Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'A Priori Knowledge' and 'The Human Animal'

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity

20475	Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo]
	Full Idea: Some people claim that modal sentences do not express truths or falsehoods.
	From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2)
	A reaction: I can only imagine this coming from a narrow hardline empiricist. It seems to me obvious that we make true or false statements about what is possible or impossible.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary

20476	If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo]
	Full Idea: If one can only know a priori that a proposition is necessary, then one can know only a priori that a proposition is contingent. The evidence relevant to determining the latter is the same as that relevant to determining the former.
	From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2)
	A reaction: This seems a telling point, but I suppose it is obvious. If you see that the cat is on the mat, nothing in the situation tells you whether this is contingent or necessary. We assume it is contingent, but that may be an a priori assumption.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori

20471	Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo]
	Full Idea: There are three suggested epistemic conditions on a priori knowledge: the first regards the source of justification, the second regards the defeasibility of justification, and the third appeals to the strength of justification.
	From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2)
	A reaction: [compressed] He says these are all inspired by Kant. The non-epistemic suggested condition involve necessity or analyticity. The source would have to be entirely mental; the defeasibly could not be experiential; the strength would be certainty.

20477	The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo]
	Full Idea: The leading claim of proponents of the a priori is that sources of justification are of two significantly different types: experiential and nonexperiential. Initially this difference is marked at the phenomenological level.
	From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 5)
	A reaction: He cites Plantinga and Bealer for the phenomenological starting point (that some knowledge just seems rationally obvious, certain, and perhaps necessary).

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

20472	Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo]
	Full Idea: There is reason to view non-epistemic analyses of a priori knowledge (in terms of necessity or analyticity) with suspicion. The a priori concerns justification. Analysis by necessity or analyticity concerns the proposition rather than the justification.
	From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2.1)
	A reaction: [compressed] The fact that the a priori is entirely a mode of justification, rather than a type of truth, is the modern view, influenced by Kripke. Given that assumption, this is a good objection.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility

20474	'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo]
	Full Idea: A justified belief that a proposition is not true is an 'overriding' defeater, ...and the belief that a justification is inadequate or defective is an 'undermining' defeater.
	From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], n 40)
	A reaction: Sounds more like a sliding scale than a binary option. Quite useful, though.

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body

16236	Maybe our persistence conditions concern bodies, rather than persons [Olson, by Hawley]
	Full Idea: Instead of attributing person-like persistence conditions to bodies, we could attribute body-like persistence conditions to persons, …so human persons are identical with human organisms.
	From: report of Eric T. Olson (The Human Animal [1997]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.10
	A reaction: In the case of pre-birth and advanced senility, Olson thinks we could have the body without the person, so person is a 'phase sortal' of bodies. A good theory, which seems to answer a lot of questions. 'Person' may be an abstraction.

6669	For 'animalism', I exist before I became a person, and can continue after it, so I am not a person [Olson, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: According to 'animalism', I existed before I was a person and I may well go one existing for some time after I cease to be a person; hence, I am not essentially a person, but a human organism.
	From: report of Eric T. Olson (The Human Animal [1997]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.10
	A reaction: There is a very real sense in which an extremely senile person has 'ceased to exist' (e.g. as the person I used to love). On the whole, though, I think that Olson is right, and yet 'person' is an important concept. Neither concept is all-or-nothing.