80 ideas
| 24261 | Devotion to learning and applied intelligence leads to divine wisdom - if truth is available [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Anyone who has devoted himself to learning and has genuinely applied his intelligence cannot fail to attain immortal, divine wisdom, if the truth should come within his grasp. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 90b) | |
| A reaction: Quite a significant proviso about truth coming within his grasp. A very scholarly view of wisdom. Anyone in academic life is certain to know people who are immensely learned but not very wise. That said, I sort of agree with this. |
| 326 | For relaxation one can consider the world of change, instead of eternal things [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If, for relaxation, one gives up discussing eternal things, it is pleasant to consider likely accounts of the world of change. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 59c) | |
| A reaction: To understand this, examine Plato's example of the Line at 'Republic' 509d. |
| 315 | Philosophy is the supreme gift of the gods to mortals [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is the greatest gift the gods have ever given or ever will give to mortals. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 47b) | |
| A reaction: I wonder why they gave it to us? |
| 11193 | Understanding begins with the notion of being and essence [Avicenna] |
| Full Idea: Understanding begins with the notion of being and essence. | |
| From: Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022], 1/6), quoted by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) p.91 | |
| A reaction: I think I might put it that wisdom is only really possible for people who aim to grasp being and essence in some way. I see no prospect of understanding 'being', and even essences may be forever just beyond our grasp. |
| 306 | Nothing can come to be without a cause [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Nothing can come to be without a cause. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 28a) |
| 24250 | We should not pick out 'this' water, but only 'something of this sort' [Plato] |
| Full Idea: We should never say 'this' water, but 'something of this sort', and the same goes for everything else that we indicate by means of expressions such as 'that' and 'this'. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 49d) | |
| A reaction: [translation disputed] The point seems to be that 'this' does not say what is being picked out, even with pointing, so the type must be specified. This connects to Geach's claim that identity can only be asserted under some embracing concept. |
| 24246 | The sun was made for light, so we could learn numbers from astronomical movement [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The god created the sun to illuminate as much of the universe as it could, and to enable all suitably endowed creatures to become numerate by studying the revolution of identity and sameness. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 39b) | |
| A reaction: Note that the sun has a specific purpose. All numbers are Forms, and are therefore eternal, the learning of numbers is empirical. It is regular movement (rather than quantities) which reveals number. |
| 324 | Before the existence of the world there must have been being, space and becoming [Plato] |
| Full Idea: There were, before the world came into existence, being, space, and becoming, three distinct realities. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 52d) | |
| A reaction: 'Becoming' is the central idea of Heraclitus, and must be what Aristotle calls 'potentiality' [dunamis]. If it was 'before' creation, he should add time to the list. Are these three 'distinct'? Being has potential. |
| 20364 | The apprehensions of reason remain unchanging, but reasonless sensation shows mere becoming [Plato] |
| Full Idea: That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state, but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason is always in a process of becoming and perishing, and never really is. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 28a) | |
| A reaction: Lots of problems with this, of which I take the main one to be the idea that sensation is 'without reason', as if there were a sharp dichotomy in our ways of evaluating reality. Laws of nature seem to be laws of change, not of stasis. |
| 458 | Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: From what in no wise exists, it is impossible for anything to come into being; for Being to perish completely is incapable of fulfilment and unthinkable. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B012), quoted by Anon (Lyc) - On Melissus 975b1-4 | |
| A reaction: The first statement of a conservation law. Modern physics is wonderful, but hasn't offered a flicker of an answer to this puzzle. Quantum fluctuations are a mode of Being. |
| 5112 | Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles claims that things are alternately changing and at rest - that they are changing whenever love is creating a unity out of plurality, or hatred is creating plurality out of unity, and they are at rest in the times in between. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 250b26 | |
| A reaction: I suppose one must say that this an example of Ruskin's 'pathetic fallacy' - reading human emotions into the cosmos. Being constructive little creatures, we think goodness leads to construction. I'm afraid Empedocles is just wrong. |
| 307 | Something will always be well-made if the maker keeps in mind the eternal underlying pattern [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Whenever the maker of anything keeps his eye on the eternally unchanging and uses it as his pattern for the form and function of his product the result must be good. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 28b) |
| 318 | In addition to the underlying unchanging model and a changing copy of it, there must also be a foundation of all change [Plato] |
| Full Idea: In addition to an eternal unchanging model and a visible and changing copy of reality, there must be a third part, the receptacle and nurse of all becoming and change. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 49b) | |
| A reaction: cf Aristotle's criticism in Metaphysics |
| 12042 | Plato's Forms were seen as part of physics, rather than of metaphysics [Plato, by Annas] |
| Full Idea: In the ancient world Plato's Theory of Forms was mostly seen as one aspect of Plato's 'physics' or theory of the world (rather than as 'metaphysics'). | |
| From: report of Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE]) by Julia Annas - Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: This is how I also see the theory, but then I am inclined to see religion as a rather startling branch of speculative physics. Annas cites 'Timaeus' as the key text for this. |
| 321 | For knowledge and true opinion to be different there must be Forms; otherwise we are just stuck with sensations [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If intelligence and true opinion are different, then the forms must exist, but if they are the same, then what our senses perceive must be the most certain reality. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 51d) |
| 317 | The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Our basic description of the universe contained an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 48e) |
| 11209 | The simple's whatness is its very self [Avicenna] |
| Full Idea: The simple's whatness is its very self. | |
| From: Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022], 5.5), quoted by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) p.103 | |
| A reaction: Aquinas endorses this Aristotelian view in Idea 11208. |
| 13209 | There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles says there is no coming-to-be of anything, but only a mingling and a divorce of what has been mingled. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314b08 | |
| A reaction: Aristotle comments that this prevents Empedocleans from distinguishing between superficial alteration and fundamental change of identity. Presumably, though, that wouldn't bother them. |
| 11204 | The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness [Avicenna] |
| Full Idea: The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness. | |
| From: Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022], 11/12.14), quoted by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) | |
| A reaction: This remark is not invalidated by developments in modern particle physics. |
| 15036 | An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio] |
| Full Idea: Avicenna's 'indifference of essence' says the essence of certain things can become universal or singular, according to whether it is entertained by the mind (as a universal) or concretely exemplified as a singular thing. One essence can exist in two ways. | |
| From: report of Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'Sources' | |
| A reaction: This would appear to be a form of nominalism, since in the concrete external world we only have particulars, and it is our mode of thinking (by abstraction?) that generates the universal aspect. I think this is probably right. |
| 457 | Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: There is no creation of substance in any one of mortal existence, nor any end in execrable death, but only mixing and exchange of what has been mixed. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1111f | |
| A reaction: also Aristotle 314b08 |
| 24254 | Two existing entities can never strictly coincide [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Anything that genuinely exists is supported by the true and rigorous argument that neither of two distinct entities can ever occur in the other, because that would simultaneously make them one and two. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 52c) | |
| A reaction: A pair of boots is one and two, but maybe our seeing them or naming them that way cannot be precisely simultaneous. If a salt molecule is two things, does it therefore not exist? On the whole I agree with Plato! |
| 24236 | Some statements about what is obvious and stable are as irrefutable as possible [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Statements about that which is stable, secure and manifest to the intellect are themselves stable and reliable (and it's important for statements about such things to be just as irrefutable and unassailable as statements can possibly be). | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 29b) | |
| A reaction: This is a nice thoughtful account of what we mean by a necessary truth, without attributing to it an absolute character. |
| 24252 | Knowledge is taught, has logos, is unshakeable, and is rare [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Unlike true belief, knowledge is the result of instruction, …it is always accompanied by a true account [logos], …it is unmoved by persuasion, …and it is the property of scarcely any human beings. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 51e) | |
| A reaction: Nowadays we are most likely to challenge the unshakeable condition, since science depends on critical challenges. Indeed Greek dialectic seem to require continual openness to the possibility of error. I like the account/logos. Those who know can teach. |
| 24251 | If knowledge is just true belief, we are forced to rely on the senses [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If true belief is no different from knowledge, then we must count all the things we perceive with our bodily senses as the most reliable thing in existence. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 51d) | |
| A reaction: Timaeus goes on to explain how knowledge differs from true belief, roughly in the way outlined in 'Theaetetus'. |
| 334 | Only bird-brained people think astronomy is entirely a matter of evidence [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Birds are empty-headed men who grew feathers instead of hair, because they were interested in astronomy but thought it was entirely a matter of physical evidence. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 91d) |
| 462 | One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: One vision is produced by both eyes | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B088), quoted by Strabo - works 8.364.3 |
| 5962 | Plato says the soul is ordered by number [Plato, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Plato regards the substance of soul not as number but as being ordered by number. | |
| From: report of Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE]) by Plutarch - 68: Generation of the soul in 'Timaeus' 1023 | |
| A reaction: This remark points towards Plato's esoteric doctrines, which are some sort of mathematical metaphysics. The idea that order and numbers are in some way connected is one of the most powerful in western civilization, with undeniable appeal. |
| 24244 | The soul is a complex mixture of pure mind and changing matter [Plato] |
| Full Idea: To create the soul the god combined two kinds of substance - one indivisible and never changing, the other the divided and created substance of the physical world - with intermediates between them, and then a homogeneous mixture. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 35a) | |
| A reaction: Interestingly, this does not imply simple mind-matter dualism, but includes bridging intermediates, ending in what seems to be a continuum between physical and mental. Not to be taken too seriously, though. Plato admits it is all speculation. |
| 24258 | The gods placed the mortal soul in the chest [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The gods bound the mortal soul within the chest - the thorax, as it is called. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 69e) | |
| A reaction: Timaeus recognises the importance of the head, and the fact that the main senses pass into the brain, but they had no indication of where thought and reason occur. |
| 330 | No one wants to be bad, but bad men result from physical and educational failures, which they do not want or choose [Plato] |
| Full Idea: No one wishes to be bad, but a bad man is bad because of some flaw in his physical makeup and failure in his education, neither of which he likes or chooses. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 86e) |
| 22765 | Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: Wisdom and power of thought, know thou, are shared in by all things. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) II.286 | |
| A reaction: Sextus quotes this, saying that it is 'still more paradoxical', and that it explicitly includes plants. This may mean that Empedocles was not including inanimate matter. |
| 1524 | For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles assumes that thinking is either identical to or very similar to sense-perception. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], A86) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 9 | |
| A reaction: Not to be sniffed at. We can, of course, control our thinking (though we can't control the controller) and we contemplate abstractions, but that might be seen as a sort of perception. Vision is not as visual as we think. |
| 24240 | Intelligence requires soul [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Nothing can have intelligence unless it has soul. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 30b) | |
| A reaction: Not the last word on the subject, but perhaps the first. If we allow a powerful chess playing computer to have intelligence, how can we not also attribute intelligence to a thermostat? Does it matter? |
| 24241 | Beauty must always be perfect [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Nothing touched by imperfection can ever be beautiful. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 30c) | |
| A reaction: Beautiful may also be 'noble'. In human experience this seems obviously false, though it may be true in Plato's world of ideals. |
| 316 | Music has harmony like the soul, and serves to reorder disharmony within us [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Music has harmonic motions like the orbits of the soul, and is not for irrational pleasure, but to reduce to order any disharmony in the revolutions within us. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 47d) |
| 24260 | The best part of the soul raises us up to the heavens, to which we are naturally akin [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The most important type of soul …raises us up from the earth towards the heavenly region to which we are naturally akin, since we are not soil-bound plants but, properly speaking, creatures rooted in heaven. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 90a) | |
| A reaction: An early example of human exceptionalism, which is still with us. Personally I think life goes much better if we acknowledge that we have more affinity with plants than with angels. |
| 24259 | Death in old age is a natural end, untroubled, and more pleasure than distress [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Therre's no death less troublesome than the one which accompanies old age on its journey to it natural end. Such a death comes with more pleasure than distress. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 81e) | |
| A reaction: You have to be more in tune with nature than we are to believe this. We only really think this way about extreme old age. Before that we are usually hoping for more. Quite a lot of people seem to welcome death in old age. |
| 552 | Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles was the first to give evil and good as principles. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 985a | |
| A reaction: Once you start to think that good and evil will only matter if they have causal powers, it is an easy step to the idea of a benevolent god, and a satanic anti-god. Otherwise the 'principles' could be ignored. |
| 24239 | Perfect goodness always produces perfect beauty [Plato] |
| Full Idea: What is perfectly good can accomplish only what is perfectly beautiful; this was and is a universal law. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 30a) | |
| A reaction: Beautiful must be 'kalon', which is better understood here as fine and noble, rather than looking pretty. This is a quintessential Plato opinion. At the highest level, the supreme Forms endorse one another. He is discussing cosmic creation. |
| 332 | One should exercise both the mind and the body, to avoid imbalance [Plato] |
| Full Idea: One should preserve a balance and avoid exercising the mind or body without the other; mathematicians should exercise physically, and athletes mentally. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 88c) | |
| A reaction: Excellent, and very modern. Use it or lose it. It suggests that Plato had a fairly holistic view of a human being, and saw mind and body as closely integrated. |
| 24257 | Unnatural modifications are painful, and restoring normality is pleasant [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Any modification that is unnatural (that is, forced) and sudden is painful, while any modification that restores the normal condition and is sudden is pleasant. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 64d) | |
| A reaction: [see also 65a] Possibly circular, if the painful is defined as unnatural, but the unnatural is defined as painful. Nowadays we find it very hard to specify what counts as 'unnatural', but our ancestors used that label all the time. Not convincing. |
| 328 | Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 81e) | |
| A reaction: Not many people would agree with this. I recently watched a sparrowhawk eat a pigeon in my garden. This is the source of the stoic formula of living according to nature. |
| 24234 | I have discussed the best constitution, and the kind of citizens it requires [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Yesterday I explained my views on what the best kind of constitution might be and what kind of citizens should make up such a state. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 17c) | |
| A reaction: This seems to refer back to 'Republic'. I include this because it says political thought should cover what good citizens ought to be like, as well as how they are organised. This is the key link between ethics and politics. |
| 24235 | Female Guardians will have identical duties to the men [Plato] |
| Full Idea: We said that the characters of the female Guardians were to be made to match the men's more or less exactly, and that in every aspect of life, including warfare, all the women were to be assigned all the same tasks as the men | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 18c) | |
| A reaction: Refers to 'Republic'. This is despite the fact that Timaeus firmly says (at 42a) that men are superior to women. Either there is an overlap in ability, or the highest ability is not essential for be a guardian. Or (best) Plato disagrees with Timaeus. |
| 24248 | The god said human nature comes as the superior male, and inferior female [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The god explained that human nature comes in two forms, and the superior kind was that which would come to be called 'male'. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 42a) | |
| A reaction: Since this contradicts what Plato says about women as Guardians, I surmise that this is the view of Timaeus, rather than of Plato. This view is presumably the more common one in its time. |
| 322 | Intelligence is the result of rational teaching; true opinion can result from irrational persuasion [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Intelligence is produced by teaching, involves truth and reason, and cannot be moved; true opinion involves persuasion, is irrational and can be moved. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 51e) |
| 331 | Bad governments prevent discussion, and discourage the study of virtue [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Under a bad government discussion, both public and private, is bad, and no courses of study are available to cure faults of character. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 87b) |
| 589 | 'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: Nature is but a word of human framing. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1015a |
| 310 | The creator of the cosmos had no envy, and so wanted things to be as like himself as possible [Plato] |
| Full Idea: This changing cosmos was made because its maker is good, and therefore lacks envy; he therefore wished all things to be as like himself as possible. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 29e) |
| 311 | The cosmos must be unique, because it resembles the creator, who is unique [Plato] |
| Full Idea: So that our universe can resemble the perfect living creature in being unique, the universe was, is and will continue to be its maker's only creation. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 31c) |
| 24249 | The elements seem able to transmute into each other [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It looks as if there is a cyclical process whereby the elements generate one another. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 49c) | |
| A reaction: He gives examples of elements turning into one another, such as air turning into rain. But originally it sounds as if they were immutable, since creation was from the distinct four elements, and not from a mixture of them. This is Timaeus speculating. |
| 21823 | The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: In Empedocles we have a dividing principle, 'Strife', set against 'Friendship' - which is the One and is to him bodiless, while the elements represent matter. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.09 | |
| A reaction: The first time I've seen the principle of Love in Empedocles identified with the One of Parmenides. Plotinus is a trustworthy reporter, I think, because he was well read, and had access to lost texts. |
| 6002 | Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles used numerical ratios to explain different kinds of matter; for example, bone is two parts water, four parts fire, two parts earth; and blood is an equal blend of all four elements. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Brad Inwood - Empedocles | |
| A reaction: Why isn't the ration 1:2:1? This presumably shows the influence of Pythagoras (who had also been based in Italy, like Empedocles), as well as that of the earlier naturalistic philosophers. It was a very good theory, though wrong. |
| 13207 | Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles says that Fire, Water, Air and Earth are four elements, and are thus 'simple' rather than flesh, bone and bodies which, like these, are 'homoeomeries'. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a26 | |
| A reaction: The translation is not quite clear. I take it that flesh and bone may look simple, because they are homoeomerous, but they are not really - but what is his evidence for that? Compare Idea 13208. |
| 13218 | The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles says it is evident that all the other bodies down to the 'elements' have their coming-to-be and their passing-away: but it is not clear how the 'elements' themselves, severally in their aggregated masses, come-to-be and pass-away. | |
| From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 325b20 | |
| A reaction: Presumably the elements are like axioms - and are just given. How do electrons and quarks come-to-be? |
| 13225 | Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: It is not an adequate explanation to say that 'Love and Strife set things moving', unless the very nature of Love is a movement of this kind and the very nature of Strife a movement of that kind. | |
| From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 333b23 | |
| A reaction: I take this to be of interest for showing Aristotle's quest for explanations, and his unwillingness to be fobbed off with anything superficial. I take a task of philosophy to be to push explanations further than others wish to go. |
| 460 | If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: Besides these elements, nothing else comes into being, nor does anything cease. For if they had been perishing continuously, they would Be no more; and what could increase the Whole? And whence could it have come? | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1- |
| 24243 | The world-maker used the four elements and their properties in entirety [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The formation of the world occupied each of the four in its entirety; the maker made it out of the totality of fire, water, air and earth, leaving unused no part or property of any of them. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 32c) | |
| A reaction: So all of the four elements entirely pre-existed (presumably for eternity), before the ordering of the cosmos. There seems to be no reference to a first creation of this chaotic collection. Interesting that all properties are used. That is a constraint. |
| 2680 | Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles holds that the corporeal elements are four, but that all the elements, including those which create motion, are six in number. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a16 |
| 459 | All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: These elements never cease their continuous exchange, sometimes uniting under the influence of Love, so that all become One, at other times again moving apart through the hostile force of Hate. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1- |
| 325 | We must consider the four basic shapes as too small to see, only becoming visible in large numbers [Plato] |
| Full Idea: We must think of the individual units of all four basic shapes as being far too small to be visible, and only becoming visible when massed together in large numbers. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 56c) |
| 327 | There are two types of cause, the necessary and the divine [Plato] |
| Full Idea: We must distinguish two types of cause, the necessary and the divine. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 68e) |
| 24255 | Motion needs differing moved and mover, so it originates in diversity [Plato] |
| Full Idea: In the absence of a mover and a moved there's no such thing as motion, and mover and moved cannot possibly be uniform with each other. It follows that we should always associate rest with uniformity and attribute motion to diversity. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 57e) | |
| A reaction: Newtonian inertia allows movement without a mover. Perhaps Plato means acceleration rather than movement. Newton ignores the question of what got the inertial movement started. The full picture needs powers! |
| 24256 | The spherical universe composed of four elements squeezes out every bit of void [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Once the vault of the universe has gathered the four bodies [elements] together inside itself, it compresses everything and and squeezes out every last bit of void, because, being spherical, it is in its nature to want to close itself. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 58a) | |
| A reaction: Notice the explanation by 'its nature'. This thought is in opposition to the atomists, who needed a perfect void to explain the movement of the atoms. Maybe the fields of modern physics squeeze out any void? |
| 24253 | Space is eternal and indestructible, but is only known by barely credible reasoning [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Space exists for ever and is indestructible, and acts as the arena for everything that is subject to creation. It is grasped by a kind of bastard reasoning, without the support of sensation, and is hardly credible. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 52b) | |
| A reaction: I'm struck by the thought that space and time are features of nature which are indestructible. Space seems to resemble what Timaeus calls the 'receptacle' for creation. When we move don't we have a spatial sensation? |
| 24245 | The god created eternity in the sequence of the universe, and its image we call 'time' [Plato] |
| Full Idea: In the very act of ordering the universe the god created a likeness of eternity, a likeness that progresses eternally through the sequence of numbers, while eternity abides in oneness. This image of eternity is what we have come to call 'time'. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 37d) | |
| A reaction: As in Aristotle, the Greek view is usually that movement creates time. But it is hard to conceive movement without a prior conception of time. |
| 314 | Heavenly movements gave us the idea of time, and caused us to inquire about the heavens [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Days, months, years and solstices have caused the invention of number, given us the notion of time, and caused us to inquire into the nature of the universe. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 47a) |
| 312 | Time came into existence with the heavens, so that there will be a time when they can be dissolved [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Time came into being with the heavens, so that they should be dissolved together if ever they are dissolved. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 38c) |
| 309 | Clearly the world is good, so its maker must have been concerned with the eternal, not with change [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If the world is beautiful and its maker good, he had an eye on the eternal; if not, on that which is subject to change; clearly the world is the fairest of things, and he the best of causes, so it is eternal. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 29a) |
| 308 | If the cosmos is an object of perception then it must be continually changing [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The cosmos is visible, tangible and corporeal, and therefore perceptible by the senses; therefore it is an object of opinion and sensation, and therefore change and coming into being. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 28d) |
| 24238 | The god found chaos, and led it to superior order [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The god found everything visible in a state of turmoil, moving in a discordant and chaotic manner, so he led it from chaos to order, which he regarded as in all ways better. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 30a) | |
| A reaction: This god is usually referred to as the 'demiurge', who creates the ordered nature which is itself a god. I find this view more appealing than the creation of the cosmos ex nihilo, our of nothing. |
| 24242 | Is there a plurality (or even an infinity) of universes? No, because the model makes it unique [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Is there a single universe, or would it be more correct to speak of a plurality, even an infinite plurality, of universes? No, there can be only one, if it is to be created by the craftsman-god so as to correspond to its model. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 30d) | |
| A reaction: Democritus believed there was an infinite plurality of universes. Does this entail that there could only be one horse, and one thing of beauty, and one truth - to correspond to their Forms? Presumably not! |
| 5090 | Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Is it just an accident that teeth and other parts of the body seem to have some purpose, and creatures survive because they happen to be put together in a useful way? Everything else has been destroyed, as Empedocles says of his 'cow with human head'. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], 61) by Aristotle - Physics 198b29 | |
| A reaction: Good grief! Has no one ever noticed that Empedocles proposed the theory of evolution? It isn't quite natural selection, because we aren't told what does the 'destroying', but it is a little flash of genius that was quietly forgotten. |
| 466 | God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: God is mind, holy and ineffable, and only mind, which darts through the whole cosmos with its swift thought. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B134), quoted by Ammonius - On 'De Interpretatione' 4.5.249.6 |
| 461 | God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: God is equal in all directions to himself and altogether eternal, a rounded Sphere enjoying a circular solitude. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B028), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.15.2 |
| 1719 | In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: It is a consequence of Empedocles' view that God is the most unintelligent thing, for he alone is ignorant of one of the elements, namely strife, whereas mortal creatures are familiar with them all. | |
| From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - De Anima 410b08 |
| 1522 | It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: Wretched is he who cares not for clear thinking about the gods. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B132), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.140.5.1 |
| 24247 | The universe has four types of living being: gods, birds, fish, and land animals [Plato] |
| Full Idea: There are four kinds of living being in the universe: the heavenly gods, winged creatures that travel through the air, those that live in water, and finally those that go on foot on dry land. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 39e) | |
| A reaction: So while the original gods are a different order of existence, the famous Olympian gods are living beings, distinguished only by their power and their immortality. |
| 24237 | The divine organiser of the world wanted it to have as little imperfection as possible [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The god wanted everything to be good, marred by as little imperfection as possible. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 30a) | |
| A reaction: The god is the demiurge which brings order to the original chaos of the cosmos. This is the trade-off view of what is bad in the world, equivalent to Leibniz's best of all possible worlds. |