6 ideas
| 5504 | Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi] |
| Full Idea: Some recent philosophers have argued that we should replace the three-dimensional view of persons with a four-dimensional view according to which only time-slices, or 'stages', of persons exist at short intervals of time. | |
| From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3) | |
| A reaction: At first glance this seems to neatly eliminate lots of traditional worries. But why would I want to retain my identity, if someone threatened to brainwash me. I also want to disown my inadequate earlier selves. Interesting, though. Lewis. |
| 5503 | Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi] |
| Full Idea: A modern question is whether personal identity is primarily what matters in survival; that is, people might cease and be continued by others whose continuation the original people would value as much. | |
| From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3) | |
| A reaction: When put like this, the proposal seems hard to grasp. It only makes sense if you don't really believe in a thing called 'personal identity'. I don't see how you can believe in it without also believing that for you it has central importance. |
| 5502 | Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi] |
| Full Idea: In modern times the Lockean intrinsic relations view of personal identity has been superseded by an extrinsic relations view (also called the 'closest-continuer' or 'externalist' view). | |
| From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.1) | |
| A reaction: Sounds sweeping. My suspicion is that there is a raging fashion for externalist views of everything (justification, content etc.), but this will pass. I take Parfit to be the source of the modern views. |
| 22439 | There are only duties if there are rights, so truth is only for those with a right to it [Constant] |
| Full Idea: A duty is that on the part of one being which corresponds to the rights of another. Where there are no rights there are no duties. To tell the truth is therefore a duty, but only to the one who has the right to the truth. | |
| From: Benjamin Constant (On Political Reactions [1797], p.123), quoted by Immanuel Kant - On a supposed right to lie p.28 | |
| A reaction: We can't claim a right to have all questions answered truthfully (because there is a right to privacy), but we might claim a right not to be lied to (as long as we accept a refusal to answer). Kant rejected this idea. |
| 22440 | Unconditional truth-telling makes a society impossible [Constant] |
| Full Idea: The moral principle 'it is a duty to tell the truth' would, if taken unconditionally and singly, make any society impossible. | |
| From: Benjamin Constant (On Political Reactions [1797], p.124), quoted by Immanuel Kant - On a supposed right to lie p.28 | |
| A reaction: He gives the well known example of the murderer at the door asking if your friend is inside. Compare everyone becoming perfectly telepathic. Our society would collapse, but a new society would learn to live with it. |
| 5505 | For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi] |
| Full Idea: In Aristotle's view, with the possible exception of 'nous' the psyche and all its parts come into being at the same time as its associated body; it is inseparable from the body, and perishes along with it. | |
| From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.8) | |
| A reaction: It is suggested that he thought there was only one 'nous', which all humans share (p.9). If he wants to claim that one part is immortal, he doesn't have much evidence. If psyche is the form of the body, it is bound to perish. |