Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Against 'Ostrich Nominalism'' and 'Positions'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction

8216	Deconstruction is not neutral; it intervenes [Derrida]
	Full Idea: Deconstruction, I have insisted, is not neutral. It intervenes.
	From: Jacques Derrida (Positions [1971], p.76)
	A reaction: This, I think, is because there is in Derrida, as in most French philosophers, a strong streak of Marxism, and a desire to change the world, rather than merely understanding it. Idea 8213 shows the sort of thing he wants to change.

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic

8213	I try to analyse certain verbal concepts which block and confuse the dialectical process [Derrida]
	Full Idea: I have tried to analyse certain marks in writing which are undecidables, false verbal properties, which inhabit philosophical opposition, resisting and disorganising it, without ever constituting a third term, withour ever leaving room for a solution.
	From: Jacques Derrida (Positions [1971], p.40)
	A reaction: [I have simplified his sentence!] Much of Derrida seems to be a commentary on the Hegelian dialectic, and the project is presumably to figure out why philosophy is not advancing in the way we would like. Interesting...

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality

8507	Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong]
	Full Idea: Some philosophers (like Devitt) think of reality as made up of things. Others, like me, think of it as made up of facts or states of affairs.
	From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3)
	A reaction: Devitt is a follower of Quine on this. Personally I rather like 'processes'. Unanalysed things with predication (Quine) don't look promising. I currently favour things with active powers, which give rise to properties. See Shoemaker and Ellis.

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

8506	Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong]
	Full Idea: I favour the Realist view that while we can distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties, but the two 'factors' are too intimately together to speak of a relation between them.
	From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3)
	A reaction: Is Armstrong being a bit of an ostrich here? We could talk of part-whole relationships, or internal relations, or set membership, or coinciding objects, or bundles. We certainly ought to have a go. Armstrong approaches Quine here!

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism

8505	Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong]
	Full Idea: A philosophical account of a general sort is required of what it is for different tokens to be of the same type. To refuse to give such an account is to be a metaphysical ostrich.
	From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §1)
	A reaction: This defines Ostrich Nominalism (a label Armstrong aims at Quine). I certainly sympathise with Armstrong. If there is no more to a class (a type) than just having members (tokens), nothing is explain. What is natural, essential, intensional etc.?