23 ideas
| 5311 | If observation goes up a level, we expect the laws of the lower level to remain in force [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: When the observer shifts his attention from one level of organisation to the next, as from physics to chemistry, he expects to find obedience to all the laws of the levels below. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to state a necessary condition of reduction, but not a sufficient one. Wilson points out that new phenomena emerge at higher levels. This principle is similar to Hume's argument against miracles. You don't easily overthrow basic laws. |
| 5312 | A child first sees objects as distinct, and later as members of groups [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: From a single-minded effort to move objects a child's activity grows into a detached reflection on the movements themselves. The objects are first perceived as distinct entities, and then as members of groups to be classified. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This does not, of course, prove anything about the philosophical problems of universals, but it does seem to pinpoint the stage in human development when 'universals' are perceived. The basis seems to be groups or sets, but how do we spot those? |
| 5309 | Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: How does he know this proposition which he asserts so confidently? Obvious counterexamples seem to be utterly trivial beliefs, and self-destructive beliefs. What is the evolutionary value of low self-esteem? Still, you see his point. |
| 21227 | The Cogito demands a bridge to the world, and ends in isolating the ego [Velarde-Mayol] |
| Full Idea: All philosophies inspired in the Cogito have the problem of building a bridge from the starting point of consciousness to the external world. The result of this is the isolation and solitude of the very ego. | |
| From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 4.7.2) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a pretty good reason not to develop a philosophy which is inspired by the Cogito. |
| 21215 | The representation may not be a likeness [Velarde-Mayol] |
| Full Idea: Representationalism is the doctrine that maintains that the object is represented in consciousness by means of an image. ...One should not confuse an image with a likeness. | |
| From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 2.4.3) | |
| A reaction: Helpful reminder that sense-data or whatever may not be a likeness. But then how do they represent? Symbolic representation needs massive interpretation. |
| 5310 | Philosophers study the consequences of ethics instead of its origins [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers examine the precepts of ethical systems with reference to their consequences and not their origins. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: He is interested in biological origins, but it strikes me that every moral theory has some account of the origins of morality, be it pure reason, or the love of pleasure, or human nature, or eternal ideas, or the will of God, or selfish desires. |
| 5078 | Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R] |
| Full Idea: Kant and Mill were in total agreement in trying to give content to the distinction between moral right and wrong, without recourse to any divine lawgiver. | |
| From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: A nice analysis, in tune with MacIntyre and others, who see such attempts as failures. It is hard, however, to deny the claims of rational principles, or of suffering, in our moral framework. I agree with Taylor's move back to virtue, but it ain't simple. |
| 5067 | Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R] |
| Full Idea: If morality is based on wrong (meaning 'forbidden'), right ('permitted'), and obligatory ('required'), we are led to ask 'Who is it that thus permits, forbids or requires that certain things be done or not done?' | |
| From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Clear reinforcement for Nietzsche's attack on conventional morals, which Taylor sees as a relic of medieval religious attitudes. Taylor says Kant offered a non-religious version of the same authority. I agree. Back to the Greek pursuit of excellence! |
| 5313 | The rules of human decision-making converge and overlap in a 'human nature' [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: The rules followed in human decision-making are tight enough to produce a broad overlap in the decisions taken by all individuals, and hence a convergence powerful enough to be labelled 'human nature'. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a nice empirical criterion for asserting the existence of human nature, and it seems right to examine decisions, rather than more thoughtless or conformist behaviour. Existentialists dream of new possibilities, but the old ways always seem best… |
| 5316 | We undermine altruism by rewarding it, but we reward it to encourage it [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: By sanctifying altruism in order to reward it we make it less true, but by that means we promote its recurrence in others. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: So is my preference for not rewarding (or even noticing) altruism an anti-social tendency. The very conspicuous charity of sponsorship seems somehow inferior to the truly anonymous gift. Or super-altruism is very public, to encourage it in others? |
| 5318 | Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: By 'hard-core' he means suicidally self-sacrificing, rather than extensive. This seems a good thesis. It strikes me that the development of civil society is often impeded by family loyalty, such as in the case of the Mafia. |
| 5079 | Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R] |
| Full Idea: Pleasures can be located in a particular part of the body, and can be momentary, and come and go, but this is not the case with happiness. | |
| From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.16) | |
| A reaction: Probably no one ever thought that pleasure and happiness were actually identical - merely that pleasure is the only cause and source of happiness. These are good objections to that hypothesis. Pleasure simply isn't 'the good'. |
| 5068 | 'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R] |
| Full Idea: The word 'eudaimonia' means literally 'having a good demon', which is apt, because it suggests some kind of supreme good fortune, of the sort which might be thought of as a bestowal. | |
| From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: Beware of etymology. This implies that eudaimonia is almost entirely beyond a person's control, but Aristotle doesn't think that. A combination of education and effort can build on some natural gifts to create a fully successful life. |
| 5317 | The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: This is a key element of social contract theory. It shows why natural selection of truly altruistic traits might be beneficial to individuals, provided they are surrounded by possible recipricators. We trust those who are genuine and sincere. |
| 5076 | To Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function [Taylor,R] |
| Full Idea: To the Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function. | |
| From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: A problem case might be a work of art, but one might reply that there is no obvious perfection there because there is no clear function. For artefacts and organisms the principle seems very good. But 'Is the Cosmos good?' |
| 5077 | The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R] |
| Full Idea: In modern moral thinking, obligation is something every responsible person is supposed to have, but it is not an obligation to the state, or society, or humanity, or even to God. It is an obligation standing by itself. | |
| From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.12) | |
| A reaction: This nicely pinpoints how some our moral attitudes are relics of religion. Taylor wants a return to virtue, but one could respond by opting for the social contract (with very clear obligations) or Kantian 'contractualism' (answering to rational beings). |
| 5066 | If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R] |
| Full Idea: Once people are declared to be images of God, just by virtue of minimal humanity, they have, therefore, no greater individual excellence to aspire to, and their purpose became one of obligation, that is, obedience to God's will. | |
| From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: An interesting and plausible historical analysis. There is a second motivation for the change, though, in Grotius's desire to develop a more legalistic morality, focusing on actions rather than character. Taylor's point is more interesting, though. |
| 5065 | The ethics of duty requires a religious framework [Taylor,R] |
| Full Idea: The ethics of duty cannot be sustained independently of a religious framework. | |
| From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This is a big challenge to Kant, echoing Nietzsche's jibe that Kant just wanted to be 'obedient'. The only options are either 'natural duties', or 'duties of reason'. Reason may have a pull (like pleasure), but a 'duty'? Difficult. |
| 5308 | The only human purpose is that created by our genetic history [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: No species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This invites the question of what that purpose is perceived to be. Some people feel an imperative to play the piano all day, so presumably genetic history has created that feeling. Presumably we can also choose a purpose, even extinction. |
| 21219 | Find the essence by varying an object, to see what remains invariable [Velarde-Mayol] |
| Full Idea: Eidetic Reduction consists of producing variations in the individual object until we see what is invariable in it. What is invariable is its essence or Eidos. | |
| From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 3.2.2) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as an excellent idea. It more or less describes the method of science. Chemical atoms were thought to be unsplittable, until someone tried a new variation for dealing with them. |
| 5314 | Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and fast, biological evolution is Darwinian and slow [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and very fast, whereas biological evolution is Darwinian and usually very slow. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: An intriguing point, given how discredited Lamarckian evolution is. It links with the Dawkins idea of 'memes' - cultural ideas which spread very fast. Is biological evolution suddenly about to become Lamarckian, as culture influences biology? |
| 5315 | Over 99 percent of human evolution has been in the hunter-gatherer phase [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Selection pressures of hunter-gatherer existence have persisted for over 99 percent of human genetic evolution. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This seems a key point to bear in mind when assessing human nature. Hunter-gathering isn't just one tendency in our genetics; it more or less constitutes everything we are. |
| 5320 | It is estimated that mankind has produced 100,000 religions [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Since the first recorded religion (in Iraq 60,000 years ago) it is estimated that mankind has produced in the order of one hundred thousand religions. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: If asked to guess the number, I would probably have said '200'! This staggering figure seems to argue both ways - it suggest a certain arbitrariness in the details of religions, but an extremely intense drive to have some sort of religious belief. |