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All the ideas for 'A Priori', 'First Things First' and 'Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
Hamann, Herder and Jacobi were key opponents of the Enlightenment [Gardner]
     Full Idea: Hamann, Herder and Jacobi are central figues in the reaction against Enlightenment.
     From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 10 'immediate')
     A reaction: From a British perspective I would see Hume as the leading such figure. Hamann emphasised the neglect of the role of language. Jacobi was a Christian.
Kant halted rationalism, and forced empiricists to worry about foundations [Gardner]
     Full Idea: Kant's Critique swiftly brought rationalism to a halt, and after Kant empiricism has displayed a nervousness regarding its foundations, and been forced to assume more sophisticated forms.
     From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 10 Intro)
     A reaction: See the ideas of Laurence Bonjour for a modern revival of rationalism. After Kant philosophers either went existential, or stared gloomily into the obscure depths. Formal logic was seen as a possible rope ladder down.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Only Kant and Hegel have united nature, morals, politics, aesthetics and religion [Gardner]
     Full Idea: Apart from Hegel, no later philosophical system equals in stature Kant's attempt to weld together the diverse fields of natural science, morality, politics, aesthetics and religion into a systematic overarching epistemological and metaphysical unity.
     From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 10)
     A reaction: Earlier candidate are Plato and Aristotle. Earlier Enlightenment figures say little about morality or aesthetics. Hobbes ranges widely. Aquinas covered most things.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares]
     Full Idea: In Husserl's philosophy after 1903, he is unwilling to commit himself to any specific metaphysical views.
     From: Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 08.2)
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
Transcendental proofs derive necessities from possibilities (e.g. possibility of experiencing objects) [Gardner]
     Full Idea: A transcendental proof converts a possibility into a necessity: by saying under what conditions experience of objects is possible, transcendental proofs show those conditions to be necessary for us to the extent that we have any experience of objects.
     From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 02 'Transc')
     A reaction: They appear to be hypothetical necessities, rather than true metaphysical necessities. Gardner is discussing Kant, but seems to be generalising. Hypothetical necessities are easy: if it is flying, it is necessarily above the ground.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Modern geoemtry is either 'pure' (and formal), or 'applied' (and a posteriori) [Gardner]
     Full Idea: There is now 'pure' geometry, consisting of formal systems based on axioms for which truth is not claimed, and which are consequently not synthetic; and 'applied', a branch of physics, the truth of which is empirical, and therefore not a priori.
     From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 03 'Maths')
     A reaction: His point is that there is no longer any room for a priori geometry. Might the same division be asserted of arithmetic, or analysis, or set theory?
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares]
     Full Idea: The epistemological burden of showing that the axioms are true is removed if we are only studying pure mathematics. If, however, we want to look at applied mathematics, then this burden returns.
     From: Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 11.4)
     A reaction: One of those really simple ideas that hits the spot. Nice. The most advanced applied mathematics must rest on counting and measuring.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares]
     Full Idea: Aristotelians treat mathematical facts as relations between properties. These properties, moreover, are abstracted from our experience of things. ...This view finds a natural companion in structuralism.
     From: Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 11.7)
     A reaction: This is the view of mathematics that I personally favour. The view that we abstract 'five' from a group of five pebbles is too simplistic, but this is the right general approach.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner]
     Full Idea: Leibnizian monads clearly satisfy Kant's definition of noumena.
     From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 06 'Noumena')
     A reaction: This needs qualifying, because Leibniz clearly specifies the main attributes of monads, where Kant is adamant that we can saying virtually nothing about noumena.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares]
     Full Idea: It seems natural to claim that light rays moving in straight lines is contingent but a priori. Scientists stipulate that they are the standard by which we measure straightness, but their appropriateness for this task is a contingent feature of the world.
     From: Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 02.9)
     A reaction: This resembles the metre rule in Paris. It is contingent that something is a certain way, so we make being that way a conventional truth, which can therefore be known via the convention, rather than via the contingent fact.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares]
     Full Idea: Aristotelians tend to eschew talk about a special faculty of pure reason that is responsible for all of our a priori judgements.
     From: Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 08.9)
     A reaction: He is invoking Carrie Jenkins's idea that the a priori is knowledge of relations between concepts which have been derived from experience. Nice idea. We thus have an empirical a priori, integrated into the natural world. Abstraction must be involved.
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares]
     Full Idea: Empiricist critiques of rationalism often accuse rationalists of confusing the limits of their imaginations with real insight into what is necessarily true.
     From: Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 03.01)
     A reaction: See ideas on 'Conceivable as possible' for more on this. You shouldn't just claim to 'see' that something is true, but be willing to offer some sort of reason, truthmaker or grounding. Without that, you may be right, but you are on weak ground.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee]
     Full Idea: Evidentialism does not support beginning epistemology by taking for granted that evidentialism is true. ...Rather, what potentially justifies belief in intial epistemic data and initial procedures of inquiry is the evidence itself.
     From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Getting')
     A reaction: This sounds good. I much prefer talk of 'evidence' to talk of 'perceptions', because evidence has been licked into shape, and its significance has been clarified. That is the first step towards the coherence we seek.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares]
     Full Idea: In what is perhaps the most popular version of coherentism, a system of beliefs is a set of beliefs that explain one another.
     From: Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 01.5)
     A reaction: These seems too simple. My first response would be that explanations are what result from coherence sets of beliefs. I may have beliefs that explain nothing, but at least have the virtue of being coherent.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]
     Full Idea: Reliabilism would count pure guesses as good reasons if guessing were properly reliable.
     From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Getting')
     A reaction: See D.H. Lawrence's short story 'The Rocking Horse Winner'. This objection strikes me as being so devastating that it is almost conclusive. Except that pure guesses are never ever reliable, over a decent period of time.
More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]
     Full Idea: Sheer reliability does not justify belief. ...It may be, for instance, that we have strong though misleading reason to deny the method's reliability.
     From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Circles')
     A reaction: That is, we accept a justification if we judge the method to be reliable, not if it IS reliable. I can disbelieve all the reliable information that arrives in my mind. People do that all the time! Hatred of experts! Support for internalism?
Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]
     Full Idea: An unrefined reliability theory does a poor job at capturing reflective judgements about hypothetical cases
     From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Stroud's')
     A reaction: Reliability can only be a test for tried and tested ways. No one can say whether imagining a range of possibilities is reliable or not. Is prediction a reliable route to knowledge?
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares]
     Full Idea: The central claim of Percy Bridgman's theory of operational definitions (1920s), is that definitions of certain scientific concepts are given by the ways that we have to measure them. For example, a straight line is 'the path of a light ray'.
     From: Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 02.9)
     A reaction: It is often observed that this captures the spirit of Special Relativity.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares]
     Full Idea: Aristotelian justification is the process of reasoning using concepts that are abstracted from experience (rather than, say, concepts that are innate or those that we associate with the meanings of words).
     From: Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 08.1)
     A reaction: See Carrie Jenkins for a full theory along these lines (though she doesn't mention Aristotle). This is definitely my preferred view of concepts.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares]
     Full Idea: In the 'classical theory' a concept includes in it those concepts that define it. ...In the 'theory theory' view the content of a concept is determined by its relationship to other concepts.
     From: Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 03.10)
     A reaction: Neither of these seem to give an intrinsic account of a concept, or any account of how the whole business gets off the ground.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares]
     Full Idea: Possible worlds semantics is appealing because it gives a compositional analysis of the truth conditions of statements about necessity and possibility.
     From: Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 02.2)
     A reaction: Not sure I get this. Is the meaning composed by the gradual addition of worlds? If not, how is meaning composed in the normal way, from component words and phrases?
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
     Full Idea: An unstructured proposition is a set of possible worlds. ....Structured propositions contain entities that correspond to various parts of the sentences or thoughts that express them.
     From: Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 02.3)
     A reaction: I am definitely in favour of structured propositions. It strikes me as so obvious as to be not worth discussion - so I am obviously missing something here. Mares says structured propositions are 'more convenient'.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares]
     Full Idea: One theory is that space is made up of dimensionless points, but physical processes cannot take place in regions of less than a certain size.
     From: Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 06.7)
     A reaction: Thinkers in sympathy with verificationism presumably won't like this, and may prefer Feynman's view.