3 ideas
| 12735 | Everything has a fixed power, as required by God, and by the possibility of reasoning [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: It follows from the nature of God that there is a fixed power of a definite magnitude [non vagam] in anything whatsoever, otherwise there would be no reasonings about those things. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (De aequopollentia causae et effectus [1679], A6.4.1964), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6 | |
| A reaction: This is double-edged. On the one hand there is the grand claim that the principle derives from divine nature, but on the other it derives from our capacity to reason and explain. No one doubts that powers are 'fixed'. |
| 16620 | A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes] |
| Full Idea: Nothing can be compounded of matter and form. The matter of a chair is wood; the form is the figure it has, apt for the intended use. Does his Lordship think the chair compounded of the wood and the figure? | |
| From: Thomas Hobbes (Letter to Bramhall [1650], 4:302), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.1 | |
| A reaction: Aristotle does use the word 'shape' [morphe] when he is discussing hylomorphism, and the statue example seems to support it, but elsewhere the form is a much deeper principle of individuation. |
| 16622 | Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes] |
| Full Idea: Essence and all other abstract names are words artificial belonging to the art of logic, and signify only the manner how we consider the substance itself. | |
| From: Thomas Hobbes (Letter to Bramhall [1650], 4:308), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 | |
| A reaction: I sympathise quite a lot with this view, but not with its dismissive tone. The key question I take to be: if you reject essences entirely (having read too much physics), how are we going to think about entities in the world in future? |