100 ideas
23350 | A wise philosophers uses reason to cautiously judge each aspect of living [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The sinews of a philosopher are desire that never fails in its achievement; aversion that never meets with what it would avoid; appropriate impulse; carefully considered purpose; and assent that is never precipitate. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.08.29) | |
A reaction: This is a very individual view of wisdom and the philosopher, whereas wisdom is often thought to have a social role. Is it not important for a philosopher to at least offer advice? |
23355 | The task of philosophy is to establish standards, as occurs with weights and measures [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Things are judged and weighed, when we have the standards ready. This is the task of philosophy: to examine and establish the standards. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.11.24) | |
A reaction: It is interesting that this gives philosophers a very specific social role, and also that it seems to identify epistemology as First Philosophy. Other disciplines, of course, establish their own standards without reference to philosophy. |
21394 | Philosophy is knowing each logos, how they fit together, and what follows from them [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: [Philosophical speculation] consists in knowing the elements of 'logos', what each of them is like, how they fit together, and what follows from them. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.08.14), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.1 | |
A reaction: [Said to echo Zeno] If you substitute understanding for 'logos' (plausibly), I think this is exactly the view of philosophy I would subscribe to. We want to understand each aspect of life, and we want those understandings to cohere with one another. |
20876 | Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The start of philosophy is perception of the mutual conflict among people, and a search for its cause, plus the rejection and distrust of mere opinion, an investigation to see if opinion is right, and the discovery of some canon, like scales for weighing. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.11.13) | |
A reaction: So the number one aim of philosophy is epistemological, to find the criterion for true opinion. But it starts in real life, and would cease to trade if people would just agree. I think we should set the bar higher than that. |
15477 | Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Ontology sets out an even more abstract model of how the world is than theoretical physics, a model that has placeholders for scientific results and excluders for tempting confusions. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: Most modern metaphysicians accept this account. The interesting (mildly!) question is whether physicists will accept it. If the metaphysics is really rooted in physics, a metaphysical physicist is better placed than a metaphysician knowing some physics. |
23344 | Reason itself must be compounded from some of our impressions [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: What is reason itself? Something compounded from impressions of a certain kind. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.20.05) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the only escape from the dead end attempts to rationally justify reason. Making reason a primitive absolute is crazy metaphysics. |
23343 | Because reason performs all analysis, we should analyse reason - but how? [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Since it is reason that analyses and completes all other things, reason itself should not be left unanalysed. But by what shall it be analysed? ..That is why philosophers put logic first, just as when measuring grain we first examine the measure. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.17.01) | |
A reaction: The problem of the definitive metre rule in Paris. I say we have to test reason against the physical world, and the measure of reason is truth. Something has to be primitive, but reason is too vague for that role. Idea 23344 agrees with me! |
15471 | Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Truth is a relation between two things - a representation (the truth 'bearer') and the world or some part of it (the 'truthmaker'). | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 03.1) | |
A reaction: That truth is about representations seems to me to be exactly right. That it is about truthmakers is more controversial. There are well known problems with negative truths, general truths, future truths etc. I'm happy with 'facts'. |
15682 | Even fairly simple animals make judgements based on categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: All organisms form categories: even mealworms have category-based preferences, and higher-order animals such as pigeons or octopi can display quite sophisticated categorical judgements. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: [She cites some 1980 research to support this] This comes as no surprise, as I take categorisation as almost definitive of what a mind is. My surmise is that some sort of 'labelling' system is at the heart of it (like Googlemail labels!). |
15691 | Children accept real stable categories, with nonobvious potential that gives causal explanations [Gelman] |
Full Idea: By five children assume that a variety of categories have rich inductive potential, are stable over outward transformations, include crucial nonobvious properties, have innate potential, privilege causal features, can be explained causally, and are real. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Intro') | |
A reaction: This is Gelman's helpful summary of the findings of research on childhood essentialising, and says the case for this phenomenon is 'compelling'. |
15484 | A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: I take properties to have a dual nature; in virtue of possessing a property, an object possesses both a particular dispositionality and a particular qualitative character. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: That leaves you with the question of the relationship between the disposition and the quality. I say you must choose, and I choose the disposition. Qualities (which are partly subjective, obviously) arise from fundamental dispositions. |
15478 | Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: If objects belong to classes in virtue of resemblances they bear to one another, they resemble one another in virtue of their properties. Objects resemble in some way or respect, and you could think of these ways or respects as 'properties'. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: If you pare the universe down to one object with five distinct properties, they resemble nothing, and fail this definition. Resemblance seems like the epistemology, not the ontology. |
15483 | Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: The redness or sphericity of this tomato cannot migrate to another tomato. This is a consequence of the idea that properties are particular ways things are. The identity of a property is bound up with the identity of its possessor. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: This is part of his declaration that he believes in tropes. At the very least, properties can be thought of separately, and have second-order properties that don't seem tied to the particulars. |
15480 | Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: The bundle theory for tropes treats properties inappositely as parts of objects. Objects can have parts, but an object's properties are not its parts, they are particular ways the object is. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: The 'way an object is' seems a very vague concept. Most things that get labelled as tropes are actually highly complex. Without mention of causal powers I think these discussions drift in a muddle. |
15489 | A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: A property that is intrinsically incapable of affecting or being affected by anything else, actual or possible, is not merely a case of inertness - it amounts to a no-thing. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 06.6) | |
A reaction: In the end Martin rejects Shoemaker's purely causal account of properties, but he clearly understands Shoemaker's point well. |
15487 | If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Given a realist view of dispositions as fully actual, even without manifestations or partners, a purely dispositional account of properties has a degree of plausibility, which is enhanced because properties lack purely qualitative characterisations. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 06.4) | |
A reaction: In the end Martin opts for a mixed account, as in Idea 15484, but he gives reasons here for the view which I favour. If he concedes that dispositions may exist without manifestation, they must surely lack qualities. Are they not properties, then? |
15479 | Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Each property endows a ball with a distinctive qualitative character and a distinctive range of powers or dispositionalities. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: I think this is the wrong way round. Do properties support powers, or powers support properties? I favour the latter. Properties are much vaguer than powers. Powers generate the required causation and activity. |
15488 | Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: For any intrinsic and irreducible property, what is qualitative and what is dispositional are one and the same property considered as what that property exhibits of its nature and what that property is directive and selective for in its manifestation. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 06.6) | |
A reaction: This is supposed to support qualities and dispositions as equal partners, but I don't see how 'what a property exhibits' can have any role in fundamental ontology. What it exhibits may be very misleading about its nature. |
15469 | Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Three forms of dispositionality are illustrated by explosives (which are destroyed by manifestation), being soluble (where the dispositions is lost but recoverable), and being stable (where the disposition is unchanged). | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.7) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Presumably the explosives could be recovered after the explosion, since the original elements are still there, but it would take a while. The retina remains stable by continually changing. There are no simple distinctions! |
15467 | Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Nobody believes, or ought to believe, that manifestations of powers follow upon the single event mentioned in the antecedent of the conditional independently of the circumstances. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.4) | |
A reaction: Another way of putting it would be that the behaviour of powers is more ceteris paribus than law. |
15466 | 'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: According to the conditional analysis of 'the wire is live', if the wire is touched then it gives off electricity. What ultimately defeats this analysis is the acknowledged possibility of objects gaining or losing powers. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.3) | |
A reaction: He offers his 'electro-fink' as a counterexample, where touching the wire changes its disposition. The conditional analysis is simple and clearcut, but dispositions in reality are complex and unstable. |
15465 | Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: It is self-defeating to try to explain dispositionality in terms of structural states because structural states are themselves dispositional. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 01.2) | |
A reaction: No doubt structures have dispositions, but are they entirely dispositional? Might there be 'emergent' dispositions which can only be explained by the structure itself, rather than by the dispositions that make up the structure? |
15476 | Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: I take it as obvious that any structural property involves dispositionality and, therefore, cannot be used to 'explain' dispositionality. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.3) | |
A reaction: I think this is the right way round. The so-called 'categorical' properties seem to be close in nature to the 'structural' properties. |
15481 | I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: I favour the old idea of substratum: the haver of properties not itself had as a property. Space-time might itself be the bearer of properties, not itself borne as a property. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: A very nice idea. The choice is between saying either that fundamentals like space-time and physical fields are the propertyless bearers of properties, or that they purely consist of properties (so properties are fundamental, not substrata). |
15474 | Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: There is no causal work for the whole that is not done by the parts, provided the complex role of the parts is fully appreciated. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.1) | |
A reaction: It seems like a truth that because some parts are doing particular causal work (e.g. glue), the whole can acquire causal powers that the mereological sum of parts lacks. |
15700 | In India, upper-castes essentialize caste more than lower-castes do [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The notion of caste in India is more essentialized among upper-caste than lower-caste individuals. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 08 'Intro') | |
A reaction: In a book defending fairly innate essentialism in the human race, Gelman offers this point as a warning that large cultural ingredients can be involved. Racism is the classic difficulty with essentialism. |
15685 | Essentialism is either natural to us, or an accident of our culture, or a necessary result of language [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The two views contrasting with essentialism naturally emerging in childhood are the claim that essentialism is a historical accident emerging from Western philosophy, and that essentialism is an inherent consequence of naming things. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Background') | |
A reaction: Helpful. I take Idea 15682 to rule out the idea that it is just a feature of western culture. I can't conceive of early man surviving without essentialism. I don't think it rules out the naming view. Animals may do what emerges in us as full 'naming'. |
15684 | Children's concepts include nonobvious features, like internal parts, functions and causes [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Children incorporate a variety of nonobvious features into their concepts, including internal parts, functions, causes, and ontological distinctions. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: This remark sums up the general thesis of her book, which she supports with a wealth of first-hand evidence. It supports my view, that the desire and need for explanation is at the root of essentialist concepts. It's hard wired in us. |
15681 | Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We map types of essentialism by asking is it in the world or in our representations, is it sortal or causal or ideal, and is it specific particulars or placeholders for the unknown? | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: I am struck by the way that this practising experimental psychologist gets to ask questions and make distinctions much more extensively than most armchair philosophers on the subject. She focuses on the representational, causal, placeholder view. |
15678 | Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism is the view that categories have an underlying reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly but that gives an object its identity. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Intro') | |
A reaction: I think the introduction of categories here is a misunderstanding. Does an uncategorisable thing therefore have no identity (even though it has properties)? If categories give objects their identity, what gives categories their identity? |
15683 | Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first [Gelman] |
Full Idea: I suggest that sortals are likewise required for determining essence. One cannot answer the question 'What is the essence of this?' without supplying the sortal - of this 'what'. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: I remain baffled by this view. I take the category to be an inductive generalisation from other similar individuals. It can't get off the ground if you don't start with the individuals. Sortals are just a shorthand. |
15697 | Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: With kind essentialism the person assumes that the world is divided up into preexisting natural categories. Individual essentialism seems not to require any such commitment to kind realism. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Essentialism') | |
A reaction: This pinpoints my difficulty: how do we decide whether some category or attributed essence is part of a preexisting natural kind? Some natural kinds are self-evident, like water (roughly), but others need subtle teasing out. How is the teasing done? |
15687 | Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Kinship is essentialized, but admits of degrees, ...and people can be essentialist even about categories they do not view as fixed over time, such as age groupings. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 03 'Summary') | |
A reaction: Given my notion of essence are necessarily explanatory, I embrace both of these points. Being very athletic comes in degrees, and changes over times. |
15679 | Essentialism comes from the cognitive need to categorise [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism has its source in the cognitive requirement of categorization in certain domains - particularly as they affect the young learner. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Essentialist') | |
A reaction: I think the phenomenon is better understood as part of the cognitive requirement to understand and explain. Categorisation is just one way to aid explanation. Children try to understand (essentially) a new animal without categorisation. |
15698 | We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children. ...Mothers teach children about kinds, not about essences, and mothers help children identify which categories are richly structured. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 07 'Conclusions') | |
A reaction: This is a psychologist who specialises in this topic. If you think essentialism is inculcated by a our culture, you will have to blame the fathers. |
15709 | Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism is a reasoning heuristic that allows us to make fairly good predictions much of the time, but it should not be confused with the structure of reality. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Discussion') | |
A reaction: She particularly cites biology as the area where it might be inaccurate. I'm beginning to think that the operations of induction are the place to look for an good understanding of essentialism. |
15696 | Peope favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is [Gelman] |
Full Idea: People favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is. ...An object looking like a knife is less likely to be called 'a knife' if it is described as having been created by accident. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Essentialism') | |
A reaction: I like this because it talks, suggestively, of 'historical paths' rather than of 'origin'. Thus we might judge a person's identity by their traumatic experience rather than by their birth. This doesn't challenge necessity of origin, but affects labels. |
15486 | Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Abstract entities (as nonspatiotemporal) seem to be the only candidates for specific and full identity specifications. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 05.2 n1) | |
A reaction: Martin says that only the 'mad logician' seeks such specifications elsewhere. Some people like persons to have perfect identity. God is a popular candidate too. Can objects have perfect 'macroscopic' identity? |
15475 | The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: We must avoid a use of 'identity' that implies that any entity over time must be said to lack continuing identity simply because it has changed properties or has lost, added, or had substituted some parts. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.3) | |
A reaction: This may the key area where the logical-mathematical type of philosophy comes into contact with the natural-metaphysical type. Imagine Martin's concept of 'identity' in mathematics. π changes to 3.1387... during the calculation! |
15472 | It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: To claim that the truthmaker for a counterfactual, for example, is a set of possible worlds, but to deny that these worlds really exist, seems pointless. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Lewis therefore argues that they do exist. Martin argues that possible worlds are not truthmakers. He rests his account of modality on dispositions. I prefer Martin. |
15707 | There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The modes of understanding (or modes of construal) which have been proposed are intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist (perhaps), and deontological. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Broadening') | |
A reaction: She cites psychological research to support this, and calls it 'a relatively small number' of modes. Compare Aristotle's four modes of cause/explanation. |
23359 | We can't believe apparent falsehoods, or deny apparent truths [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to assent to an apparent falsehood, or to deny an apparent truth. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.07.15) | |
A reaction: The way some philosophers write you would think that most beliefs just result from private whims or social fashion. That happens, of course, but most beliefs result from direct contact with reality. |
23356 | Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: It is about the strongest proof one could offer of a proposition being evident, that even he who contradicts it finds himself having to make use of it. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.20.01) | |
A reaction: Philosophers sometimes make fools of themselves by trying, by the use of elaborate sophistry, to demolish propositions which are self-evidently true. Don't be one of these philosophers! |
15703 | Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Memory is notorious for conforming to theory (rather than memory being a neutral source of information). | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 09 'Theory') | |
A reaction: This observation by a psychologist is music to sceptics about objectivity. Memory is so fundamental to our basic epistemology that it could even be the nature of thought itself. |
15708 | Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Inductive success is rewarded with more induction. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Broadening') | |
A reaction: I love this one. Neat, accurate, and central to how we understand the world. I take inductive success to be stored as labels, concepts, categories, words and general truths, which are then our resource for further attempts. |
15695 | Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Because of their narrow focus, children's sensitivity to categories as the basis of induction is a reasoning bias that, though useful much of the time, results in systematic errors. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'The role') | |
A reaction: This is the bad sense of 'essentialism' which worries its opponents. Presumably, though, my favoured scientific essentialism will be 'scientific', and avoid this problem. The relation between categories and induction needs to be clear. |
15694 | Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We suggest that children overestimate the power of a single example. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'The role') | |
A reaction: This conclusion arises from extensive psychological research. 'My grandma smoked, and she lived to be 97' - adults do this too. Wittgenstein says assuming other minds because of your own is induction from one example! |
15692 | People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman] |
Full Idea: People tend to be satisfied with rather shallow explanations. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Is essentialism') | |
A reaction: She cites some psychological research to support this. Pretty obvious really. I take the so-called 'scientific method' to be nothing more than ceasing to be satisfied with such shallowness. |
15492 | Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 10.2) | |
A reaction: I don't think you can rule out the 'real' explanation, as the one dominant causal predecessor, such as the earthquake producing a tsunami. |
15495 | Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: The long-derided way of analogy works! Otherwise why, when someone else is relishing a food we have not tried, is it reasonable for us to try it ourselves? | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 12.2) | |
A reaction: Why wouldn't we rush to eat something an animal was relishing? Nice idea. |
15493 | Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Selectivity and abstraction are required for the development of memory, because reminders and promptings are rarely replicas of what is being remembered. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 10.3) | |
A reaction: I take the key idea of mental life to be that of a 'label'. This need not be verbal, so 'conceptual label'. It could be an image, as on a road sign. Labelling is the most indispensable aspect of thought. We label objects, parts, properties and groups. |
23329 | We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Progress is when any of you turns to his own faculty of choice, working at it and perfecting it, so as to bring it fully into harmony with nature; elevated, free, unrestrained, unhindered, faithful, self-respecting. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.04.18) | |
A reaction: [See also Disc.3.5.7] Rationality is the stoic concept of being in 'harmony with nature'. It appears (from reading Frede) that this may be the FIRST EVER reference to free will. Note the very rhetorical way in which it is presented. |
23330 | Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: He is free for whom all things happen in accordance with his choice, and whom no one can constrain. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.12.09) | |
A reaction: The idea of 'free' will seems to have resulted from a wide extension of the idea of constraint, with global determinism lurking in the background. |
23342 | Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: He is free for whom all things happen in accordance with his choice, and whom no one can constrain. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.12.09) | |
A reaction: Presumable this means that constraint is absolutely impossible, even by Zeus, and not just contingent possibility, when no one sees me raid the fridge. |
23332 | Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Zeus placed my good nature in my own power, and gave it to me as he has it himself, free from all hindrance, compulsion and restraint. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.03.10) | |
A reaction: Although Frede traces the origin of free will to the centrality of choice in moral life (and hence to the elevation of its importance), this remark shows that there is a religious aspect to it. Zeus is supreme, and obviously has free will. |
23331 | Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus himself can get the better of my choice. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.01.23) | |
A reaction: This is the beginnings of the idea of free will. It is based on the accurate observation that the intrinsic privacy of a mind means that no external force can be assured of controlling its actions. Epictetus failed to think of internal forces. |
23338 | You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: What are you saying, man? Fetter me? You will fetter my leg; but not even Zeus himself can get the better of my choice. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.01.23) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the beginning of the idea of 'absolute' freedom, which is conjured up to preserve perfect inegrity and complete responsibility. Obviously you can be prevented from doing what you choose, so this is not compatibilism. |
20875 | If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The philosophers are right to say that if the honorable and good person knew what was going to happen, he would even collaborate with disease, death and lameness. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.05) | |
A reaction: The 'philosophers' must be the earlier stoics, founders of his school. |
23347 | If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: If I really knew that it was ordained for me to be ill at this moment, I would aspire to be so. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.06.10) | |
A reaction: The rub, of course, is that it is presumably impossible to know what is fated. Book 2.7 is on divination. I don't see any good in a mortally ill person desiring, for that reason alone, to die. Rage against the dying of the light, I say. |
15680 | Folk essentialism rests on belief in natural kinds, in hidden properties, and on words indicating structures [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The three components of essentialism as a folk belief are the idea that certain categories are natural kinds, the idea that some unobservable property causes the way things are, and the idea that words reflect real structures. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') |
15686 | Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Labels may signal categories that are believed to embody an essence. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 02 'Privileged') | |
A reaction: This is quoted by her, as a summary of a substantial body of research which she endorses. I cite it because it pinpoints my own view. I take 'labels' to be basic to minds, as organisers of thought, and this ties essences to labels. Satisfying picture. |
15690 | Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Properties that enter into causally meaningful links are better remembered and are treated as more central to the category than properties that are not causally meaningful. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 05 'Causation2') | |
A reaction: This is a summary of considerable psychological research. This account not only sounds plausible, but would fit better withy why we form concepts and categories in the first place. We are trying to relate to the causations of nature. |
15688 | Categories are characterized by distance from a prototype [Gelman] |
Full Idea: On prototype views, categories are characterized by distance from a prototype. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 05 'Causation') | |
A reaction: Gelman observes that this view makes no reference to any causal features of things. This cuts them off from using underlying essences in the process of categorisation and concept-formation. How do you spot a prototype, with no category? |
15689 | Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Theory-based approaches to categories are a response to the limitations of mere similarities holding the category together, and require knowledge-rich explanatory models to say which features are more central to a concept. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 05 'Causation1') | |
A reaction: I see a promising account in linking theory theory to essentialism. For a physical object (or even for a process) infer a structure, and then identify what is most important in that structure. That gives you your stable, agreed concept. |
15699 | Prelinguistic infants acquire and use many categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Language does not appear to be necessary for forming categories, since prelinguistic infants acquire many categories, and even use categories to form inferences about unknown properties. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 08 'Intro') | |
A reaction: She cites lots of research in support of this claim. The idea may come as a surprise to some people, but not to me. I take it that categorisation is what a brain is for, including animal brains. |
23325 | Epictetus developed a notion of will as the source of our responsibility [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The notion of will in Epictetus is clearly developed to pinpoint the source of our responsibility for our actions and to identify precisely what it is that makes them our own doings. | |
From: report of Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56]) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 3 | |
A reaction: So the key move is that responsibility needs a 'source', rather than being a generalisation about how our actions arise. The next step is demand an 'ultimate' source, and this leads to the idea that this new will is 'free'. This will can be good or bad. |
20873 | Tragedies are versified sufferings of people impressed by externals [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Tragedies are nothing but the sufferings of people who are impressed by externals, performed in the right sort of meter. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.04.26) | |
A reaction: The externals are things like honour, position and wealth. Wonderfully dismissive! |
23364 | Homer wrote to show that the most blessed men can be ruined by poor judgement [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Did not Homer write to show us that the noblest, the strongest, the richest, the handsomest of men may nevertheless be the most unfortunate and wretched, if they do not hold the judgements that they ought to hold? | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.10.36) | |
A reaction: This seems to be right. He clearly wrote about the greatest and most memorable events of recent times, but not just to record triumphs, because almost every hero (in the Iliad, at least) ends in disaster. |
23340 | We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: We have these two elements mingled within us, a body in common with the animals, and reason and intelligence in common with the gods. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.03.03) | |
A reaction: This is what I call Human Exceptionalism, but note that it doesn't invoke a Christian soul or spiritual aspect. This separation of reason goes back at least to Plato. High time we stopped thinking this way. Animals behave very sensibly. |
23358 | Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: In every species nature produces some exceptional being, in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses. We do not say to them 'Who are you?' It will tell you 'I am like the purple in the robe. Do not expect me to be like the rest, or find fault with my nature'. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.01.23) | |
A reaction: This idea began with Aristotle's 'great soul', and presumably culminates in Nietzsche, who fills in more detail. In the modern world such people are mostly nothing but trouble. |
23339 | I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: When the time comes, then I will die - as becomes a person who gives back what is not his own. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.01.32) | |
A reaction: There is a tension between his demand that he have full control of his choices, and this humility that says his actual life is not his own. The things which can't be controlled, though, are 'indifferents' so life and death are indifferent. |
23345 | Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: It is not pain or death that is to be feared, but the fear of pain or death. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.01.13) | |
A reaction: These two cases are quite different, I would say. I'm much more frightened of pain than I am of the fear of pain, and the opposite view seems absurd. About death, though, I think this is right. Mostly I'm with Spinoza: think about life, not death. |
23357 | Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Whoever has knowledge of good things would know how to love them; and how could he who cannot distinguish good things from evil still have to power to love? It follows that the wise man alone has the power to love. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.22.03) | |
A reaction: A rather heartwarming remark, but hard to assess for its truth. Evil people are unable to love? Not even love a cat, or their favourite car? We would never call someone wise if they lacked love. |
23363 | The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Where is the paradox if we say that what is evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature? | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.01.125) | |
A reaction: A very Greek view. For humans, it must rely on the belief that human nature is essentially good. If I am sometimes grumpy and annoying, why is that not part of my nature? |
23328 | The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The essence of the good is a certain disposition of our choice, and essence of evil likewise. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.29.01) | |
A reaction: This is the origin of Kant's famous view, that the only true good is a good will. This is the alternative to good character or good states of affairs as the good. It points towards the modern more legalistic view of morality, as concerning actions. |
23362 | All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The cause of all human ills is that people are incapable of applying their general preconceptions to particular cases. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.01.42) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure whether 'preconceptions' is meant pejoratively (as unthinking, and opposed to true principles). This sounds like modern particularism (e.g. Jonathan Dancy) to the letter. |
23353 | We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: What faculty do you mean? - Have we not a natural sense of honour? - We have. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.22) | |
A reaction: This seems unlikely, given the lower status that honour now has with us, compared to two hundred years ago. But there may be a natural sense of status, and of humiliation and shame. |
23354 | If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Since he has harmed himself by wronging me, shall not I harm myself by harming him? | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.26) | |
A reaction: I am very keen on this idea. See Hamlet's remarks to Polonius about 'honour and dignity'. The best strategy for achieving moral excellence is to focus on our own characters, rather than how to act, and to respond to others. |
23324 | In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: In Epictetus's 'Discourses' the notion of choice [prohairesis] plays perhaps the central role. It is our prohairesis which defines us a person, as the sort of person we are; it is our prohairesis which determines how we behave. | |
From: report of Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56]) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 3 | |
A reaction: Frede is charting the gradual move in Greek philosophy from action by desire, reason and habit to action by the will (which then turns out to be 'free'). Character started as dispositions and ended as choices. |
23361 | Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Is health a good and sickness an evil? No. Health is good when used well, and bad when used ill. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.20.04) | |
A reaction: Although I like the idea that health is a natural value, which bridges the gap from facts to values (as a successful function), there is no denying that the health of very evil people is not something the rest of us hope for. |
23346 | A person is as naturally a part of a city as a foot is part of the body [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Just as the foot in detachment is no longer a foot, so you in detachment are not longer a man. For what is a man? A part of a city, first. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.05.26) | |
A reaction: It is, of course, not true that a detached foot ceases to be a foot (and an isolated human is still a human). This an extreme version of the Aristotelian idea that we are essentially social. It is, though, the sort of view favoured by totalitarianism. |
23351 | We are citizens of the universe, and principal parts of it [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: You are a citizen of the universe, and a part of it; and no subservient, but a principal part of it. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.03) | |
A reaction: He got this view from Diogenes of Sinope, one of his heroes. What community you are a part of seems to be a choice as much as a fact. Am I British or a European? |
20874 | A citizen is committed to ignore private advantage, and seek communal good [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The commitment of the citizen is to have no private advantage, not to deliberate about anything as though one were a separate part. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.04) | |
A reaction: This is the modern problem of whether democratic voters are choosing for themselves or for the community. I think we should make an active effort at every election to persuade voters to aim for the communal good. Cf Rawls. |
23352 | A citizen should only consider what is good for the whole society [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The calling of a citizen is to consider nothing in terms of personal advantage, never to deliberate on anything as though detached from the whole, but be like our hand or foot. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.04) | |
A reaction: Fat chance of that in an aggressively capitalist society. I've always voted for what I thought was the common good, and was shocked to gradually realise that many people only vote for what promotes their own interests. Heigh ho. |
22604 | Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: You should ask 'Ought not this man to be put to death, who is deceived in things of the greatest importance, and is blinded in distinguishing good from evil?' …You then see how inhuman it is, and the same as 'Ought not this blind man to be put to death?' | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.18.6-7) | |
A reaction: This is the doctrine of Socrates, that evil is ignorance (and weakness of will [akrasia] is impossible). Epictetus wants us to reason with the man, but what should be do if reasoning fails and he persists in his crimes? |
23349 | Asses are born to carry human burdens, not as ends in themselves [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: An ass is surely not born as an end in itself? No, but because we had need of a back that is able to carry burdens. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.08.07) | |
A reaction: This is the absurd human exceptionalism which plagues our thinking. It would be somewhat true of animals which are specifically bred for human work, such as large cart horses. |
15693 | One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We can confidently determine the chemical composition of gold from just a single sample, but we cannot determine the height of trees from just a single tree. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'The role') | |
A reaction: The tricky word here is 'confidently'. If you meet one Latvian who is nice, do you assume they are all nice? At what point do you decide gold etc. really are natural kinds, where one sample tells all? Evolution of species... |
15701 | Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Children judged personal characteristics as more stable when they were referred to by a noun ('She is a carrot eater') than by a verbal predicate ('She eats carrots whenever she can') | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 08 'Naming') | |
A reaction: This fits with my feeling that 'labels' are the basis of how the mind works. The noun invokes a genuine category of thing, where a predicate attaches to some preselected category ('she'). Gelman says names encourage inductions. |
15485 | Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: The two-event cause-and-effect view is easily avoided and replaced by the view of mutual manifestations of reciprocal disposition partners, suggesting a natural contemporaneity. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 05.1) | |
A reaction: This view, which I find much more congenial than the traditional one, is explored in the ideas of Mumford and Anjum. |
15491 | Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Disposition and manifestation are the basic categories by means of which cause and effect are to be explained. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 07.8) | |
A reaction: 'Manifestation' sounds a bit subjective. The manifestation evident to us may not indicate what is really going on below the surface. I like his basic picture. |
15468 | Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: 'Causal' counterfactuals have a place, of course, but only as clumsy and inexact linguistic gestures to dispositions, and they should be kept in that place. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.6) | |
A reaction: Counterfactuals only seem to give a regularity account of causation, by correlating an effect with a minimal context which will give rise to it. Surely dispositions run deeper than that? |
15702 | Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism does not entail that people know what the essence is. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 09 'Theory') | |
A reaction: This is a fundamental and (I would say) fairly obvious point, but it needs to be made to the more passionate opponents of essentialism. |
15705 | Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism encourages a 'scientific' mindset in thinking about the natural world, a belief that intensive study of a natural domain will yield ever more underlying properties. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Maybe scientists must be committed to essences, the way mathematicians must be committed to numbers? This idea spendidly opposes the doubts expressed by Popper. |
15470 | Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Causal laws are summaries of what entities are capable and incapable of. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.8) | |
A reaction: That's a pretty good formulation. Personally I favour a Humean analysis, perhaps along Lewis's lines, but on a basis of real powers. This remark of Martin's has got me rethinking. |
15704 | Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman] |
Full Idea: If my speculations are correct, then essentialism starts out strictly as a belief that many categories are richly structured kinds, then additionally becomes a search for underlying inherent properties. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 10 'Figuring') | |
A reaction: This is her summary of extensive essentialist research among children. She favours the priority of kinds and categories. We actually change taxonomies on the basis of revisions in our accounts of essence. Science negotiates. |
15706 | A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman] |
Full Idea: One major argument against the view that essences are real is the rampant essentializing of categories that are socially constructed (such as race, caste and occupation). | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Is essentialism') | |
A reaction: You can't argue with that. It raises the question of whether the approach of scientific essentialism has any value in the social, rather than physical, sciences. We jokingly essentialise groups of people such as referees or Oxonians. |
15482 | We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: It makes no sense in ontology or modern physics to think of space-time as empty and propertyless. Space-time nicely fulfils the condition of a substratum. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: At the very least, space-time seems to be 'curved', so it had better be something. Time has properties like being transitive. Space-time (or fields) might be a pure bundle of properties (the only pure bundle?), rather than a substratum. |
23341 | God created humans as spectators and interpreters of God's works [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: God has introduced man into the world as a spectator of himself and of his works: and not only as a spectator of them, but an interpreter of them as well. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.06.19) | |
A reaction: This idea (which strikes me as bizarre) was picked up directly by the Christians. I can't imagine every Johnson wanting to creating their own Boswell. If you think we are divinely created, you have to propose some motive for it, I suppose. |
23348 | Both god and the good bring benefits, so their true nature seems to be the same [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: God brings benefits; but the good also brings benefit. It would seem, then, that where the true nature of god is, there too is the true nature of good. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.08.01) | |
A reaction: An enthymeme, missing the premise that there can only be one source of benefit (which sounds unlikely). Does god bring anything other than benefits? And does the good? I think this is an idea from later platonism. |
23360 | Each of the four elements in you is entirely scattered after death [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Whatever was in you of fire, departs into fire; what was of earth, into earth; what of air, into air; what of water, into water. There is no Hades, nor Acheron. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.13.15) | |
A reaction: This sort of remark may explain why so few of the great Stoic texts (such as those of Chrysippus) survived the Christian era. |