Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Librium de interpretatione editio secunda' and 'The Analysis of Mind'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity

14665	We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius]
	Full Idea: Let the incommunicable property of Plato be called 'Platonity'. For we can call this quality 'Platonity' by a fabricated word, in the way in which we call the quality of man 'humanity'. Therefore this Platonity is one man's alone - Plato's.
	From: Boethius (Librium de interpretatione editio secunda [c.516], PL64 462d), quoted by Alvin Plantinga - Actualism and Possible Worlds 5
	A reaction: Plantinga uses this idea to reinstate the old notion of a haecceity, to bestow unshakable identity on things. My interest in the quotation is that the most shocking confusions about properties arose long before the invention of set theory.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory

6417	In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling]
	Full Idea: In 'The Analysis of Mind' Russell gave up talk of 'sense-data', and ceased to distinguish between the act of sensing and what is sensed.
	From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
	A reaction: This seems to lead towards the modern 'adverbial' account of sensing, where I don't sense 'data', but where qualia (such as redness) are our particular mode of directly perceiving objects, where insects might directly perceive them in a different mode.

6474	Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell]
	Full Idea: Undeniably, knowledge comes through seeing, but it is a mistake to regard the mere seeing itself as knowledge; if we are so to regard it, we must distinguish the seeing from what is seen; a patch of colour is one thing, and our seeing it is another.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII)
	A reaction: This is Russell's 1921 explanation of why he adopted sense-data (but he rejects them later in this paragraph). This gives a simplistic impression of what he intended, which has three components: the object, the 'sensibile', and the sense-datum.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems

6476	We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]
	Full Idea: If we are to avoid a perfectly gratuitous assumption, we must dispense with the subject as one of the actual ingredients of the world; but when we do this, the possibility of distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum vanishes.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII)
	A reaction: This is the reason why Russell himself rejected sense-data. It is more normal, I think, to reject them simply as being superfluous. If the subject can simply perceive the sense-data, why can't they just perceive the object more directly?

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory

2792	It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell]
	Full Idea: There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal past.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], p.159)
	A reaction: One of the great sceptical arguments! At a stroke it undermines forever any dreams that memories are totally certain. This is an extra scepticism, which arises if you decide that current experience IS totally certain.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism

22326	Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell]
	Full Idea: Accuracy of response to stimulus does not alone show knowledge, but must be reinforced by appropriateness, i.e. suitability of realising one's purpose.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], p.261), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 66 'Rel'
	A reaction: The aim of 'realising one's purpose' puts a very pragmatist spin on this. The point is a good one, and seems to apply particularly to Nozick's accurate 'tracking' account of knowledge.

16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self

6475	In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell]
	Full Idea: In perception, the idea of the subject appears to be a logical fiction, like mathematical points and instants; it is introduced, not because observation reveals it, but because it is linguistically convenient and apparently demanded by grammar.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII)
	A reaction: In 1912, Russell had felt that both the Cogito, and the experience of meta-thought, had confirmed the existence of a non-permanent ego, but here he offers a Humean rejection. His notion of a 'logical fiction' is behaviouristic. I believe in the Self.