Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'How to Russell a Frege-Church' and 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions

11989	For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: It is a tenet of Russell's theory that all expressions, and especially definite descriptions, whose denotation is dependent upon contingent circumstances must be eliminated.
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], II)

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences

15990	Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
	Full Idea: I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism

11990	'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: The doctrine that we can ask whether this is the same individual in another possible world, and that a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance, I call 'Haecceitism'.
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
	A reaction: Penelope Mackie emphasises that this doctrine, that each thing is somehow individuated, is not the same as believing in actual haecceities, specific properties which achieve the individuating.

9668	'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: That a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance I call 'haecceitism'. (I prefer the pronunciation Hex'-ee-i-tis-m).
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
	A reaction: [odd pronunciation, if 'haec' is pronounced haeek] The view seems to be very unpopular (e.g. with Lewis, Bird and Mumford). But there is an intuitive sense of whether or not two things are identical when they seem dissimilar.

11991	If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: If one regards the usual form of quantification into modal and other intensional contexts - modality de re - as legitimate (without special explanations), then one seems committed to some form of haecceitism.
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
	A reaction: That is, modal reference requires fixed identities, irrespective of possible changes in properties. Why could one not refer to objects just as bundles of properties, with some sort of rules about when it ceased to be that particular bundle (keep 60%?)?

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty

15994	If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
	Full Idea: What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.