6 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
| From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
| A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
| 3653 | My Meditations are the complete foundation of my physics [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: My six Meditations contain all the foundations of my physics, …and their principles destroy those of Aristotle. | |
| From: René Descartes (Letters to Mersenne [1640], 1641.01.28) |
| 4736 | Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined. | |
| From: René Descartes (Letters to Mersenne [1640], 1642), quoted by Pascal Engel - Truth Intro | |
| A reaction: This is the view endorsed by Davidson. It is tempting to take basic concepts as axiomatic, but philosophers can't make that move every time they are in trouble. I have to say, though, that truth is a good candidate. |
| 9465 | Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette] |
| Full Idea: The substitutional interpretation says the universal quantifier is true just in case it remains true for all substitutions of terms of the same type as that of the universally bound variable. | |
| From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to III: Quantifiers [2002], p.143) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem to tell us how it gets started with being true. |
| 9466 | Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette] |
| Full Idea: Some substitutional quantificationists in logic hope to avoid philosophical entanglements about the metaphysics of objects, ..and nominalists can find aid and comfort there. | |
| From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to III: Quantifiers [2002], p.143) | |
| A reaction: This has an appeal for me, particularly if it avoids abstract objects, but I don't see much problem with material objects, so we might as well have a view that admits those. |
| 3652 | I can't prove the soul is indestructible, only that it is separate from the mortal body [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I don't know how to demonstrate that God cannot annihilate the soul, but only that it is entirely distinct from the body, and consequently that it is not naturally subject to die with it, which is all that is required to establish religion. | |
| From: René Descartes (Letters to Mersenne [1640], 1640.02.24) |