Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Foundations of Geometry' and 'Should a materialist believe in qualia?'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
     From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
     A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true [Russell]
     Full Idea: We must only assert of various geometries that the axioms imply the propositions, not that the axioms are true and therefore that the propositions are true.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Foundations of Geometry [1897], Intro vii), quoted by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §4
     A reaction: Clearly the truth of the axioms can remain a separate issue from whether they actually imply the theorems. The truth of the axioms might be as much a metaphysical as an empirical question. Musgrave sees this as the birth of if-thenism.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Geometry is united by the intuitive axioms of projective geometry [Russell, by Musgrave]
     Full Idea: Russell sought what was common to Euclidean and non-Euclidean systems, found it in the axioms of projective geometry, and took a Kantian view of them.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (Foundations of Geometry [1897]) by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §4
     A reaction: Russell's work just preceded Hilbert's famous book. Tarski later produced some logical axioms for geometry.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Part of the folk concept of qualia is what makes recognition and comparison possible [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The concept of qualia (a part of the folk concept) is the concept of properties of experiences apt for causing abilities to recognize and to imagine experiences of the same type.
     From: David Lewis (Should a materialist believe in qualia? [1995], p.327)
     A reaction: I presume the other part of the folk concept would be what it is about qualia that makes this possible, namely that they 'look/sound/feel.. the same'. Lewis emphasises the functional aspect, which could not possibly be the whole story.