25 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
| From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
| A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
| 22121 | The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus was the first scholastic to hold that the concept of being and other transcendentals were univocal, not only in application to substance and accidents, but even to God and creatures. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.205 | |
| A reaction: So either it exists or it doesn't. No nonsense about 'subsisting'. Russell flirted with subsistence, but Quine agrees with Duns Scotus (and so do I). |
| 22122 | Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus said the primary object of the created intellect was being, rejecting Aquinas's Aristotelian view that it was limited to the quiddity of the sense particular, and Henry of Ghent's Augustinian view that it was God. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.205 | |
| A reaction: I suppose the 'primary object of the intellect' is the rationalist/empiricism disagreement. So (roughly) Aquinas was an empiricist, Duns Scotus was a rationalist, and Augustine was a transcendentalist? Augustine sounds like Spinoza. |
| 22125 | Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus was a realist on the issue of universals and one of the main adversaries of Ockham's programme of nominalism. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: The view of Scotus seems to be the minority view. It is hard to find thinkers who really believe that universals have an independent existence. My interest in Duns Scotus waned when I read this. How does he imagine universals? |
| 22127 | Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Rejecting the standard views that essences are individuated by either actual existence, quantity or matter, Scotus said that the principle of individuation is a further substantial difference added to the species - the so-called haecceitas or 'thisness'. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: [Scotus seldom referred to 'haecceitas'] I suppose essences have prior existence, but are too generic, so something must fix an essence as pertaining to this particular object. Is the haecceitas part of the essence, or of the particular? |
| 22126 | Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus endorsed Avicenna's theory of the common nature, according to which the essences have an independence and priority to their existence as either universal in the mind or singular outside it. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: I occasionally meet this weird idea in modern discussions of essence (in Lowe?), and now see its origin. It makes little sense without a divine mind to support the independent essences. Scotus had to add a principle of individuation for essences. |
| 22129 | Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus grounded certitude in the knowledge of self-evident propositions, induction, and awareness of our own state. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: Induction looks like the weak link here. |
| 22130 | Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Scotus allocated to the intellect a direct, existential awareness of the intelligible object, called 'intuitive cognition', in contrast to abstractive knowledge, which seized the object independently of its presence to the intellect in actual existence. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: Presumably if you see a thing, shut your eyes and then know it, that is 'abstractive'. Scotus says open your eyes for proper knowledge. |
| 22128 | Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Scotus rejected Henry of Ghent's defence of Augustine's of knowledge by 'illumination', as leading to nothing but scepticism. ...After this, illumination never made a serious recovery. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 |
| 22131 | The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Scotus said the will is a power for opposites, in the sense that even when actually willing one thing, it retains a real, active power to will the opposite. He detaches the idea of freedom from time and variability. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: In the sense that we can abandon an action when in the middle of it, this seems to be correct. Not just 'I could have done otherwise', but 'I don't have to be doing this'. This shows that the will has wide power, but not that it is 'free'. |
| 3926 | The human heart has a natural concern for public good [Hume] |
| Full Idea: While the human heart is compounded of the same elements as at present, it will never be wholly indifferent to public good. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], IX.I.222) | |
| A reaction: Even criminals can be patriotic. Why do people dump rubbish in beauty spots? |
| 3929 | No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned [Hume] |
| Full Idea: What theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, that all the duties which it recommends, are also the true interest of each individual? | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], IX.II.228) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to disagree, even if occasional cases of extreme altruism can occur. |
| 3925 | Personal Merit is the possession of useful or agreeable mental qualities [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Personal Merit consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], IX.I.217) | |
| A reaction: If pleasure and utility can be intrinsically valuable, why can't virtue be as well? |
| 3922 | Justice only exists to support society [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The necessity of justice to the support of society is the sole foundation of that virtue. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], III.II.163) | |
| A reaction: A sense of fairness precedes the building of a society, rather than arising out of it. |
| 23560 | If we all naturally had everything we could ever desire, the virtue of justice would be irrelevant [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Suppose nature has bestowed on humans such abundance of external conveniences that every individual is fully provided with whatever his appetites can want. …Justice, in that case, would be totally useless, and have no place in the catalogue of virtues. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], I.III.145) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This seems to emphasise possessions and satisfaction of appetites, but presumably it would also need total security from other humans, which nature might struggle to provide. No sharing in this imagined world. |
| 3918 | Moral philosophy aims to show us our duty [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], I.136) | |
| A reaction: A surprising view from someone who thinks morals are basically sentiment. |
| 3919 | Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Inference and conclusions of the understanding have no hold of the affections nor set in motion the active powers of man. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], I.136) | |
| A reaction: I disagree. This is a typical empiricist separation of ideas from experience, of inner from outer, of analytic from synthetic. |
| 3928 | Virtue just requires careful calculation and a preference for the greater happiness [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The sole trouble which virtue demands is that of just calculation, and a steady preference for the greater happiness. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], IX.II.228) | |
| A reaction: Hume was the parent of utilitarianism. Can one person exhibit virtue on a desert island? |
| 3923 | No one would cause pain to a complete stranger who happened to be passing [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Would any man, who is walking along, tread as willingly on another's gouty toes, whom he has no quarrel with, as on the hard flint and pavement? | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], V.II.183) | |
| A reaction: He is right that we empathise with the pain of others, and this is presumably one of the bases of morality. Animals lack sympathy for other animals. |
| 3924 | Nature makes private affections come first, because public concerns are spread too thinly [Hume] |
| Full Idea: It is wisely ordained by nature, that private connexions should commonly prevail over universal views and considerations; otherwise our affections and actions would be dissipated and lost, for want of a proper limited object. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], V.II.186n) | |
| A reaction: A very good objection to the excessively altruistic demands of utilitarianism. |
| 3921 | The safety of the people is the supreme law [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The safety of the people is the supreme law. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], III.II.157) | |
| A reaction: No political system ever seems able to disagree with this. |
| 3927 | Society prefers helpful lies to harmful truth [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Truths which are pernicious to society, if any such there be, will yield to errors which are salutary and advantageous. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], IX.II.228) | |
| A reaction: Hume probably meant religion. Two centuries later we have a greater appetite for uncomfortable truth. |
| 3920 | If you equalise possessions, people's talents will make them unequal again [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Render possessions ever so equal, men's different degrees of art, care, and industry will immediately break that equality. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], III.II.155) | |
| A reaction: This might not be so if there is a totalitarian restriction of economic freedom. |
| 22123 | The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus establishes God as first efficient cause, as ultimate final cause, and as most eminent being - his so-called 'triple primacy' - and says there is a unique nature within these primacies. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: This is the first stage of Duns Scotus's unusually complex argument for God's existence. Asserting the actual infinity of this unique being concludes his argument. |
| 22124 | We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus rejected the traditional argument that the infinity of God can be inferred from creation ex nihilo. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: He accepted the infinity of God, however, but not for this reason. I don't know why he rejected it. I suppose the rejected claim is that something has to be infinite, and if it isn't the Cosmos then that leaves God? |