4 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
18776 | Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: A 'contextual' definition shows how to eliminate a description from a context. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Quantification and Descriptions [2014], 2) | |
A reaction: I'm trying to think of an example, but what I come up with are better described as 'paraphrases' than as 'definitions'. |
18774 | Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: Definite descriptions seem to have a logical structure in a way that proper names do not. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Quantification and Descriptions [2014], 1.1.1) | |
A reaction: Thus descriptions have implications which plain names do not. |
19673 | Galileo mathematised movement, and revealed its invariable component - acceleration [Galileo, by Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Galileo conceives of movement in mathematical terms. ...In doing so, he uncovered, beyond the variations of position and speed, the mathematical invariant of movement - that is to say, acceleration. | |
From: report of Galileo Galilei (Two Chief World Systems [1632]) by Quentin Meillassoux - After Finitude; the necessity of contingency 5 | |
A reaction: That is a very nice advert for the mathematical physics which replaced the Aristotelian substantial forms. ...And yet, is acceleration some deep fact about nature, or a concept which is only needed if you insist on being mathematical? |