Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'A Dictionary of Philosophy' and 'De ente praedicamentali'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things

16700	In order to speak about time and successive entities, the 'present' must be enlarged [Wycliff]
	Full Idea: It is clear from the way in which one must speak about time and other successive entities that talk about 'the present' must be enlarged. Otherwise it would have to be denied that any successive entity could exist, which is impossible.
	From: John Wycliff (De ente praedicamentali [1375], 20 p.189), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
	A reaction: This is a lovely idea, even if it is not quite clear what it means. The mind seems to stretch out the now anyway (as the 'specious present'), so why not embrace that in language and conscious thought?

16701	To be successive a thing needs parts, which must therefore be lodged outside that instant [Wycliff]
	Full Idea: If something is successive, it is successive with respect to its individual parts, which cannot exist at the same instant. Therefore it follows that many of its parts are lodged outside that instant.
	From: John Wycliff (De ente praedicamentali [1375], 20 p.189), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
	A reaction: An obvious would be to say that there are therefore no successive entities, but Wycliff is appealing to our universal acceptance of them, and offering a transcendental argument. Nice move.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory

6455	Maybe 'sense-data' just help us to talk about unusual perceptual situations [Lacey]
	Full Idea: One possibility is that talk of sense-data is a mere linguistic convenience, providing a noun for talking about appearances, as when seeing a red object in sodium light (when it looks grey).
	From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196)
	A reaction: The term seems to have been coined to deal with situations where there is a gap between appearance and presumed reality, as in illusions. Maybe illusions prove the existence of sense-data, rather than it being a 'convenient' term.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data

6454	Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey]
	Full Idea: It is hard to individuate sense-data, saying where one ends and the next begins, and hard to say whether they can change; are they substances, qualities, events, or what?
	From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196)
	A reaction: The problem is not that these questions are unanswerable. The answer seems to be either that they are physical and external, or that they are mental and internal, and that there is no ontological space for them between the two.

6453	Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey]
	Full Idea: Sometimes it is said that sense-data are public, and parts either of objects or of the surfaces of objects.
	From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196)
	A reaction: This suggests two drastically different theories, one making sense-data into mental events, the other placing them in the 'external' world. The latter theory can dovetail them with the physics, but then why would we need them?