10 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
| From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
| A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
| 2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy marks the limits of human theoretical intelligence. Philosophy is an attempt to overstep our cognitive bounds, a kind of magnificent failure. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.209) | |
| A reaction: No one attempts to overstep boundaries once they are confirmed as such. The magnificent attempts persist because failure is impossible to demonstrate (except, perhaps, by Gödel's Theorem). |
| 2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Our thoughts have a kind of duality, corresponding to their surface appearance to introspection and their underlying logical reality. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.147) |
| 2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: The prevailing view in cognitive psychology is that the mind consists of separate faculties, each with a certain cognitive task: linguistic, social, practical, theoretical, abstract, spatial and emotional. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.40) | |
| A reaction: 'Faculties' are not quite the same as 'modules', and this list mostly involves more higher-order activities than a modules list (e.g. Idea 2495). The idea that emotion is a 'faculty' sounds old-fashioned. |
| 2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Free will is mental causation in action. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.167) |
| 2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: All matter must contain the potential to underlie consciousness, since there is nothing special about the matter that composes brain tissue. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.100) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me one of the most basic assumptions which we should all make about the mind. The mind is made of the brain, and the brain is made of food. However, there must be something 'special' about the brain. |
| 2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: You can look into your mind until you burst and not discover neurons and synapses, and you can stare at someone's brain from dawn till dusk and not perceive the consciousness that is so apparent to the person whose brain it is. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.47) | |
| A reaction: This is a striking symmetry of ignorance, though hardly enough to justify McGinn's pessimism about understanding the mind. 'When you are in the grass you can't see the whole of England; if you can see the whole of England, you won't see the grass'. |
| 2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: There is information in a system if there are symbols in it that refer to things and that together form strings that can be true or false. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.225) | |
| A reaction: We can also directly apprehend information by perception. Are facts identical with correct information? Can a universal generalisation be information? |
| 2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Causation in the material world works by energy transfer of some sort: transfer of motion, of electrical energy, of gravitational force. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.92) |
| 16697 | Time is independent of motion, because God could stop everything for a short or long time [Crathorn, by Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Suppose God annihilates everything, and then creates something new. The vacant interval could last a shorter or longer time, so there are facts about time independent of facts about motion. | |
| From: report of William Crathorn (Sentences [1335], I.16, concl.2) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.2 | |
| A reaction: Not very persuasive if God is in some way 'timeless'. Crathorn would have loved Shoemaker's argument, where motionless time is the best explanation, rather than a possible explanation. |