6 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
Full Idea: 'Logical constants', which might seem to be entities occurring in logical propositions, are really concerned with pure form, and are not actually constituents of the propositions in the verbal expressions of which their names occur. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX) | |
A reaction: This seems to entirely deny the existence of logical constants, and yet he says that they are named. Russell was obviously under pressure here from Wittgenstein. |
23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
Full Idea: Such words as or, not, all, some, plainly involve logical notions; since we use these intelligently, we must be acquainted with the logical objects involved. But their isolation is difficult, and I do not know what the logical objects really are. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX) | |
A reaction: See Idea 23476, from the previous page. Russell is struggling. Wittgenstein was telling him that the constants are rules (shown in truth tables), rather than objects. |
18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
Full Idea: A touchstone by which logical propositions may be distinguished from all others is that they result from a process of generalisation which has been carried to its utmost limits. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], p.129), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 'What' |
22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
Full Idea: On Russell's pre-war conception it is obvious that a complex cannot be negative. If a complex were true, what would make it false would be its non-existence, not the existence of some other complex. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 41 'Neg' | |
A reaction: It might be false because it doesn't exist, but also 'made' false by a rival complex (such as Desdemona loving Othello). |
4677 | If suicide is wrong because only God disposes of our lives, it must also be wrong to save lives [Hume] |
Full Idea: Were the disposal of human life so much the peculiar province of the Almighty that it were an encroachment on His right, for men to dispose of their own lives; it would be equally criminal to act for the preservation of life as for its destruction. | |
From: David Hume (On suicide [1775]), quoted by Jonathan Glover - Causing Death and Saving Lives §13 | |
A reaction: A characteristically wicked and neat point. Maybe we can intervene in the environment (diverting a falling stone), but not directly in a life? Life is sacred, but stones are not? |