80 ideas
9955 | Contextual definitions replace a complete sentence containing the expression [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: A contextual definition shows how to analyse an expression in situ, by replacing a complete sentence (of a particular form) in which the expression occurs by another in which it does not. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This is a controversial procedure, which (according to Dummett) Frege originally accepted, and later rejected. It might not be the perfect definition that replacing just the expression would give you, but it is a promising step. |
10031 | Impredicative definitions quantify over the thing being defined [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: When a definition contains a quantifier whose range includes the very entity being defined, the definition is said to be 'impredicative'. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably they are 'impredicative' because they do not predicate a new quality in the definiens, but make use of the qualities already known. |
19215 | Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks] |
Full Idea: There is a seasoned method of turning your opponent's modus ponens into your own modus tollens. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 5.VII) | |
A reaction: That is, they say 'if he's coming he'll be hear by now, and he's definitely coming', to which you say 'I'm afraid he's not here, so he obviously isn't coming after all'. They say if-A-then-B, and A, so B. You say not-B, so you're wrong about A. |
19205 | 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks] |
Full Idea: It is contingently true that 'snow is white' expresses the proposition that snow is white. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 1.V n14) | |
A reaction: Tarski stuck to sentences, but Merricks rightly argues that truth concerns propositions, not sentences. Sentences are subservient entities - mere tools used to express what matters, which is our thoughts (say I). |
19209 | Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Logical consequence guarantees preservation of truth. The Converse Barcan, a theorem of Simple Quantified Modal Logic, says that an obvious truth implies an obvious falsehood. So SQML gets logical consequence wrong. So SQML is mistaken. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 2.V) | |
A reaction: I admire this. The Converse Barcan certainly strikes me as wrong (Idea 19208). Merricks grasps this nettle. Williamson grasps the other nettle. Most people duck the issue, I suspect. Merricks says later that domains are the problem. |
19208 | The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The Converse Barcan Formula has a startling result. Simple Quantified Modal Logic (SQML) has the following as a theorem: □∀xFx → ∀x□Fx. So 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists'. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 2.V) | |
A reaction: He says this is blatantly wrong. Williamson is famous for defending it. I think I'm with Merricks on this one. |
10098 | The 'power set' of A is all the subsets of A [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The 'power set' of A is all the subsets of A. P(A) = {B : B ⊆ A}. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) |
10099 | The 'ordered pair' <a, b>, for two sets a and b, is the set {{a, b},{a}} [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The 'ordered pair' <a, b>, for two sets a and b, is the set {{a, b},{a}}. The existence of this set is guaranteed by three applications of the Axiom of Pairing. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: See Idea 10100 for the Axiom of Pairing. |
10101 | Cartesian Product A x B: the set of all ordered pairs in which a∈A and b∈B [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The 'Cartesian Product' of any two sets A and B is the set of all ordered pairs <a, b> in which a ∈ A and b ∈ B, and it is denoted as A x B. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) |
10103 | Grouping by property is common in mathematics, usually using equivalence [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The idea of grouping together objects that share some property is a common one in mathematics, ...and the technique most often involves the use of equivalence relations. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) |
10104 | 'Equivalence' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation; 'same first letter' partitions English words [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: A relation is an equivalence relation if it is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. The 'same first letter' is an equivalence relation on the set of English words. Any relation that puts a partition into clusters will be equivalence - and vice versa. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This is a key concept in the Fregean strategy for defining numbers. |
10096 | Even the elements of sets in ZFC are sets, resting on the pure empty set [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: ZFC is a theory concerned only with sets. Even the elements of all of the sets studied in ZFC are also sets (whose elements are also sets, and so on). This rests on one clearly pure set, the empty set Φ. ..Mathematics only needs pure sets. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This makes ZFC a much more metaphysically comfortable way to think about sets, because it can be viewed entirely formally. It is rather hard to disentangle a chair from the singleton set of that chair. |
10097 | Axiom of Extensionality: for all sets x and y, if x and y have the same elements then x = y [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Extensionality says that for all sets x and y, if x and y have the same elements then x = y. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This seems fine in pure set theory, but hits the problem of renates and cordates in the real world. The elements coincide, but the axiom can't tell you why they coincide. |
10100 | Axiom of Pairing: for all sets x and y, there is a set z containing just x and y [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Pairing says that for all sets x and y, there is a set z containing x and y, and nothing else. In symbols: ∀x∀y∃z∀w(w ∈ z ↔ (w = x ∨ w = y)). | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: See Idea 10099 for an application of this axiom. |
17900 | The Axiom of Reducibility made impredicative definitions possible [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility ...had the effect of making impredicative definitions possible. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) |
10109 | ZFC can prove that there is no set corresponding to the concept 'set' [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Sets, unlike extensions, fail to correspond to all concepts. We can prove in ZFC that there is no set corresponding to the concept 'set' - that is, there is no set of all sets. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is rather an important point for Frege. However, all concepts have extensions, but they may be proper classes, rather than precisely defined sets. |
10108 | As a reduction of arithmetic, set theory is not fully general, and so not logical [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The problem with reducing arithmetic to ZFC is not that this theory is inconsistent (as far as we know it is not), but rather that is not completely general, and for this reason not logical. For example, it asserts the existence of sets. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Note that ZFC has not been proved consistent. |
10111 | Asserting Excluded Middle is a hallmark of realism about the natural world [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: A hallmark of our realist stance towards the natural world is that we are prepared to assert the Law of Excluded Middle for all statements about it. For all statements S, either S is true, or not-S is true. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Personally I firmly subscribe to realism, so I suppose I must subscribe to Excluded Middle. ...Provided the statement is properly formulated. Or does liking excluded middle lead me to realism? |
10129 | A 'model' is a meaning-assignment which makes all the axioms true [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: A 'model' of a theory is an assignment of meanings to the symbols of its language which makes all of its axioms come out true. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: If the axioms are all true, and the theory is sound, then all of the theorems will also come out true. |
19207 | Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The models for sentential logic map sentences to truth-values. The models for predicate logic map parts of sentences to objects and sets. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 2.II) | |
A reaction: Logic books rarely tell you important things like this. That is why this database is so incredibly important! You will never understand the subject if you don't collect together the illuminating asides of discussion. They say it all so much more simply. |
10105 | Differences between isomorphic structures seem unimportant [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Mathematicians tend to regard the differences between isomorphic mathematical structures as unimportant. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a pointer towards Structuralism as the underlying story in mathematics. The intrinsic character of so-called 'objects' seems unimportant. How theories map onto one another (and onto the world?) is all that matters? |
10119 | Consistency is a purely syntactic property, unlike the semantic property of soundness [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Consistency is a purely syntactic property, unlike the semantic property of soundness. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.6) |
10126 | A 'consistent' theory cannot contain both a sentence and its negation [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: If there is a sentence such that both the sentence and its negation are theorems of a theory, then the theory is 'inconsistent'. Otherwise it is 'consistent'. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.7) |
10120 | Soundness is a semantic property, unlike the purely syntactic property of consistency [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Soundness is a semantic property, unlike the purely syntactic property of consistency. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.6) |
10127 | A 'complete' theory contains either any sentence or its negation [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: If there is a sentence such that neither the sentence nor its negation are theorems of a theory, then the theory is 'incomplete'. Otherwise it is 'complete'. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Interesting questions are raised about undecidable sentences, irrelevant sentences, unknown sentences.... |
10106 | Rational numbers give answers to division problems with integers [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: We can think of rational numbers as providing answers to division problems involving integers. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 10102. |
10102 | The integers are answers to subtraction problems involving natural numbers [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: In defining the integers in set theory, our definition will be motivated by thinking of the integers as answers to subtraction problems involving natural numbers. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Typical of how all of the families of numbers came into existence; they are 'invented' so that we can have answers to problems, even if we can't interpret the answers. It it is money, we may say the minus-number is a 'debt', but is it? Cf Idea 10106. |
10107 | Real numbers provide answers to square root problems [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: One reason for introducing the real numbers is to provide answers to square root problems. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Presumably the other main reasons is to deal with problems of exact measurement. It is interesting that there seem to be two quite distinct reasons for introducing the reals. Cf. Ideas 10102 and 10106. |
9946 | Logicists say mathematics is applicable because it is totally general [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The logicist idea is that if mathematics is logic, and logic is the most general of disciplines, one that applies to all rational thought regardless of its content, then it is not surprising that mathematics is widely applicable. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Frege was keen to emphasise this. You are left wondering why pure logic is applicable to the physical world. The only account I can give is big-time Platonism, or Pythagoreanism. Logic reveals the engine-room of nature, where the design is done. |
10125 | The classical mathematician believes the real numbers form an actual set [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Unlike the intuitionist, the classical mathematician believes in an actual set that contains all the real numbers. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.6) |
17899 | Second-order induction is stronger as it covers all concepts, not just first-order definable ones [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The first-order version of the induction axiom is weaker than the second-order, because the latter applies to all concepts, but the first-order applies only to concepts definable by a formula in the first-order language of number theory. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.7 n7) |
10128 | The Incompleteness proofs use arithmetic to talk about formal arithmetic [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The idea behind the proofs of the Incompleteness Theorems is to use the language of Peano Arithmetic to talk about the formal system of Peano Arithmetic itself. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: The mechanism used is to assign a Gödel Number to every possible formula, so that all reasonings become instances of arithmetic. |
17902 | A successor is the union of a set with its singleton [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: For any set x, we define the 'successor' of x to be the set S(x) = x U {x}. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This is the Fregean approach to successor, where the Dedekind approach takes 'successor' to be a primitive. Frege 1884:§76. |
10133 | Frege's Theorem shows the Peano Postulates can be derived from Hume's Principle [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The derivability of Peano's Postulates from Hume's Principle in second-order logic has been dubbed 'Frege's Theorem', (though Frege would not have been interested, because he didn't think Hume's Principle gave an adequate definition of numebrs). | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.8 n1) | |
A reaction: Frege said the numbers were the sets which were the extensions of the sets created by Hume's Principle. |
10130 | Set theory can prove the Peano Postulates [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The Peano Postulates can be proven in ZFC. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.7) |
10089 | Talk of 'abstract entities' is more a label for the problem than a solution to it [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: One might well wonder whether talk of abstract entities is less a solution to the empiricist's problem of how a priori knowledge is possible than it is a label for the problem. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints my view nicely. What the platonist postulates is remote, bewildering, implausible and useless! |
10131 | If mathematics is not about particulars, observing particulars must be irrelevant [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: As, in the logicist view, mathematics is about nothing particular, it is little wonder that nothing in particular needs to be observed in order to acquire mathematical knowledge. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002]) | |
A reaction: At the very least we can say that no one would have even dreamt of the general system of arithmetic is they hadn't had experience of the particulars. Frege thought generality ensured applicability, but extreme generality might entail irrelevance. |
17901 | Type theory prohibits (oddly) a set containing an individual and a set of individuals [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: If a is an individual and b is a set of individuals, then in the theory of types we cannot talk about the set {a,b}, since it is not an individual or a set of individuals, ...but it is hard to see what harm can come from it. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) |
10092 | In the unramified theory of types, the types are objects, then sets of objects, sets of sets etc. [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: In the unramified theory of types, all objects are classified into a hierarchy of types. The lowest level has individual objects that are not sets. Next come sets whose elements are individuals, then sets of sets, etc. Variables are confined to types. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: The objects are Type 0, the basic sets Type 1, etc. |
10094 | The theory of types seems to rule out harmless sets as well as paradoxical ones. [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The theory of types seems to rule out harmless sets as well as paradoxical ones. If a is an individual and b is a set of individuals, then in type theory we cannot talk about the set {a,b}. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Since we cheerfully talk about 'Cicero and other Romans', this sounds like a rather disasterous weakness. |
10095 | Type theory has only finitely many items at each level, which is a problem for mathematics [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: A problem with type theory is that there are only finitely many individuals, and finitely many sets of individuals, and so on. The hierarchy may be infinite, but each level is finite. Mathematics required an axiom asserting infinitely many individuals. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Most accounts of mathematics founder when it comes to infinities. Perhaps we should just reject them? |
10134 | Much infinite mathematics can still be justified finitely [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: It is possible to use finitary reasoning to justify a significant part of infinitary mathematics. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: This might save Hilbert's project, by gradually accepting into the fold all the parts which have been giving a finitist justification. |
10114 | Bounded quantification is originally finitary, as conjunctions and disjunctions [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: In the first instance all bounded quantifications are finitary, for they can be viewed as abbreviations for conjunctions and disjunctions. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as quite good support for finitism. The origin of a concept gives a good guide to what it really means (not a popular view, I admit). When Aristotle started quantifying, I suspect of he thought of lists, not totalities. |
10123 | The intuitionists are the idealists of mathematics [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The intuitionists are the idealists of mathematics. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.6) |
10124 | Gödel's First Theorem suggests there are truths which are independent of proof [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: For intuitionists, truth is not independent of proof, but this independence is precisely what seems to be suggested by Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem. | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: Thus Gödel was worse news for the Intuitionists than he was for Hilbert's Programme. Gödel himself responded by becoming a platonist about his unprovable truths. |
458 | Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: From what in no wise exists, it is impossible for anything to come into being; for Being to perish completely is incapable of fulfilment and unthinkable. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B012), quoted by Anon (Lyc) - On Melissus 975b1-4 | |
A reaction: The first statement of a conservation law. Modern physics is wonderful, but hasn't offered a flicker of an answer to this puzzle. Quantum fluctuations are a mode of Being. |
5112 | Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Empedocles claims that things are alternately changing and at rest - that they are changing whenever love is creating a unity out of plurality, or hatred is creating plurality out of unity, and they are at rest in the times in between. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 250b26 | |
A reaction: I suppose one must say that this an example of Ruskin's 'pathetic fallacy' - reading human emotions into the cosmos. Being constructive little creatures, we think goodness leads to construction. I'm afraid Empedocles is just wrong. |
13209 | There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Empedocles says there is no coming-to-be of anything, but only a mingling and a divorce of what has been mingled. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314b08 | |
A reaction: Aristotle comments that this prevents Empedocleans from distinguishing between superficial alteration and fundamental change of identity. Presumably, though, that wouldn't bother them. |
457 | Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: There is no creation of substance in any one of mortal existence, nor any end in execrable death, but only mixing and exchange of what has been mixed. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1111f | |
A reaction: also Aristotle 314b08 |
19214 | In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Origin essentialists claim that parental union results in a person, and that person could not have resulted from any other union. However, if the fertilised egg undergoes twinning, at least one of the resultant persons is not the original person. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 5.V) | |
A reaction: Merricks says that therefore that origin could have just produced the second twin, rather than the original person. This is interesting, but doesn't seem to threaten the necessity of origin thesis. Once I'm here, I have that origin, despite my twin. |
462 | One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: One vision is produced by both eyes | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B088), quoted by Strabo - works 8.364.3 |
22765 | Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: Wisdom and power of thought, know thou, are shared in by all things. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) II.286 | |
A reaction: Sextus quotes this, saying that it is 'still more paradoxical', and that it explicitly includes plants. This may mean that Empedocles was not including inanimate matter. |
1524 | For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus] |
Full Idea: Empedocles assumes that thinking is either identical to or very similar to sense-perception. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], A86) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 9 | |
A reaction: Not to be sniffed at. We can, of course, control our thinking (though we can't control the controller) and we contemplate abstractions, but that might be seen as a sort of perception. Vision is not as visual as we think. |
10110 | Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some of them sets) [George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some classes will be sets, the others proper classes). | |
From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.4) |
19217 | I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The Aboutness Assumption says that necessarily, if a proposition is directly about an entity, then that proposition stands in a relation to the entity. I shall argue that the Assumption is false. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 5.VII) | |
A reaction: This feels sort of right, though the nature of aboutness remains elusive. He cites denials of existence. I take speech to be fairly internal, even though its main role is communication. Maybe its a Cambridge relation, as far as the entity is concerned. |
19203 | A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks] |
Full Idea: A sentence has truth conditions only in a context of use. And the truth conditions of many sentences can differ from one context of use to another (as in 'I am a philosopher'). | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 1.II) | |
A reaction: He is building a defence of propositions, because they are eternal, and have their truth conditions essentially. I too am a fan of propositions. |
19200 | Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The thesis that propositions are sets of possible worlds is one of the two leading accounts of the nature of propositions. The other leading account endorses structured propositions. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], Intro) | |
A reaction: Merricks sets out to reject both main views. I take the idea that propositions actually are sets of possible worlds to be ridiculous (though they may offer a way of modelling them). The idea that they have no structure at all strikes me as odd. |
19206 | 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The proposition expressed by 'Cicero is an orator' represents things as being exactly the same way as does the proposition expressed by 'Tully is an orator'. Hence two sentences express the same proposition. Fregeans about names deny this. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 2.II) | |
A reaction: Merricks makes the situation in the world fix the contents of the proposition. I don't agree. I would expand the first proposition as 'The person I know as 'Cicero' was an orator', but I might never have heard of 'Tully'. |
19202 | Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks] |
Full Idea: My account says that each proposition is a necessary existent that essentially represents things as being a certain way, ...and there is no explanation of how propositions do that. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], Intro) | |
A reaction: Since I take propositions to be brain events, I don't expect much of an explanation either. The idea that propositions necessarily exist strikes me as false. If there were no minds, there would have been no propositions. |
19204 | True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks] |
Full Idea: 1,000 years ago, no sentence had ever expressed, and no one had believed, the true proposition 'a water molecule has two hydrogen and one oxygen atoms'. There are surely true propositions that have never been, and never will be, expressed or believed. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 1.V) | |
A reaction: 'Surely'? Surely not! How many propositions exist? Where do they exist? What are they made of? If they already exist when we think them, how do we tune into them? When did his example come into existence? Before water did? No! No! |
19210 | The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The standard view among philosophers nowadays seems to be that propositions do not and even cannot change in truth-value. But my own view is that some propositions can, and do, change in truth value. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 3.VII) | |
A reaction: He gives 'that A sits' as an example of one which can change, though 'that A sits at time t' cannot change. I take Merricks to be obviously right, and cannot get my head round the 'standard' view. What on earth do they think a proposition is? |
19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks] |
Full Idea: If a singular proposition is 'directly about' an entity, I argue that a singular proposition does not have the entity that it is directly about as a constituent. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], Intro) | |
A reaction: This opposes the view of the early Russell, that propositions actually contain the entities they are about, thus making propositions real features of the external world. I take that view of Russell's to be absurd. |
19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks] |
Full Idea: I describe Russell's 1903 account of propositions as the view that each proposition is identical with the state of affairs that makes that proposition true. That is, a proposition is identical with its 'truthmaking' state of affairs. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 4.II) | |
A reaction: Russell soon gave this view up (false propositions proving tricky), and I'm amazed anyone takes it seriously. I take it as axiomatic that if there were no minds there would be no propositions. Was the Big Bang a set of propositions? |
19212 | Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks] |
Full Idea: What binds the constituents of a structured proposition together into a single unity, a proposition? Can the very same constituents constitute two distinct propositions? These are questions about 'the unity of the proposition'. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 4.II) | |
A reaction: Merricks solves it by saying propositions have no structure. The problem is connected to the nature of predication (instantiation, partaking). You can't just list objects and their properties. Objects are united, and thus propositions are too. |
19213 | We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks] |
Full Idea: A successful account of the unity of the proposition tells us what unites the relevant constituents not merely into some entity or other, but into a proposition. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 4.X) | |
A reaction: Merrickes takes propositions to be unanalysable unities, but their central activity is representation, so if they needed uniting, that would be the place to look. Some people say that we unite our propositions. Others say the world does. I dunno. |
552 | Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Empedocles was the first to give evil and good as principles. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 985a | |
A reaction: Once you start to think that good and evil will only matter if they have causal powers, it is an easy step to the idea of a benevolent god, and a satanic anti-god. Otherwise the 'principles' could be ignored. |
589 | 'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: Nature is but a word of human framing. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1015a |
21823 | The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus] |
Full Idea: In Empedocles we have a dividing principle, 'Strife', set against 'Friendship' - which is the One and is to him bodiless, while the elements represent matter. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.09 | |
A reaction: The first time I've seen the principle of Love in Empedocles identified with the One of Parmenides. Plotinus is a trustworthy reporter, I think, because he was well read, and had access to lost texts. |
6002 | Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood] |
Full Idea: Empedocles used numerical ratios to explain different kinds of matter; for example, bone is two parts water, four parts fire, two parts earth; and blood is an equal blend of all four elements. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Brad Inwood - Empedocles | |
A reaction: Why isn't the ration 1:2:1? This presumably shows the influence of Pythagoras (who had also been based in Italy, like Empedocles), as well as that of the earlier naturalistic philosophers. It was a very good theory, though wrong. |
13207 | Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Empedocles says that Fire, Water, Air and Earth are four elements, and are thus 'simple' rather than flesh, bone and bodies which, like these, are 'homoeomeries'. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a26 | |
A reaction: The translation is not quite clear. I take it that flesh and bone may look simple, because they are homoeomerous, but they are not really - but what is his evidence for that? Compare Idea 13208. |
459 | All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: These elements never cease their continuous exchange, sometimes uniting under the influence of Love, so that all become One, at other times again moving apart through the hostile force of Hate. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1- |
13218 | The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
Full Idea: Empedocles says it is evident that all the other bodies down to the 'elements' have their coming-to-be and their passing-away: but it is not clear how the 'elements' themselves, severally in their aggregated masses, come-to-be and pass-away. | |
From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 325b20 | |
A reaction: Presumably the elements are like axioms - and are just given. How do electrons and quarks come-to-be? |
13225 | Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
Full Idea: It is not an adequate explanation to say that 'Love and Strife set things moving', unless the very nature of Love is a movement of this kind and the very nature of Strife a movement of that kind. | |
From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 333b23 | |
A reaction: I take this to be of interest for showing Aristotle's quest for explanations, and his unwillingness to be fobbed off with anything superficial. I take a task of philosophy to be to push explanations further than others wish to go. |
460 | If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: Besides these elements, nothing else comes into being, nor does anything cease. For if they had been perishing continuously, they would Be no more; and what could increase the Whole? And whence could it have come? | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1- |
2680 | Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Empedocles holds that the corporeal elements are four, but that all the elements, including those which create motion, are six in number. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a16 |
5090 | Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Is it just an accident that teeth and other parts of the body seem to have some purpose, and creatures survive because they happen to be put together in a useful way? Everything else has been destroyed, as Empedocles says of his 'cow with human head'. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], 61) by Aristotle - Physics 198b29 | |
A reaction: Good grief! Has no one ever noticed that Empedocles proposed the theory of evolution? It isn't quite natural selection, because we aren't told what does the 'destroying', but it is a little flash of genius that was quietly forgotten. |
461 | God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: God is equal in all directions to himself and altogether eternal, a rounded Sphere enjoying a circular solitude. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B028), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.15.2 |
466 | God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: God is mind, holy and ineffable, and only mind, which darts through the whole cosmos with its swift thought. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B134), quoted by Ammonius - On 'De Interpretatione' 4.5.249.6 |
1719 | In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
Full Idea: It is a consequence of Empedocles' view that God is the most unintelligent thing, for he alone is ignorant of one of the elements, namely strife, whereas mortal creatures are familiar with them all. | |
From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - De Anima 410b08 |
1522 | It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: Wretched is he who cares not for clear thinking about the gods. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B132), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.140.5.1 |