3 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
22628 | Substance has to exist, with no intrinsic qualities or relations [McTaggart] |
Full Idea: Something must exist, then, and have qualities, without being itself either a quality or a relation. And this is Substance. | |
From: J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.1 [1921], §67), quoted by R.D. Ingthorsson - A Powerful Particulars View of Causation 7.2 | |
A reaction: Ingthorsson quotes this as 'the most extreme analytic view', which is a long way from the Aristotelian view. This is the implausible bare substrate. |
14528 | Maybe modal thought is unavoidable, as a priori recognition of necessary truth-preservation in reasoning [Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
Full Idea: There are 'transcendental' arguments saying that modal thought is unavoidable - recognition, a priori, of the necessarily truth-preserving character of some forms of inference is a precondition for rational thought in general, and scientific theorizing. | |
From: Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann (Introduction to 'Modality' [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: So the debate about the status of logical truths and valid inference, are partly debates about whether out thought has to involve modality, or whether it could just be about the actual world. I take possibilities and necssities to be features of nature. |