Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Purifications (frags)', 'Vagaries of Definition' and 'A Theory of Conditionals'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


5 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine]
     Full Idea: The arithmetic of ratios and irrational and imaginary numbers can all be reduced by definition to the theory of classes of positive integers, and this can in turn be reduced to pure set theory.
     From: Willard Quine (Vagaries of Definition [1972], p.53)
     A reaction: This summarises Quine's ontology of mathematics, which tries to eliminate virtually everything, but has to affirm the existence of sets. Can you count sets and their members, if the sets are used to define the numbers?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Consider a possible world in which A is true and otherwise differs minimally from the actual world. 'If A, then B' is true (false) just in case B is true (false) in that possible world.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (A Theory of Conditionals [1968], p.34), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.1
     A reaction: This is the first proposal to give a possible worlds semantics for conditional statements. Edgington observes that worlds which are nearby for me may not be nearby for you.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: A possible world is the ontological analogue of a stock of hypothetical beliefs.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (A Theory of Conditionals [1968], p.34), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.1
     A reaction: Sounds neat and persuasive. What is the ontological analogue of a stock of hopes? Heaven!
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine]
     Full Idea: Meaning is essence divorced from the thing and wedded to the word.
     From: Willard Quine (Vagaries of Definition [1972], p.51)
     A reaction: Quine's strategy is that a demolition of essences will be a definition of meaning. Personally I would like to defend essences, though I admit to finding meaning tricky. That is because essences are external, but meanings are in minds.
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine]
     Full Idea: The distinction between what belongs to the meaning of a word and what counts as further information is scarcely clearer than the distinction between the essence of a thing and its accidents.
     From: Willard Quine (Vagaries of Definition [1972], p.51)
     A reaction: In lots of cases the distinction between essence and accident strikes me as totally clear. Tricky borderline cases don't destroy a distinction. That bachelors are married is clearly not 'further information'.