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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Foucault: a very short introduction' and 'Papers of 1913'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
21943 Since Kant, self-criticism has been part of philosophy [Gutting]
     Full Idea: Philosophy after Kant has involved a continuing critique of its own project.
     From: Gary Gutting (Foucault: a very short introduction [2005], 6)
     A reaction: I'm struck by many modern philosophers in the analytic tradition who write as if Kant had never existed. I don't know if that is a conscious decision, but it may be a good one.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
     From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
     A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
21944 Structuralism describes human phenomena in terms of unconscious structures [Gutting]
     Full Idea: Structuralism in the 1960s was a set of theories which explained human phenomena in terms of underlying unconscious structures, rather than the lived experience described by Phenomenology.
     From: Gary Gutting (Foucault: a very short introduction [2005], 6)
     A reaction: Hence the interest in Freud and Marx, and Foucault's interest in history, each offering to unmask what is hidden in consciousness. The unmasking is a basically Kantian project. Cf. Frege's hatred of 'psychologism'.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
22308 Only the actual exists, so possibilities always reduce to actuality after full analysis [Russell]
     Full Idea: Possibility always marks insufficient analysis: when analysis is completed, only the actual can be relevant, for the simple reason that there is only the actual, and that the mere possibility is nothing.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Papers of 1913 [1913], VII.26), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 42 'Logic'
     A reaction: Quine agreed with Russell on this. You won't get far in life if you deny possibilities. The answer is to recognise that the actual is dynamic, and not passive.