Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Counterfactuals' and 'Philosophical Theology'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
     From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
     A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson]
     Full Idea: Unlike Stalnaker, Lewis holds that indicative conditionals have the truth conditions of material conditionals.
     From: report of David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973]) by Frank Jackson - Conditionals 'Further'
     A reaction: Thus Lewis only uses the possible worlds account for subjunctive conditionals, where Stalnaker uses it for both. Lewis is defending the truth-functional account for the indicative conditionals.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich]
     Full Idea: According to Lewis, a counterfactual holds when the consequent is true in possible worlds very like our own except for the fact that the antecedent is true.
     From: report of David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973]) by Paul Horwich - Lewis's Programme p.213
     A reaction: Presumably the world being very like our own would make it unlikely that there would be anything else to cause the consequent, apart from the counterfactual antecedent.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A contingent generalization is a law of nature if and only if it appears as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that achieves a best combination of simplicity and strength.
     From: David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973], 3.3)
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Design is seen in the way ideas match the world, in the mechanisms of evolution, and in values [Tennant,FR, by PG]
     Full Idea: There is evidence for design in the correspondence of pure ideas to the world, in the origin and mechanism of evolution, and in the existence of moral values and beauty.
     From: report of F.R. Tennant (Philosophical Theology [1930], II.IV) by PG - Db (ideas)