as an activity without some value to motivate it. |
13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Holes are things of such a kind that they can coincide without being identical - as are, for example, shadows and spots of light. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: His point is that they thereby fail one of the standard tests for being an 'object'. |
13921 | All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Things must have an essence, in the sense of 'what it is to be the individual of that kind', or it would make no sense to say we can talk or think comprehendingly about things at all. If we don't know what it is, how can we think about it? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 2) | |
A reaction: Lowe presents this as a sort of Master Argument for essences. I think he is working with the wrong notion of essence. All he means is that things must have identities to be objects of thought. Why equate identity with essence, and waste a good concept? |
13922 | Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe] |
Full Idea: To know something's essence is not to be acquainted with some further thing of a special kind, but simply to understand what exactly that thing is. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 2) | |
A reaction: I think he is wrong about this, or at least is working with an unhelpful notion of essence. Identity is one thing, and essence is another. I take essences to be certain selected features of things, which explain their nature. |
13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Any individual thing must be a thing of some general kind - because, at the very least, it must belong to some ontological category. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 2) | |
A reaction: Where does the law that 'everything must have a category' come from? I'm baffled by remarks of this kind. Where do we get the categories from? From observing the individuals. So which has priority? Not the categories. Is God a kind? |
3802 | Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett] |
Full Idea: You say you cannot imagine that p, and therefore declare that p is impossible. Mightn't that be hubris? | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §7.3) |
3795 | Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett] |
Full Idea: In causal theories of knowledge and reference, the causal chain between object and thought must be of the "right" sort - the nature of rightness to be specified later, typically. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §3.3 n14) | |
A reaction: This is now the standard objection to a purely causal account of reference. Which of the many causal chains causes the meaning? Knowledge of maths is a further problem for it. |
3797 | I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Control is the ultimate criterion of the self: I am the sum total of the parts I control directly. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §4.2) | |
A reaction: This looks awfully like a flagrant self-contradiction, and I think it is. It seems pretty obvious that there is at least a distinction between the bit or bits that do the controlling, and the bits that get controlled. |
3800 | You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG] |
Full Idea: If a brain implant would compel you to perform an action which you in fact freely choose, then you are free, but couldn't have done otherwise. | |
From: report of Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §6.1) by PG - Db (ideas) |
3803 | Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Can I even conceive of beings whose wills are freer than our own? | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §7.3) |
3791 | Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett] |
Full Idea: The creature who is not only sensitive to patterns in its environment, but also sensitive to patterns in its own reactions to patterns in its environment, has taken a major step. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §2.2) |
3794 | Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Foreknowledge is what permits control. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §3.2) |
3796 | The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Faced with our inability to 'see' where the centre or source of our free actions is,…we exploit the gaps in our self-knowledge by filling it with a mysterious entity, the unmoved mover, the active self. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §4.1) | |
A reaction: I am convinced that there is no such things as free will; its origins are to be found in religion, where it is a necessary feature of a very supreme God. I don't believe for a moment that we need to believe in free will. |
22086 | The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
Full Idea: Kierkegaard insisted that the most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion. | |
From: report of Søren Kierkegaard (works [1845]) by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed Intro | |
A reaction: Hume comes to mind for a similar view, but in character Hume was far more rational than Kierkegaard. |