Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' and 'On the Basis of Morality'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers

19044	Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
	Full Idea: The notion of fitting the totality of experience ...adds nothing intelligible to the simple concept of being true. ....Nothing, ...no thing, makes sentences and theories true: not experience, not surface irritations, not the world.
	From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.11), quoted by Willard Quine - On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma p.39
	A reaction: If you don't have a concept of what normally makes a sentence true, I don't see how you go about distinguishing what is true from what is false. You can't just examine the sentence to see if it has the 'primitive' property of truth. Holism is involved....

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique

6400	Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson]
	Full Idea: The third dogma of empiricism is the dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, which cannot be made intelligible and defensible. If we give it up, it is not clear that any distinctive empiricism remains.
	From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.189)
	A reaction: The first two dogmas were 'analyticity' and 'reductionism', as identified by Quine in 1953. Presumably Hume's Principles of Association (Idea 2189) would be an example of a scheme. A key issue is whether there is any 'pure' content.

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique

6398	Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson]
	Full Idea: Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them.
	From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.184)
	A reaction: This seems right to me. I am very struck by the close similarities between people from wildly differing cultural backgrounds, as seen, for example, at the Olympic Games.

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation

6399	Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson]
	Full Idea: Studying the criteria of translation is a way of focusing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes.
	From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.184)
	A reaction: This is why it was an inspired idea of Quine's to make translation a central topic in philosophy. We must be cautious, though, about saying that the language is the conceptual scheme, as that leaves animals with no scheme at all.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics

21375	Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational [Schopenhauer]
	Full Idea: Reasonable and vicious are quite consistent with each other, in fact, only through their union are great and far-reaching crimes possible.
	From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.83), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
	A reaction: This is opposed to Kant, who always looks wildly optimistic in his hope that high rationality entails a morally good will. Good people seem to have a fairly irrational empathy with their fellow citizens.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature

21379	Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion [Schopenhauer]
	Full Idea: Man's three fundamental ethical incentives, egoism, malice and compassion, are present in everyone in different and incredibly unequal proportions. In accordance with them, motives will operate on man and actions will ensue.
	From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.192), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Egoism'
	A reaction: A well chosen trio. Kant would be shocked that he has left out duty, which is supposed to rise above such feelings.

25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights

21376	Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives [Schopenhauer]
	Full Idea: In philosophical morals animals are mere 'things', mere means to any end whatsoever. ...Shame on such a morality, that fails to recognise the eternal essence that lives in every living thing, and shines forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes.
	From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.96), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
	A reaction: Good. I find Kant's theoretical indifference to animals very creepy (despite his kind attitude to them). And I also think the utilitarians are wrong to only value animals for their pain, as if any animal could be shredded for fun, if it felt no pain.