14 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
23269 | Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen] |
Full Idea: True philosophers concern themselves first and foremost to take clearly observed facts as their point of departure. | |
From: Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170], Kiv.11.817) | |
A reaction: I love this one, especially the desire that the facts be 'clearly observed'. That, thank goodness, eliminates quantum mechanics. If you don't love history and the physical sciences, you are not a philosopher. Oh, and reliable gossip. |
23266 | The spirit in the soul wants freedom, power and honour [Galen] |
Full Idea: The spirited part of the soul is desiderative of freedom, victory, power, authority, reputation, and honour. | |
From: Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170], Kiv.2.772) | |
A reaction: This is the concept of 'thumos' [spirit], taken straight from Plato's tripartite account of the soul, in 'Republic'. Note that it includes a desire for freedom (in an age of slavery). |
23219 | Stopping the heart doesn't terminate activity; pressing the brain does that [Galen, by Cobb] |
Full Idea: Even when an animals heart was stopped [by hand] it continued its muted whimpers, …but when the brain was pressed the animal stopped making a noise and became unconscious. | |
From: report of Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170]) by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 1 | |
A reaction: It's not that the ancients didn't do science. It's that ancient people paid no attention to what their scientists discovered. |
23264 | Philosophers think faculties are in substances, and invent a faculty for every activity [Galen] |
Full Idea: Philosophers conceive of faculties as things which inhabit 'substances' much as we inhabit houses, not realising that causes of events are conceived in relational terms. We therefore attribute as many faculties to a substance as activities. | |
From: Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170], Kiv.2.769) | |
A reaction: This seems to demolish speculative faculties, but they were revived during the Enlightenment. I am happy to talk of 'philosophical faculties' where they are presumed to originate a type of thought, without commitment to any neuroscience. |
23220 | The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision [Galen] |
Full Idea: The brain is the principal organ of the psychical members. For within the brain is seated memory, reason and intellect, and from the brain is distributed the power, sensation and voluntary motion. | |
From: Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170]), quoted by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 1 | |
A reaction: [not sure of ref] Interesting that he assigns the whole of mind to the brain, and not just some aspect of it. He had done experiments. Understanding the role of the brain was amazingly slow. Impeded by religion, I guess. |
23265 | The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen] |
Full Idea: That part of the soul which we call rational is desiderative: …it desires truth, knowledge, learning, understanding, and recollection - in short, all the good things. | |
From: Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170], Kiv.2.772) | |
A reaction: Truth is no surprise, but recollection is. Note the separation of knowledge from understanding. This is a very good characterisation of rationality. For the Greeks it has a moral dimension, of wanting what is good. |
3785 | You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover] |
Full Idea: A mistake of consequentialists is to treat actions as though they can somehow be isolated from the people performing them. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) | |
A reaction: I agree. The weather produces consequences. Morality is about people. Crocodiles, for example, are exempt. |
3786 | Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover] |
Full Idea: Forming the intention to use nuclear retaliation if attacked may both be the best way to avoid the catastrophe of nuclear war and at the same time be morally corrupting. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) | |
A reaction: A famous moment in 2017 when Jeremy Corbyn refused to say he would be willing to use the weapons, if elected. It would be hard to sustain a determination to do it, and then reject it at the crucial moment. |
3784 | Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover] |
Full Idea: The deontological view is that some acts are absolutely prohibited, regardless of consequences. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) |
3782 | Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG] |
Full Idea: Objections to utilitarianism as maximisation of preferences: faded past desires or the desires of the dead; obtaining desires and happiness are different; fewer desires are easier to satisfy; pain is good if it can be removed. | |
From: report of Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Two) by PG - Db (ideas) |
3787 | Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover] |
Full Idea: Rule-utilitarianism seems either to collapse into act-utilitarianism, or else it is only partly utilitarian. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Six) |
3783 | How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover] |
Full Idea: There are deep problems for utilitarianism in trying to work out what the ideal population size would be. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Four) |
23268 | We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen] |
Full Idea: We kill the irredeemably wicked, for three reasons: that they may no longer harm us; as a deterrent to others like them; and because it is actually better from their own point of view to die, when their souls are so damaged they cannot be improved. | |
From: Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170], Kiv.11.816) | |
A reaction: The third one sounds like a dubious rationalisation, given that the prisoner probably disagrees. Nowadays we are not so quick to judge someone as irredeemable. The first one works when they run wild, but not after their capture. |