Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood' and 'On Perceptions'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth

6343	For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell]
	Full Idea: Given Russell's notion of a proposition, as an arrangement of objects and properties, it is hard to see how there could be any difference at all between such a proposition and the fact corresponding to it, since they each involve the same arrangement.
	From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood [1910]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Ch.7.35
	A reaction: This seems a little unfair, given that Russell (in 1912) uses the notion now referred to as 'congruence', so that the correspondence is not in the objects and properties, but in how they are 'ordered', which may differ between proposition and fact.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

12739	If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Skeptics may doubt the truth of things, and if it pleases them to call the things that occur to us dreams, it suffices for these dreams to be in agreement with each other, and to obey certain laws.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Perceptions [1680], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
	A reaction: Leibniz flirted a great deal with phenomenalism throughout the middle of his career, as charted by Garber. Descartes made similar points. It is really only Berkeley who took this idea seriously.

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction

12738	Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: He who can finally make predictions with success must be said to have become sufficiently proficient in nature.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Perceptions [1680], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
	A reaction: Is prediction achieved by knowledge of laws, or knowledge of essences and powers? The trouble with most laws is that they permit exceptions. 'Things fall, unless prevented' etc.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique

7534	In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk]
	Full Idea: With a characteristic readiness to abandon views that he had previously considered definitively correct, Russell declared in 1906 that there were, after all, no such 'things' as propositions. It is judgements that are true or false.
	From: report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood [1910]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.6
	A reaction: Written 1906. Russell developed a 'multiple relation theory of judgement'. But if a judgement is an assessment of truth or falsehood, what is it that is being assessed?