Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'There is no question of physicalism' and 'Tonk, Plonk and Plink'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
     From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
     A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: It is sometimes contended that the whole idea of materialism is somehow empty, on the grounds that there is no proper way to characterize the 'physical' realm.
     From: report of DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.1
     A reaction: [Papineau also cites Gabriel Segal] I agree with Papineau in rejecting this. Uncertainties about quantum states do not pose a problem, and the position tends to have an implicit dualism buried in it somewhere.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Analytic explanation is wholes in terms of parts; synthetic is parts in terms of wholes or contexts [Belnap]
     Full Idea: Throughout the whole texture of philosophy we distinguish two modes of explanation: the analytic mode, which tends to explain wholes in terms of parts, and the synthetic mode, which explains parts in terms of the wholes or contexts in which they occur.
     From: Nuel D. Belnap (Tonk, Plonk and Plink [1962], p.132)
     A reaction: The analytic would be bottom-up, and the synthetic would be top-down. I'm inclined to combine them, and say explanation begins with a model, which can then be sliced in either direction, though the bottom looks more interesting.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane]
     Full Idea: The problem thoughts pose for causation is that causation depends directly only on intrinsic properties, whereas the causal powers of token thoughts depend on their contents, which are not intrinsic.
     From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.194)
     A reaction: This, as we find later in the paper, depends on an externalist account of thoughts. Could a relational property not be causal? Edinburgh's being wetter than London is caused by its being further north?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane]
     Full Idea: There are many psychophysical laws, linking sensations to non-mental features of those who have them; the industries of anaesthetics, scents, narcotics, sweeteners, coloured paints, loudspeakers and soft cushions depend on them.
     From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.198)
     A reaction: It may be expressing it a little strongly to call these 'laws', but they are certainly reliable regularities, and they are probably enough to undermine Davidson's claim that such laws don't exist.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]
     Full Idea: Neither laws nor causation nor claims of supervenience (the last refuge of the physicalist) deprive psychology of the ontological authority of non-mental science.
     From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.203)
     A reaction: There is no need to defend the practice of psychologists (or garden designers) from the depradations of bandit physicalists. But what is the ontology of psychology if it isn't dualist or physicalist?