Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mathematics and Indispensibility', 'fragments/reports' and 'Making Mind Matter More'

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6 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
All scientific tests will verify mathematics, so it is a background, not something being tested [Sober]
     Full Idea: If mathematical statements are part of every competing hypothesis, then no matter which hypothesis comes out best in the light of observations, they will be part of the best hypothesis. They are not tested, but are a background assumption.
     From: Elliott Sober (Mathematics and Indispensibility [1993], 45), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics
     A reaction: This is a very nice objection to the Quine-Putnam thesis that mathematics is confirmed by the ongoing successes of science.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor]
     Full Idea: The avoidance of epiphenomenalism requires making it plausible that intentional properties can meet sufficient conditions for causal responsibility.
     From: Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.154)
     A reaction: A wordy way of saying we either have epiphenomenalism, or the mind had better do something - and a good theory will show how. The biggest problem of the mind may not be Chalmer's Hard Question (qualia), but how thought-contents cause things.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor]
     Full Idea: I argue that (contrary to the doctrine called "anomalous monism") there is no good reason to doubt that there are intentional causal laws.
     From: Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.151)
     A reaction: I certainly can't see a good argument, in Davidson or anywhere else, to demonstrate their impossibility. Give the complexity of the brain, they would be like the 'laws' for weather or geology.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor]
     Full Idea: If one of your reasons for doubting that believing-that-P is a physical property is that believing is multiply realizable, then you have the same reason for doubting that being an airfoil (or a mountain) counts as a physical property.
     From: Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.153)
     A reaction: This merely points out that functionalism is not incompatible with physicalism, which must be right.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias]
     Full Idea: More men are good through habit than through character.
     From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B09), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.41
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias]
     Full Idea: When the laws forbade men to commit open crimes of violence, and they began to do them in secret, a wise and clever man invented fear of the gods for mortals, to frighten the wicked, even if they sin in secret.
     From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B25), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.54