3 ideas
| 9182 | Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: In the case of 'Obadiah', associated only with one act of writing a prophecy, ..it is the tradition which connects our use of the name with the man; where the actual name itself first came from has little to do with it. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference [1975], p.256) | |
| A reaction: Excellent. This seems to me a much more accurate account of reference than the notion of a baptism. In the case of 'Homer', whether someone was ever baptised thus is of no importance to us. The tradition is everything. Also Shakespeare. |
| 15432 | Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest, by Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Forrest proposed that structural universals should serve as ersatz possible worlds. | |
| From: report of Peter Forrest (Ways Worlds Could Be [1986]) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'Intro' | |
| A reaction: I prefer powers to property universals. Perhaps a possible world is a maximal set of co-existing dispositions? |
| 9181 | The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: The causal theory of reference, in a full-blown form, makes it impossible to distinguish between knowing the use of a proper name and simply having heard the name and recognising it as a name. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference [1975], p.254) | |
| A reaction: None of these things are all-or-nothing. I have an inkling of how to use it once I realise it is a name. Of course you could be causally connected to a name and not even realise that it was a name, so something more is needed. |