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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'lectures' and 'The Sentiment of Rationality'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
It is wisdom to believe what you desire, because belief is needed to achieve it [James]
     Full Idea: Clearly it is often the part of wisdom to believe what one desires; for the belief is one of indispensable preliminary conditions of the realisation of its object.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.43)
     A reaction: Roughly, action is impossible without optimism about possible success. This may count as instinct, rather than 'wisdom'.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
All good philosophers start from a dumb conviction about which truths can be revealed [James]
     Full Idea: Every philosopher whose initiative counts for anything in the evolution of thought has taken his stand on a sort of dumb conviction that the truth must lie in one direction rather than another, and a preliminary assurance that this can be made to work.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.40)
     A reaction: I would refer to this as 'intuition', which I think of as reasons (probably good reasons) which cannot yet be articulated. Hence I like this idea very much, except for the word 'dumb'. It is more like a rational vision, yet to be filled in.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
A complete system is just a classification of the whole world's ingredients [James]
     Full Idea: A completed theoretic philosophy can never be anything more than a completed classification of the world's ingredients.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.23)
     A reaction: I assume this is not just the physical ingredients, but must also include our conceptual scheme - but then we must first decide which is the best conceptual scheme to classify, and that's where the real action is. [He scorns such classifation later].
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
A single explanation must have a single point of view [James]
     Full Idea: A single explanation of a fact only explains it from a single point of view.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.23)
     A reaction: I take this to imply that multiple viewpoints lead us towards objectivity. The single viewpoint of an expert is of much greater value than that of a novice, on the whole.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Our greatest pleasure is the economy of reducing chaotic facts to one single fact [James]
     Full Idea: Our pleasure at finding that a chaos of facts is the expression of single underlying fact is like a musician's relief at discovering harmony. …The passion for economy of means in thought is the philosophic passion par excellence.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.21)
     A reaction: We do, though, possess an inner klaxon warning against stupid simplistic reductions. Reducing all the miseries of life to the workings of the Devil is not satisfactory, even it it is economical. Simplicities are dangerously tempting.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: From what in no wise exists, it is impossible for anything to come into being; for Being to perish completely is incapable of fulfilment and unthinkable.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B012), quoted by Anon (Lyc) - On Melissus 975b1-4
     A reaction: The first statement of a conservation law. Modern physics is wonderful, but hasn't offered a flicker of an answer to this puzzle. Quantum fluctuations are a mode of Being.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Empedocles claims that things are alternately changing and at rest - that they are changing whenever love is creating a unity out of plurality, or hatred is creating plurality out of unity, and they are at rest in the times in between.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 250b26
     A reaction: I suppose one must say that this an example of Ruskin's 'pathetic fallacy' - reading human emotions into the cosmos. Being constructive little creatures, we think goodness leads to construction. I'm afraid Empedocles is just wrong.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Classification can only ever be for a particular purpose [James]
     Full Idea: Every way of classifying a thing is but a way of handling it for some particular purpose. Conceptions, 'kinds', are teleological instruments.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.24)
     A reaction: Could there not be ways of classifying which suit all of our purposes? If there were a naturally correct way to classifying things, then any pragmatist would probably welcome that. (I don't say there is such a way).
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Empedocles says there is no coming-to-be of anything, but only a mingling and a divorce of what has been mingled.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314b08
     A reaction: Aristotle comments that this prevents Empedocleans from distinguishing between superficial alteration and fundamental change of identity. Presumably, though, that wouldn't bother them.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: There is no creation of substance in any one of mortal existence, nor any end in execrable death, but only mixing and exchange of what has been mixed.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1111f
     A reaction: also Aristotle 314b08
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Direct realism is false, because defeasibility questions are essential to perceptual knowledge [Galloway]
     Full Idea: Since awareness of defeasibility issues is an essential prerequisite for any genuine perceptual knowledge of even straightforward physical objects, any realist theory of perception must be indirect or representative, rather than direct.
     From: David Galloway (lectures [2007]), quoted by PG - lecture notes
     A reaction: [a very compressed summary] A very interesting claim. The issue might be over what direct realism is actually claiming. If it claims full-blown knowledge, then the criticism seems good. But it might survive if it claimed rather less.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: One vision is produced by both eyes
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B088), quoted by Strabo - works 8.364.3
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
Scientific genius extracts more than other people from the same evidence [James]
     Full Idea: What is the use of being a genius, unless with the same scientific evidence as other men, one can reach more truth than they?
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.40)
     A reaction: This is aimed at Clifford's famous principle. He isn't actually contraverting the principle, but it is a nice point about evidence. Simple empiricists think detectives only have to stare at the evidence and the solution creates itself.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Experimenters assume the theory is true, and stick to it as long as result don't disappoint [James]
     Full Idea: Each tester of the truth of a theory …acts as if it were true, and expects the result to disappoint him if his assumption is false. The longer disappointment is delayed, the stronger grows his faith in his theory.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.42)
     A reaction: This is almost exactly Popper's falsificationist proposal for science, which interestingly shows the close relationship of his view to pragmatism. Believe it as long as it is still working.
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We can't know if the laws of nature are stable, but we must postulate it or assume it [James]
     Full Idea: That nature will follow tomorrow the same laws that she follows today is a truth which no man can know; but in the interests of cognition as well as of action we must postulate or assume it.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.39)
     A reaction: The stability of nature is something to be assessed, not something taken for granted. If you arrive in a new city and it all seems quiet, you keep your fingers crossed and treat it as stable. But revolution or coup could be just round the corner.
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Trying to assess probabilities by mere calculation is absurd and impossible [James]
     Full Idea: The absurd abstraction of an intellect verbally formulating all its evidence and carefully estimating the probability thereof solely by the size of a vulgar fraction, is as ideally inept as it is practically impossible.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.40)
     A reaction: James probably didn't know about Bayes, but this is directed at the Bayesian approach. My view is that full rational assessment of coherence is a much better bet than a Bayesian calculation. Factors must be weighted.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We have a passion for knowing the parts of something, rather than the whole [James]
     Full Idea: Alongside the passion for simplification …is the passion for distinguishing; it is the passion to be acquainted with the parts rather than to comprehend the whole.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.22)
     A reaction: As I child I dismantled almost every toy I was given. This seems to be the motivation for a lot of analytic philosophy, but Aristotle also tended to think that way.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The mind has evolved entirely for practical interests, seen in our reflex actions [James]
     Full Idea: It is far too little recognised how entirely the intellect is built up of practical interests. The theory of evolution is beginning to do very good service by its reduction of all mentality to the type of reflex action.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.34)
     A reaction: Hands evolved for manipulating tools end up playing the piano. Minds evolved for action can be afflicted with boredom. He's not wrong, but he is risking the etymological fallacy (origin = purpose). I take navigation to be the original purpose of mind.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Dogs' curiosity only concerns what will happen next [James]
     Full Idea: A dog's curiosity about the movements of his master or a strange object only extends as far as the point of what is going to happen next.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.31)
     A reaction: Good. A nice corrective to people like myself who are tempted to inflate animal rationality, in order to emphasise human evolutionary continuity with them. It is hard to disagree with his observation. But dogs do make judgements! True/false!
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: Wisdom and power of thought, know thou, are shared in by all things.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) II.286
     A reaction: Sextus quotes this, saying that it is 'still more paradoxical', and that it explicitly includes plants. This may mean that Empedocles was not including inanimate matter.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus]
     Full Idea: Empedocles assumes that thinking is either identical to or very similar to sense-perception.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], A86) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 9
     A reaction: Not to be sniffed at. We can, of course, control our thinking (though we can't control the controller) and we contemplate abstractions, but that might be seen as a sort of perception. Vision is not as visual as we think.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
How can the ground of rationality be itself rational? [James]
     Full Idea: Can that which is the ground of rationality in all else be itself properly called rational?
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.25)
     A reaction: This is the perennial problem in deciding grounds, and in deciding what to treat as primitive. The stoics see the whole of nature as rational. Cf how can the ground of what is physical be itself physical?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
It seems that we feel rational when we detect no irrationality [James]
     Full Idea: I think there are very good grounds for upholding the view that the feeling of rationality is constituted merely by the absence of any feelings of irrationality.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.20)
     A reaction: A very interesting proposal. Nothing is more basic to logic (well, plausible versions of logic) than the principle of non-contradiction - perhaps because it is the foundation of our natural intellectual equipment.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Evolution suggests prevailing or survival as a new criterion of right and wrong [James]
     Full Idea: The philosophy of evolution offers us today a new criterion, which is objective and fixed, as an ethical test between right and wrong: That is to be called good which is destined to prevail or survive.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.44)
     A reaction: Perceptive for its time. Herbert Spencer may have suggested the idea. James dismisses it, because it implies a sort of fatalism, whereas genuine moral choices are involved in what survives.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Empedocles was the first to give evil and good as principles.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 985a
     A reaction: Once you start to think that good and evil will only matter if they have causal powers, it is an easy step to the idea of a benevolent god, and a satanic anti-god. Otherwise the 'principles' could be ignored.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: Nature is but a word of human framing.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1015a
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus]
     Full Idea: In Empedocles we have a dividing principle, 'Strife', set against 'Friendship' - which is the One and is to him bodiless, while the elements represent matter.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.09
     A reaction: The first time I've seen the principle of Love in Empedocles identified with the One of Parmenides. Plotinus is a trustworthy reporter, I think, because he was well read, and had access to lost texts.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood]
     Full Idea: Empedocles used numerical ratios to explain different kinds of matter; for example, bone is two parts water, four parts fire, two parts earth; and blood is an equal blend of all four elements.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Brad Inwood - Empedocles
     A reaction: Why isn't the ration 1:2:1? This presumably shows the influence of Pythagoras (who had also been based in Italy, like Empedocles), as well as that of the earlier naturalistic philosophers. It was a very good theory, though wrong.
Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Empedocles says that Fire, Water, Air and Earth are four elements, and are thus 'simple' rather than flesh, bone and bodies which, like these, are 'homoeomeries'.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a26
     A reaction: The translation is not quite clear. I take it that flesh and bone may look simple, because they are homoeomerous, but they are not really - but what is his evidence for that? Compare Idea 13208.
All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: These elements never cease their continuous exchange, sometimes uniting under the influence of Love, so that all become One, at other times again moving apart through the hostile force of Hate.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1-
The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles]
     Full Idea: Empedocles says it is evident that all the other bodies down to the 'elements' have their coming-to-be and their passing-away: but it is not clear how the 'elements' themselves, severally in their aggregated masses, come-to-be and pass-away.
     From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 325b20
     A reaction: Presumably the elements are like axioms - and are just given. How do electrons and quarks come-to-be?
Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles]
     Full Idea: It is not an adequate explanation to say that 'Love and Strife set things moving', unless the very nature of Love is a movement of this kind and the very nature of Strife a movement of that kind.
     From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 333b23
     A reaction: I take this to be of interest for showing Aristotle's quest for explanations, and his unwillingness to be fobbed off with anything superficial. I take a task of philosophy to be to push explanations further than others wish to go.
If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: Besides these elements, nothing else comes into being, nor does anything cease. For if they had been perishing continuously, they would Be no more; and what could increase the Whole? And whence could it have come?
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1-
Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Empedocles holds that the corporeal elements are four, but that all the elements, including those which create motion, are six in number.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a16
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James]
     Full Idea: The knowledge of things by their causes, which is often given as a definition of rational knowledge, is useless unless the causes converge to a minimum number, while still producing the maximum number of effects.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.21)
     A reaction: This is certainly the psychological motivation for trying to identify 'the' cause of something, but James always tries to sell such things as subjective. 'Useless' to one person is a subjective criterion; useless to anyone is much more objective.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Is it just an accident that teeth and other parts of the body seem to have some purpose, and creatures survive because they happen to be put together in a useful way? Everything else has been destroyed, as Empedocles says of his 'cow with human head'.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], 61) by Aristotle - Physics 198b29
     A reaction: Good grief! Has no one ever noticed that Empedocles proposed the theory of evolution? It isn't quite natural selection, because we aren't told what does the 'destroying', but it is a little flash of genius that was quietly forgotten.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: God is equal in all directions to himself and altogether eternal, a rounded Sphere enjoying a circular solitude.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B028), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.15.2
God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: God is mind, holy and ineffable, and only mind, which darts through the whole cosmos with its swift thought.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B134), quoted by Ammonius - On 'De Interpretatione' 4.5.249.6
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles]
     Full Idea: It is a consequence of Empedocles' view that God is the most unintelligent thing, for he alone is ignorant of one of the elements, namely strife, whereas mortal creatures are familiar with them all.
     From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - De Anima 410b08
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: Wretched is he who cares not for clear thinking about the gods.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B132), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.140.5.1
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Early Christianity says God recognises the neglected weak and tender impulses [James]
     Full Idea: In what did the emancipating message of primitive Christianity consist but in the announcement that God recognizes those weak and tender impulses which paganism had so rudely overlooked.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.36)
     A reaction: Nietzsche says these are the virtues of a good slave. Previous virtues were dominated by military needs, but the new virtues are those of large cities, where communal living with strangers is the challenge.