7 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
| From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
| A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
| 24069 | Much metaphysical debate concerns what is fundamental, rather than what exists [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Some of the most important debates in metaphysics or ontology do not concern existential questions, but focus on questions of fundamentality. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 5 Intro) | |
| A reaction: In modern times we have added the structure of existence to the mere ontological catalogue, and this idea makes another important addition to our concept of metaphysics. She gives disagreement over tropes as an example. |
| 17697 | The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The standpoint of pure experience seems to me to be refuted by the objection that the existence, possible or actual, of an arbitrarily large number can never be derived through experience, that is, through experiment. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic [1904], p.130) | |
| A reaction: Alternatively, empiricism refutes infinite numbers! No modern mathematician will accept that, but you wonder in what sense the proposed entities qualify as 'numbers'. |
| 17698 | Logic already contains some arithmetic, so the two must be developed together [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: In the traditional exposition of the laws of logic certain fundamental arithmetic notions are already used, for example in the notion of set, and to some extent also of number. Thus we turn in a circle, and a partly simultaneous development is required. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic [1904], p.131) | |
| A reaction: If the Axiom of Infinity is meant, it may be possible to purge the arithmetic from the logic. Then the challenge to derive arithmetic from it becomes rather tougher. |
| 24065 | Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: A structured whole derives its unity from the way in which its parts interact with other parts to allow both the whole and its parts to manifest those of their capacities which require 'team work' among the parts. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is a culminating thesis of her book. She defends it at length. It looks like a nice theory for things which are lucky enough to have capacities involving teamwork. Does this mean a pebble can't be unified? She wants a dynamic view. |
| 24066 | The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Hylomorphists tend to agree that the form (rather than matter) explains 1) kind membership, 2) structure, 3) unity, 4) characteristic activities. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 3.2.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed; she explains each of them] Personally I would add continuity through change (statue/clay). Glad to see that kind membership is not part of the form. And what about explaining observed properties? Does form=essence? |
| 24067 | Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: It is difficult to see how forms could serve as cross-world identity principles for hylomorphic compounds, unless these forms are particular or individual entities. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 3.4.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a key part of her objection to treating the form as universal or generic. I agree with her view. |