3 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
4869 | Experience does not teach us any essences of things [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Experience does not teach us any essences of things. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to De Vries [1664], 1664?) | |
A reaction: This, along with Leibniz's claim that experience cannot reveal necessities, may constitute a striking criticism of empiricism, but it invites the obvious reply 'so much the worse for essences'. An essence seems to be a theoretical concept, not a priori. |
7639 | The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans] |
Full Idea: The 'homunculus fallacy' attempts to explain what is involved in a subject's being related to objects in the external world by appealing to the existence of an inner situation which recapitulates the essential features of the original situation. | |
From: Gareth Evans (Molyneux's Question [1978], p.397) | |
A reaction: This is obviously right, but we aren't forced to settle for direct realism. Inner perception may be very different, or we may employ the idea of Dennett and Lycan, that the homunculi don't regress, they deteriorate steadily down into mechanisms. |