5 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
| From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
| A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
| 21552 | Common speech is vague; its vocabulary and syntax must be modified, for precision [Russell] |
| Full Idea: I am persuaded that common speech is full of vagueness and inaccuracy, and that any attempt to be precise and accurate requires modification of common speech both as regards vocabulary and as regards syntax. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Mr Strawson on Referring [1957], p.123) | |
| A reaction: It is interesting that he cites the syntax of ordinary language, as well as the vocabulary. The implication is that vagueness can also be a feature of syntax (and hence his pursuit of logical form), which is not normally mentioned |
| 21551 | Empirical words need ostensive definition, which makes them egocentric [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The meanings of all empirical words depend ultimately upon ostensive definitions, ostensive definitions depend upon experience, and that experience is egocentric. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Mr Strawson on Referring [1957], p.122) | |
| A reaction: He seems to imply that this makes them partly subjective, but I don't see why an objective consensus can't be reached when making an ostensive definition. We just need to clearly agree what 'that' refers to. |
| 6171 | Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: We view beliefs both as states of the head explanatory of behaviour, and as items possessed of referential truth-conditions. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (The Structure of Content [1982]), quoted by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: McGinn wants to build a two-part account of meaning on this point, which Rowlands resists. Hume just wanted to define belief by a feeling, but it seems obvious that truth must also be involved. |
| 21550 | Science reduces indexicals to a minimum, but they can never be eliminated from empirical matters [Russell] |
| Full Idea: It is of the essence of a scientific account of the world to reduce to a minimum the egocentric element in assertion, but success in this attempt is a matter of degree, and is never complete where empirical matter is concerned. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Mr Strawson on Referring [1957], p.121) | |
| A reaction: He cites ostensive definitions. The key issue is whether they can be wholly eliminated when we try to be objective. Russell here endorses Perry's claim that they never go away. Personally I just think that (if so) we should try harder. |