Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic' and 'The Philosophical Culture'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
     From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
     A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
1489 Modern philosophy tends to be a theory-constructing extension of science, but there is also problem-solving [Nagel]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is now dominated by a spirit of theory construction which sees philosophy as continuous with science, but the other problem-centred style is still in existence and it is important to keep it alive.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The Philosophical Culture [1995], §6)
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
22329 Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock]
     Full Idea: In 1911 Russell held that the propositions of logic are supremely general truths about the most pervasive traits of reality, to which we have access by abstraction from non-logical propositions.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic [1911]) by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 2.4
     A reaction: Glock says the rival views were Mill's inductions, psychologism, and Frege's platonism. Wittgenstein converted Russell to a fifth view, that logic is empty tautologies. I remain resolutely attached to Russell's abstraction view.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
21569 It is good to generalise truths as much as possible [Russell]
     Full Idea: It is a good thing to generalise any truth as much as possible.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic [1911], p.289)
     A reaction: An interesting claim, which seems to have a similar status to Ockham's Razor. Its best justification is pragmatic, and concerns strategies for coping with a big messy world. Russell's defence is in 'as much as possible'.