Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Secret Connexion' and 'Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism

19494	Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo]
	Full Idea: The fictionalist offers the option that your simulated beliefs and assertions may be tracking a realm of genuine facts, or a realm of what you take to be facts.
	From: Stephen Yablo (Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism [2001], 13)
	A reaction: This means that fictionalism does not have to be an error theory. That is, we aren't mistakenly believing something that we actually made up. Instead we are sensibly believing something we know to be not literally true. Love it.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions

19493	Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo]
	Full Idea: The governing fiction of possible worlds theory says that whenever something is possible, there is a world where it happens.
	From: Stephen Yablo (Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism [2001], 05)
	A reaction: This sounds like the only sensible attitude to possible worlds I can think of.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction

8338	A phenomenalist about objects has to be a regularity theorist about causation [Strawson,G]
	Full Idea: If you are a phenomenalist about objects, then there is an important sense in which you ought to be a Regularity theorist about what causation is, in such objects.
	From: Galen Strawson (The Secret Connexion [1989], App C)
	A reaction: Strawson is denying that Hume is a phenomenalist. One might go a little further, and say that a phenomenalist should abandon the idea of causation (as Russell did).