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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Particle Zoo' and 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism'

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46 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
     From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
     A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis]
     Full Idea: The methodology of metaphysics... is that of arguing to the simplest explanation, without regard to testability.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 1)
     A reaction: I love that! I'd be a bit cautious about 'simplest', since 'everything is the output of an ineffable God' is beautifully simple, and brings the whole discussion to a halt. I certainly think metaphysics goes deeper than testing. String Theory?
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis]
     Full Idea: In logic, acceptability conditions can replace truth conditions, ..and the only price one has to pay for this is that one has to abandon the implausible Fregean idea that logic is the theory of truth preservation.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 1)
     A reaction: This has always struck me as correct, given that if you assign T and F in a semantics, they don't have to mean 'true' and 'false', and that you can do very good logic with propositions which you think are entirely false.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis]
     Full Idea: I wish to explore the idea that mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6)
     A reaction: Categorical dimensions are spatiotemporal relations and other non-causal properties. Ellis defends categorical properties as an aspect of science. The obvious connection seems to be with structuralism in mathematics. Shapiro is sympathetic.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
     Full Idea: The category of natural kinds of objects or substances should be regarded simply as a subcategory of the category of the natural kinds of processes.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3)
     A reaction: This is a new, and interesting, proposal from Ellis (which will be ignored by the philosophical community, as all new theories coming from elderly philosophers are ignored! Cf Idea 12652). A good knowledge of physics is behind Ellis's claim.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis]
     Full Idea: We may define a physical event as any change of distribution of energy in any of its forms.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2)
     A reaction: This seems to result in an awful lot of events. My own (new this morning) definition is: 'An event is a process which can be individuated in time'. Now you just have to work out what a 'process' is, but that's easier than understanding an 'event'.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis]
     Full Idea: We may define a physical property as one whose value is relevant, in some circumstances, to how a physical system is likely to act.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2)
     A reaction: Fair enough, but can we use the same 'word' property when we are discussing abstractions? Does 'The Enlightenment' have properties? Do very simple things have properties? Can 'red' act, if it isn't part of any physical system?
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
     Full Idea: I want to insist on the existence of a class of categorical properties distinct from causal powers. This is contentious, for there is a growing body of opinion that all properties are causal powers.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], Intro)
     A reaction: Alexander Bird makes a case against categorical properties. If what is meant is that 'being an electron' is the key property of an electron, then I disagree (quite strongly) with Ellis. Ellis says they are needed to explain causal powers.
Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
     Full Idea: Essentialist metaphysics seem to require that there be at least two kinds of properties in nature: dispositional properties (causal powers, capacities and propensities), and categorical ones (spatiotemporal and numerical relations).
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3)
     A reaction: At last someone tells us what a 'categorical' property is! Couldn't find it in Stanford! Bird and Molnar reject the categorical ones as true properties. If there are six cats, which cat has the property of being six? Which cat is 'three metres apart'?
Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
     Full Idea: Spatial, temporal and numerical relations can have various causal roles without themselves being instances of causal powers.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3)
     A reaction: He cites gaps, aggregates, orientations, approaching and receding, as examples of categorical properties which make a causal difference. I would have thought these could be incorporated in accounts of more basic causal powers.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
     Full Idea: To regard properties as sets of individuals, and relations as sets of ordered individuals, is to make a nonsense of the whole idea of discovering a new property or relationship. Sets are defined or constructed, not discovered.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2)
     A reaction: This bizarre view of properties (as sets) drives me crazy, until it dawns on you that they are just using the word 'property' in a different way, probably coextensively with 'predicate', in order to make the logic work.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis]
     Full Idea: A causal power can never be dependent on anything that does not have any causal powers.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3)
     A reaction: Sounds right, though you worry when philosophers make such bold assertions about such extreme generalities. But see Idea 12667. This is, of course, the key argument for saying that causal powers are the bedrock of reality, and of explanation.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE]
     Full Idea: Ellis allows categoricals alongside powers, …to influence the sort of manifestations produced by powers. He lists structures, arrangements, distances, orientations, and magnitudes.
     From: report of Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009]) by Neil E. Williams - The Powers Metaphysics 05.2
     A reaction: I would have thought that all of these could be understood as manifestations of powers. The odd one out is distances, but then space and time are commonly overlooked in every attempt to produce a complete ontology. [also Molnar 2003:164].
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis]
     Full Idea: The causal powers are just a proper subset of the dispositional properties.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 5)
     A reaction: Sounds wrong. Causal powers have a physical reality, while a disposition sounds as if it can wholly described by a counterfactual claim. It seems better to say that things have dispositions because they have powers.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis]
     Full Idea: I would define categorical properties as those whose identities depend only on the kinds of structures they represent.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3 n8)
     A reaction: Aha. So categorical properties would be much more perspicaciously labelled as 'structural' properties. Why does philosophical terminology make it all more difficult than it needs to be?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis]
     Full Idea: A distinctive set of intrinsic properties for a given kind is called a 'real essence'.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3)
     A reaction: Note that he thinks essence is a set of properties (rather than what gives rise to the properties), and that it is kinds (and not individuals) which have real essences, and that one role of the properties is to be 'distinctive' of the kind. Cf. Oderberg.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis]
     Full Idea: Metaphysical necessitation is the relation that holds between things in the world and the things they make true.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 1)
     A reaction: Not sure about that. It implies that it is sentences that have necessity, and he confirms it by calling it 'a semantic relation'. So there are no necessities if there are no sentences? Not the Brian Ellis we know and love.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis]
     Full Idea: A metaphysically necessary proposition is one that is true in virtue of the essential nature of things.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6)
     A reaction: It take this to be what Kit Fine argues for, though it tracks back to Aristotle. I also take it to be correct, though one might ask whether there are any other metaphysical necessities, ones not depending on essences.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis]
     Full Idea: The primary aim of science is to explain what happens, not just to describe it.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2)
     A reaction: This I take to be a good motto for scientific essentialism. Any scientist who is happy with anything less than explanation is a mere journeyman, a servant in the kitchens of the great house of science.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
     Full Idea: There are natural kinds of processes.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3)
     A reaction: Interesting. I am tempted by the view that processes are the most basic feature of reality, since I think of the mind as a process, and quantum reality seems more like processes than like objects.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis]
     Full Idea: Natural kind structures go all the way down to the most basic levels of existence.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3)
     A reaction: Even the bottom level? Is there anything to explain why the bottom level is a kind, given that all the higher kinds presumably have an explanation?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis]
     Full Idea: The laws of nature must be supposed to be just descriptions of the ways in which things are intrinsically disposed to behave: of how they would behave if they existed as closed and isolated systems.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3)
     A reaction: I agree with this, and therefore take 'laws of nature' to be eliminable from any plausible ontology (which just contains the things and their behaviour). Ellis tends to defend laws, when he doesn't need to.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis]
     Full Idea: The classical conception of force is an entity that intervenes between a physical cause and its effect, but is not itself a physical cause. I see no reason to believe in forces of this kind.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2)
     A reaction: The difference of view between Leibniz and Newton is very illuminating on this one (coming this way soon!). Can you either have forces and drop causation, or have causation and drop forces?
Relativity and Quantum theory give very different accounts of forces [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: General Relativity and quantum mechanics are the two great theories in physics today but they give two very different ideas for how forces work.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 01)
     A reaction: Relativity says it is space curvature, and quantum theory says it is particle exchange? But is there a Relativity account of the strong nuclear force?
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis]
     Full Idea: Perhaps the most important of all multi-valued properties is energy itself. I think a scientific realist must believe that energy exists.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2)
     A reaction: It's odd that the existence of the most basic thing in physics needs a credo from a certain sort of believer. I have been bothered by notion of 'energy' for fifty years, and am still none the wiser. I'm sure I could be scientific realist without it.
Thermodynamics introduced work and entropy, to understand steam engine efficiency [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: The Laws of Thermodynamics introduced the concepts of entropy and work; put simply, how much useful energy you can really get out of a steam engine.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 03)
     A reaction: The point of science by this stage was to introduce measurable and quantifiable concepts
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Photons are B and W° bosons, linked by the Higgs mechanism [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: The photon is actually a mix of two deeper things, the B and the W°, tied together by the Higgs mechanism.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 06)
     A reaction: The B (for 'Boson') transmits a force associated with the 'winding symmetry'. (I record this without properly understanding it.)
Spinning electric charge produces magnetism, so all fermions are magnets [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: The muon, like all fermions, spins - and because a spinning electric charge generates a magnetic field all fermions act like tiny bar magnets.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 11)
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons may have smaller components, bound by a new force [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: Quarks, leptons or bosons may actually be made up of something even smaller, bound together by a conjectural new force.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 05)
     A reaction: Electrons are a type of lepton. Compare Idea 21180, from the same book. If electrons are not fundamental, what matters is not some 'stuff' they are made of, but a different force that would bind the ingredients.
Electrons are fundamental and are not made of anything; they are properties without size [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: As far as we can tell, electrons (and quarks) are fundamental. They are not small lumps of material, because we could always ask what the material is. The electron just ...is. They are collections of properties, with no apparent size.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 01)
     A reaction: This idea from physics HAS to be of interest to philosophers! The bundle theory is discredited for normal objects and for minds, and so is the substrate idea for supporting properties. But rigorous physics accepts a bundle theory.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum mechanics is our only theory, and is very precise, and repeatedly confirmed [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: Quantum mechanics is the only working description of the universe that we have. It is amazingly precise, and so far every experimental test has verified its predictions.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 02)
     A reaction: I take it from this that quantum mechanics is simply TRUE. Get over it! It will never turn out to be wrong, but may be subsumed within some more fine-grained or extensive theory.
Physics was rewritten to explain stable electron orbits [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: Explaining the stable electron orbits would require a complete rewriting of the physics of subatomic particles.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 03)
     A reaction: This really looks like a simple and major landmark moment. You can ignore a single anomaly, but not a central feature of your entire theory.
Virtual particles can't be measured, and can ignore the laws of physics [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: We can never measure these virtual (transitory) particles directly, and it turns out that they don't even have to obey the laws of physics.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 05)
     A reaction: These seems to be the real significance of the Uncertainty Principle. Such particles 'borrow' huge amounts of energy for very short times.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
Colour charge is positive or negative, and also has red, green or blue direction [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: Colour charge is 'three-dimensional'. As well as the charge having a positive or negative sign, it can also have a direction, and for convenience these three different directions (pointing like a weather vane) are labelled 'red', 'green' and 'blue'.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 04)
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / b. Standard model
The Standard Model omits gravity, because there are no particles involved [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: Gravity is not included in the Standard Model because we simply cannot study it using particles.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 09)
     A reaction: I'm guessing that Einstein describes how gravity behaves, but not what it is.
In Supersymmetry the Standard Model simplifies at high energies [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: Supersymmetry suggest that the Standard Model becomes much simpler at high energies.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10)
Standard Model forces are one- two- and three-dimensional [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: The forces in the Standard Model are built on gauge symmetries, with a one-dimensional charge (like electromagnetism), a two-dimensional charge (the weak force), and a three dimensional charge (the strong force).
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10)
     A reaction: See also Idea 21185.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties
Quarks and leptons have a weak charge, for the weak force [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: For the weak force there must be a corresponding 'weak charge', and all the fermions, all the quarks and leptons carry it.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 05)
     A reaction: So electrons carry a weak charge, as well as an electromagnetic charge. Like owning several passports.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / e. Protons
Quarks rush wildly around in protons, restrained by the gluons [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: Inside a proton the quarks are rushing around like caged animals, free to move until they push against the bars to try to escape, when the gluons pull them back in.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 04)
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / f. Neutrinos
Neutrinos only interact with the weak force, but decays produce them in huge numbers [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: Neutrinos only interact with the weak force, which means they barely interact at all, but because the weak force is crucial in the decays of so many other particles, neutrinos are still produced in huge numbers.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 08)
     A reaction: They only interact with the W and Z bosons.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / c. Supersymmetry
To combine the forces, they must all be the same strength at some point [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: If all the forces are to combine, at some point they must all be the same strength, and Supersymmetry (SuSy) makes this happen.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10)
     A reaction: This sounds like an impressive reason for favouring supersymmetry - as long as you have an a priori preference for everything combining.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
'Space' in physics just means location [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: 'Space' in physics really just means location.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 06)
     A reaction: Location can, of course, only be specified relative to something else. Space is really an abstraction, but at least it means there is some sort of background to locate all the fundamental fields.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis]
     Full Idea: Cosmologists have a concept of objective simultaneity, which they take to mean something like 'temporally equidistant from the Big Bang'.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6)
     A reaction: I find this very appealing, when faced with all the relativity theory that tells me there is no such thing as global simultaneity, a claim which I find deeply counterintuitive, but seems to have the science on its side. Bravo.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis]
     Full Idea: The global wavefront that collapses when a light signal from the Big Bang is observed is what most plausibly defines the frontier between past and future.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6)
     A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but it is clearly worth passing on. Of all the deep mysteries, the 'present' time may be the deepest.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 8. Dark Matter
The universe is 68% dark energy, 27% dark matter, 5% regular matter [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: The most precise surveys of the stars and galaxies tell us that the universe is made up of 68% dark energy, 27% dark matter, and just 5% regular matter (the stuff of the Standard Model of particle physics).
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 09)
     A reaction: Regular matter - that's me, that is.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 9. Fine-Tuned Universe
If a cosmic theory relies a great deal on fine-tuning basic values, it is probably wrong [Hesketh]
     Full Idea: If a theory has to rely on excessive 'fine-tuning', a series of extremely unlikely events in order to produce the universe we see around us, then it is extremely unlikely that this theory is correct.
     From: Gavin Hesketh (The Particle Zoo [2016], 10)
     A reaction: He says the Standard Model has 26 parameters which are only known by experiment, rather than by theory. So instead of saying '...so there is a God', we should say '...so our theory isn't very good'.