6 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
| From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
| A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
| 14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: Chance is the name for some law that is unknown to us? If you say 'each die moves under the influence of precise mechanical laws', it seems to me it is not these laws which made the tie turn up sixes, for the laws act the same when other throws come up. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.333) |
| 14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: Among some of the lower organisms, it is a moot point with biologists whether there be anything which ought to be called death. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.334) | |
| A reaction: The point, presumably, is that one phase of an organisms moves into another, and the 'individuals' are not distinct enough for their 'death' to be a significant transition. A nicely mind-expanding thought. |
| 5126 | A carelessly thrown brick is condemned much more if it hits someone [Smith,A, by Harman] |
| Full Idea: Adam Smith wrote about the influence of fortune on moral judgements, giving nice examples. Someone carelessly throws a brick over a wall. His companion may complain even if no harm is done. But if the brick hits someone much greater condemnation ensues. | |
| From: report of Adam Smith (The Theory of Moral Sentiments [1759]) by Gilbert Harman - Moral Philosophy meets social psychology 10.7.1.2 | |
| A reaction: This appears to be the earliest observation of the phenomenon of moral luck, though Plato (Idea 269) endorsed the view that the luck of outcome should be taken into account in moral judgements. |
| 14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: The mechanical philosopher leaves the whole specification of the world utterly unaccounted for, which is pretty nearly as bad as to baldly attribute it to chance. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.337) | |
| A reaction: If now complete is even remotely available, then that doesn't seem to matter too much, but if there is one message modern physics teaches philosophy, it is that we should not give up on trying to answer the deeper questions. |
| 14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: Try to verify any law of nature, and you will find that the more precise your observations, the more certain they will be to show irregular departures from the law. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.331) | |
| A reaction: This nicely encapsulates modern doubts about whether the so-called 'laws' of nature actually capture what is going on in the real world. |