97 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
23000 | Vicious regresses force you to another level; non-vicious imply another level [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: A regress is vicious if the problem at level n can only be solved at level n+1; it is non-vicious if it can be solved at n, but the solution forces another level n+1, where the problem can be reformulated. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 2.3.2) | |
A reaction: So in a vicious regress you chase the apparent solution, but never attain it. In the non-vicious you solve it, but then find you have a new problem. I think. |
3137 | Varieties of singular terms are used to designate token particulars [Rey] |
Full Idea: We designate token particulars with singular terms, such as: proper names, numerals, definite descriptions, demonstratives, pronouns or variables. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 1.1.1) |
23024 | A traveller takes a copy of a picture into the past, gives it the artist, who then creates the original! [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Suppose an art critic travels back in time with a copy of an artist's masterpiece, gives the artist the copy, and the artist copies it. The copy of the copy turns out to be the original mastepiece. The artwork seems to come from nowhere. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 8.6) | |
A reaction: Lovely thought. Is the example possible (even with time travel)? How would the critic possess the copy before making the time journey? What if the critic decided not to travel back in time? Can a picture exist if no one has imagined it first? |
3143 | Physics requires the existence of properties, and also the abstract objects of arithmetic [Rey] |
Full Idea: Physics is committed to arithmetic, which seems committed to abstract objects such as numbers, and its causal explanations seem to appeal to properties, such as mass and charge. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 2.3) |
23008 | Grounding is intended as a relation that fits dependences between things [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Grounding is a posit introduced by metaphysicians in an attempt to devise a relation that can accommodate dependence between things in the world. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.6) | |
A reaction: Grounding is a recent concept which seems to have lots of enemies, but I assume you can only reject it if you reject the concept of dependence - yet that seems a fairly obvious fact to me. My favoured metaphysical relation is 'determination'. |
23018 | How does a changing object retain identity or have incompatible properties over time? [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The problems of temporary intrinsics are reconciling the indiscernibility of identicals with change in an object over time, and the problem of something have incompatible properties over time (such as tired and not-tired). | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 7.3.1) | |
A reaction: Loosely speaking, I would offer some sort of essentialism as the answer to these problems. People are not essentially sitting down, or tired. Or we can relativise properties to times t1 and t2. |
3145 | The Indiscernibility of Identicals is a truism; but the Identity of Indiscernibles depends on possible identical worlds [Rey] |
Full Idea: Leibniz's Law, the indiscernibility of identicals, is a truism which should not be confused with the more controversial identity of indiscernibles, which depends on the possibility of perfectly replicated universes. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 2.4) |
3172 | Empiricism says experience is both origin and justification of all knowledge [Rey] |
Full Idea: Two of the key claims of empiricism are that all knowledge must be justified on the basis of experience, and that all knowledge in fact originates in experience. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 4.3) |
3166 | Animal learning is separate from their behaviour [Rey] |
Full Idea: Rats and monkeys exhibit 'latent learning' (learning just for fun) which is later beneficial. They learn with no consequences, and then can't learn when the good consequences are available. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 4.1.1) | |
A reaction: This looks like a bit of a setback for naturalised epistemology and cognitive science, if learning can't be brought within a stimulus-response framework. |
3232 | Abduction could have true data and a false conclusion, and may include data not originally mentioned [Rey] |
Full Idea: Abduction moves from some data to a 'best explanation'. It is not deduction because the data could be true but the conclusion false, and it is not induction because the conclusion may involve data not mentioned in the premises. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], p.322) |
3128 | It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere [Rey] |
Full Idea: It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], Int.2) |
3136 | The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism [Rey] |
Full Idea: There are three main views regarding the ontology of mental phenomena: reductionism, dualism and eliminativism. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 1.1) | |
A reaction: It is precisely this picture which is rejected by Davidson and co, who want something called 'property dualism', with a unique relationship which is labelled 'supervenient'. Unfortunately there is no analogy for it. Not even beauty and a statue. |
3141 | Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex? [Rey] |
Full Idea: Crick and Koch claim that visual consciousness is correlated with a 40Hz oscillation in layers five and six of the primary visual cortex. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Not many people seem to have been enthused by their proposal. The target is the NCC (Neural Correlate of Consciousness), but we would only accept that location if the 'oscillations' seemed in some way special. |
3148 | Dualist privacy is seen as too deep for even telepathy to reach [Rey] |
Full Idea: The privacy that is a serious issue for the dualist is a peculiarly epistemic privacy that not even telepathy or brain fusions would seem to overcome. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 2.5.4) | |
A reaction: This is a key idea in the traditional defence of dualism. I'm inclined to think that we are faced with deep privacy not because the mind is so hidden, but because the observer is trapped in NOT being the thing observed. In that sense, rocks are private. |
3164 | Intentional explanations are always circular [Rey] |
Full Idea: There can seem to be no escape from the "intentional circle" - the use of one intentional idiom always seems to presuppose the use of another. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 3.3) | |
A reaction: The best explanation of this is Conceptual Dualism (Papineau: Thinking about Consciousness). We are locked into dualist concepts because of our long-term ignorance about the brain. |
3138 | Arithmetic and unconscious attitudes have no qualia [Rey] |
Full Idea: The contents of thoughts, beliefs and desires seem quite distinct from qualia. Arithmetic has no particular feeling attached to it, and Freud showed that many propositional attitudes have no feeling at all, as they are unconscious. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 1.1.2) | |
A reaction: I don't think we should rule out 'pre-conscious' qualia. The fact that advanced human mental capacities like arithmetic have thinned out their qualia doesn't count against qualia being essential to normal mental life. |
3142 | Why qualia, and why this particular quale? [Rey] |
Full Idea: If we allow as a brute fact that certain mental states possess conscious qualitative content, there is still the problem of explaining why they possess one content rather than another (why does this stimulus look RED?). | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as the Really Hard Question. The Hard Question is merely 'why are creatures aware of their thoughts?' Personally I don't rule out finding a physical answer to the RHQ, and it is certainly not grounds for drifting into neo-dualism. |
3224 | If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey] |
Full Idea: If qualia are non-functionally defined objects, then their attachment to their role in my thought would seem to be metaphysically accidental. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 11.4.2) | |
A reaction: A rock at sea can cause a shipwreck without being defined as 'a shipwrecker'. It is, of course, tautological that if qualia have a 'role' in my thoughts, they must have causal powers, but 'function' is a much trickier concept. |
3227 | Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey] |
Full Idea: Qualitative experience is just a particular species of propositional attitude. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 11.6.1) | |
A reaction: This sounds very implausible. If I hear a loud and baffling noise, is a proposition instantly involved? When a subtle change of colour occurs in the sky at sunset, is that 'propositional'? Do slugs formulate propositions when they taste garlic? |
3226 | Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? [Rey] |
Full Idea: Phenomenal objects and properties are no more needed to explain the workings of our mind than are angels needed to explain the motion of the planets. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 11.6.1) | |
A reaction: The question would be whether 'phenomenal properties' contained unique information, which could therefore influence behaviour. It is also a matter of exactly what you are trying to explain. |
3229 | If colour fits a cone mapping hue, brightness and saturation, rotating the cone could give spectrum inversion [Rey] |
Full Idea: If colour can be modelled as a cone, with points mapped by hue, brightness and saturation, then a rotation could be isomorphic with the hues switched, so we may all experience different hues. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 11.7.1) | |
A reaction: from Levine |
3223 | Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality [Rey] |
Full Idea: It is tempting to think that if a system has concepts for nested intentionality and first-person reflection, it has all that's needed for self-consciousness. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 11.2.2) | |
A reaction: If there nothing more than nested intentionality in complex minds like ours, the top level of the nesting would still have a special status. And if the top level always seemed to stay the same while the lower levels changed, I'd probably call it the Self |
3162 | Experiments prove that people are often unaware of their motives [Rey] |
Full Idea: Experiments have shown (Nisbett and Wilson 1977) that people's introspective knowledge is a lot less reliable than they suppose. People are sensitive to but entirely unaware of many factors that influence their social behaviour. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 3.2.2) | |
A reaction: This type of observation rests on an overemphasis on the conscious mind. We are not conscious of liver events, or of deep buried brain events, both of which motivate us. We should only expect introspection to reveal what is fully conscious. |
3163 | Brain damage makes the unreliability of introspection obvious [Rey] |
Full Idea: The most dramatic phenomena undermining the absolute reliability of introspection are those of blindsight and "anosognosia" (unawareness of one's own brain damage). | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 3.2.2) | |
A reaction: It might depend on what you expected introspection to reveal. If you only expected it to tell you about your consciousness, it would be unreasonable to expect knowledge of blindsight information by introspection. |
3195 | If reason could be explained in computational terms, there would be no need for the concept of 'free will' [Rey] |
Full Idea: If a computational account of reasoning processes could be given, then there is no need to settle the issue of "free will", as reason could get along without it. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 8.6) |
3196 | Free will isn't evidence against a theory of thought if there is no evidence for free will [Rey] |
Full Idea: We don't need arguments to show that if there were free will then computational accounts of the mind would be inadequate; what is needed is good evidence that there actually exists such free will in the first place. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 8.6) |
3180 | Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group [Rey] |
Full Idea: Defining most mental states seems to requiring citing other mental states - but perhaps behaviourists can define them all simultaneously | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 5.3) | |
A reaction: This is an interesting strategy for trying to avoid the well known circularity of attempting to define mental states in behavioural terms. Behaviourism won't go away. |
3165 | Behaviourism is eliminative, or reductionist, or methodological [Rey] |
Full Idea: There are three different views concerning behaviourism - the 'radical' view, which aims at eliminativism, the 'analytical' view, which is a reductionist enterprise, and the 'methodological' view, somewhere between the two. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 4) | |
A reaction: The first appears to be ontological, the second about relationships between areas of our language, and the third epistemological. You could attempt language reduction because we can only know behaviour, because that's all there is. |
3167 | Animals don't just respond to stimuli, they experiment [Rey] |
Full Idea: Animals exhibit 'spontaneous alteration' in their behaviour (e.g. varying the route to the food), or improvisation (finding short cuts instead of following training). They use mental maps, or dead reckoning, not just conditioned responses. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 4.1.4) | |
A reaction: If we can't even get a decent behaviourist account of animal behaviour, presumably the chances for humans look even less good. 'Black box' behaviourism, rather than the eliminativist version, might allow internal mechanisms to modify responses. |
3173 | How are stimuli and responses 'similar'? [Rey] |
Full Idea: Radical behaviourists say animals emit "similar" responses to "similar" reinforcements, but that is empty without specifying in what respect there is a similarity. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 4.3) | |
A reaction: The point is that when you try to specify the similarity you are (supposedly) forced to use mental language to make the distinctions, thus contradicting behaviourism. It is not, though, self-evidently impossible to give a behaviourist specification. |
3179 | Behaviour is too contingent and irrelevant to be the mind [Rey] |
Full Idea: The two main anti-behaviourist intuitions are that mind and behaviour only relate contingently, and that for much mental life (thinking, emotion) the resulting behaviour seems unimportant. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Attractive intuitions, but not unquestionable. Since no two states of mind are ever fully identical, we can never test whether the resulting behaviour arises contingently or necessarily. The second point underestimates the physicality of mental life. |
3127 | Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research [Rey] |
Full Idea: Neither dualism nor physicalism provides much serious explanation of any mental phenomena, or even much in the way of a program of research. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], Int.2) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure if people who demand an "explanation of mental phenomena" are quite clear about what it is they want. God might just say "Mental phenomena are just brain events from the brain's point of view". |
3186 | If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? [Rey] |
Full Idea: If many otherwise ordinary people turned out to have skulls which were empty or filled with oatmeal, would that mean that they didn't have minds? | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 7.1.4) | |
A reaction: That's a John Locke sort of question, implying that 'persons' are logically independent of their implementation. Personally I would search for a radio receiver, because oatmeal is implausible as a thinker. |
3188 | Homuncular functionalism (e.g. Freud) could be based on simpler mechanical processes [Rey] |
Full Idea: So-called 'homuncular functionalism' (such as Freud's or Plato's internal struggles of the soul) needn't lead to an infinite regress if eventually the homunculi become so stupid they could be replaced by a machine. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 7.2.2) | |
A reaction: from Fodor |
3216 | Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker? [Rey] |
Full Idea: The question for a computational-representation theory about the Chinese Room is: is what is happening inside the room functionally equivalent to what is happening inside a normal Chinese speaker? | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 10.2.1) | |
A reaction: Certainly the Room lacks morality ('how can I torture my sister?'). It won't spot connections between recent questions. It won't ask itself questions. It will take years to spot absurd questions. |
3220 | Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part [Rey] |
Full Idea: You should no more attribute understanding of Chinese to this one part of the system than you should ascribe the properties of the entire British Empire to Queen Victoria. This is the fallacy of division. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 10.2.3) | |
A reaction: This very nicely pinpoints what is wrong with the Chinese Room argument (nice analogy, too). If you carefully introspect what is involved when you 'understand' something, it is immensely complex, though it feels instant and simple. |
3206 | One computer program could either play chess or fight a war [Rey] |
Full Idea: It is always possible to provide incompatible interpretations of formal theories, so that a computer could use the same program one day to play chess, the next to fight a war. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 9.1.3) | |
A reaction: This seems to present a huge gulf between human chess players (who 'understand' what they are doing) and machines, but I don't accept it. Giving the machine cameras and multi-level software would fix it. |
3140 | If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it [Rey] |
Full Idea: Reduction is not the same as elimination; if chemists reduce water to H2O, or biologists reduce life to a complex chemical process, they have not shown that they don't exist. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 1.2.1) | |
A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'elimination'. It is important to be clear whether you are eliminating something from life, or from strict philosophical ontology. Ontologists never mention mountains. |
3134 | Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain [Rey] |
Full Idea: There is clear evidence against eliminative materialism in the law-like correlations found among millions of answers in standardised school tests, for which it can give no explanation. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], Int.3) | |
A reaction: Not very persuasive. If neural networks got involved in complex competitions with one another, you would expect them to evolve similar tactics. |
3200 | Pattern recognition is puzzling for computation, but makes sense for connectionism [Rey] |
Full Idea: Connectionism is a way of capturing the holism of pattern recognition, as stressed by many critics of computational theories of mind. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 8.8) | |
A reaction: I am drawn to the idea that arithmetic derives from pattern recognition, and the latter is basic to all minds (a kind of instant unthinking induction), so this seems to me a win for connectionism. |
3201 | Connectionism explains well speed of perception and 'graceful degradation' [Rey] |
Full Idea: Connectionism is better than other AI strategies at capturing the extraordinary swiftness of perception, and of degrading in a 'graceful' way. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 8.8) | |
A reaction: A good theory had better capture the extraordinary swiftness of perception. Also the swiftness of recognition. Compare seeing a surprising old friend in a crowd, and recognising the person you are looking for. |
3202 | Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well [Rey] |
Full Idea: Connectionism offers promising accounts of irrational behaviour, such as people's bias towards positive instances, and their tendency to fall for the gamblers' fallacy. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 8.8) | |
A reaction: That is strong support, because the chances of a computational robot having such tendencies is virtually nil, but all humans have the biases referred to (even philosophers). |
3199 | Connectionism assigns numbers to nodes and branches, and plots the outcomes [Rey] |
Full Idea: In connectionism, each node is given an activation level, and each branch a weight, according to possible degree of effect. This results in 'excitatory' and 'inhibitory' connections. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 8.8) | |
A reaction: Whether such a system could ever be 'conscious' is not the only interesting question. What could such a system do? Could it ever be good at philosophy? |
3150 | Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience? [Rey] |
Full Idea: Eight properties of mind are problems for the identity theory: rationality, free will, spatiality, privacy, intentionality, essential mentality, subjective content, and the explanatory gap. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 2.7) | |
A reaction: The list could go on: poetry, creativity, love, normativity... Actually, these are problems for every theory. |
3129 | Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance [Rey] |
Full Idea: In physicalism the "ghost in the machine" is merely replaced by the "complexity" in it. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], Int.2) | |
A reaction: This is nonsense. No one thinks that mere complexity generates consciousness. The assumption is that we would begin to understand the mind only if we could somehow map the connections of the brain. |
3139 | Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) [Rey] |
Full Idea: Propositional attitudes divide into two broad types: neutral informational ones (belief, suspicion, imagining), and directional ones which motivate an agent (preference, desire, hate). | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 1.1.2) | |
A reaction: Since suspicions are motivating, and preferences are informational, this is not a very sharp distinction. An alternative would be to say that there is one type, and sometimes the will gets involved. |
3171 | Children speak 90% good grammar [Rey] |
Full Idea: Ninety percent of most young children's utterances are grammatical. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 4.2.4) | |
A reaction: This is good evidence for some sort of innate element in the grammar of language. But the accurate grammar is not in a particular language. Good communication must be the driving force in all this. |
3174 | Good grammar can't come simply from stimuli [Rey] |
Full Idea: Grammatical sensitivity is in no way a physical property of the stimulus, and we can't imagine how to build a device which would produce grammatical structures in response to the environment. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 4.3) | |
A reaction: You could try to program it with a set of (say) Aristotelian categories, and mechanisms to sort the environment accordingly. It then has to query its database, in response to practical needs. A doddle. |
3213 | Animals may also use a language of thought [Rey] |
Full Idea: The language of thought need not only be confined to creatures which speak a natural language. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 10.1.1) | |
A reaction: I take it as axiomatic that our brains are no different in principles and fundamental mechanics from the lowliest of creatures. See Idea 7509. |
3170 | We train children in truth, not in grammar [Rey] |
Full Idea: Very young children have been shown (Brown and Halon 1970) to be 'reinforced' not for their grammar but for the informational content of what they say. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 4.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is what you would expect. It doesn't follow that the grammar comes from innate mechanisms, because the pressure to get the information right could impose increasing accuracy in grammar. |
3215 | Images can't replace computation, as they need it [Rey] |
Full Idea: Processing of images and mental models seems to require, and therefore is unlikely to replace, computation and representation. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 10.1.2) | |
A reaction: A good point. If you are a fan of mental imagery, you still have to explain how we can hold an image, or recall it, or manipulate it. I always, I don't know why, wince at the thought of 'computations' among neurons. |
3194 | CRTT is good on deduction, but not so hot on induction, abduction and practical reason [Rey] |
Full Idea: The computational/representational theory of thought has given a good account of deduction, but mechanical theories of induction, abduction and practical reason are needed in order to make a machine which could reason. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 8.5) | |
A reaction: This is the best analysis of rationality that I have found (four components: deduction, induction, abduction, practical reason). I can think of nothing to add, and certainly none of these should be omitted. |
3147 | Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images [Rey] |
Full Idea: Recent experiments (Shepard 1982) suggest people have imagistic representations they inspect when solving problems. In comparing two rotated images, the time for comparison varies with the angle of rotation. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 2.5.3) | |
A reaction: This doesn't prove that they are slowly rotating something. It may just be harder to make the leap to the new shape, when it is 'further away'. Picturing a 20-sided figure, we don't add sides one-by-one. |
3175 | Animals map things over time as well as over space [Rey] |
Full Idea: To map things like food over time, animals must somehow represent events as having temporal properties, and somehow store those representations ready for later use. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 4.3) | |
A reaction: If the mechanisms for doing this are basic, then so is the ontology. Objects must be categorised, properties spotted, time-spans correlated etc. 'Represent' needs to be sharp to be useful. |
3207 | Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object [Rey] |
Full Idea: The oldest version of the externalist theory of meaning is the Fido/Fido theory, according to which the meaning of a representation is the object for which it stands. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 9.2) | |
A reaction: Modern baptismal theories of reference seem to have taken us back to this, for distinct individuals such as Aristotle, or natural kinds like gold. What, though, does 'Fido' mean to me? Asthma! |
3176 | Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one [Rey] |
Full Idea: Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 4.3) |
3181 | A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be [Rey] |
Full Idea: You couldn't directly verify that the whole universe had stopped for one hour, but you might indirectly verify it (by prediction) - but then almost anything could be very indirectly verified. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 5.4) | |
A reaction: Does indirect verification include time travel? Or perfect knowledge of quantum theory, and total knowledge of quantum states. Laplace's Hypothesis. |
3204 | The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal" [Rey] |
Full Idea: The view that the meaning of language of thought expressions is based on their conceptual role (derived from Wittgenstein's idea of meaning as use), is most plausible for the logical connectives like "and", but implausible for, say, "animal". | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 9.1.2) | |
A reaction: It was the logical connectives that got LW started on this track. If it doesn't work for 'animal' then does that mean we need two different theories? |
3205 | Semantic holism means new evidence for a belief changes the belief, and we can't agree on concepts [Rey] |
Full Idea: Semantic holism is a desperate measure. Belief content would be continually changed by new beliefs, evidence for a belief would change the target belief, and no two people would ever agree on concepts. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 9.1.2) | |
A reaction: It is far more plausible to say language is a bit on the holistic side. Total holism is mad. |
3209 | Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers [Rey] |
Full Idea: Causal histories may have some role to play in a theory of reference, but the chain of causation requires internal characterisations at each stage, and the original dubber had one thing rather than another in mind when dubbing. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 9.2.1) | |
A reaction: The modern view of direct reference seems to prefer social context rather than a complete causal chain. |
3210 | If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning [Rey] |
Full Idea: What is special about meaning? If meaning and reference are just the result of causal chains, almost everything will mean something, since almost everything is reliably caused by something. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 9.2.2) | |
A reaction: It would be insane to think that all causal events produced meanings. It is probably better not to mention causation at all when discussing meaning. |
3149 | Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta') [Rey] |
Full Idea: Referential Opacity says you cannot preserve truth if you substitute one referring term for another ('Oedipus desires Jocasta', 'Oedipus desires his mother'). | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 2.5.6) | |
A reaction: ….That is, in the context of expressing a propositional attitude. 'Oedipus desired his mother' was true. This idea requires some ignorance on the part of the person expressing the thought. |
3169 | A simple chaining device can't build sentences containing 'either..or', or 'if..then' [Rey] |
Full Idea: Bifurcated logical particles (either/or, if/then) are in principle beyond the power of any local chaining device to build sentences. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 4.2.1) | |
A reaction: True in natural languages, but not in formal ones? If P then either if-Q-then-R or if-S-then-T. Is that chaining? If rain, then if light then puddles, or if heavy then floods. Hm. |
3221 | Our desires become important when we have desires about desires [Rey] |
Full Idea: What gives people's desires certain moral importance is the fact that they have desires about those desires. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 11.1) | |
A reaction: from Frankfurt |
23011 | Modern accounts of causation involve either processes or counterfactuals [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The two major contemporary theories of causation are process theories and counterfactual theories. …Process theories treat it as something to be discovered. …Counterfactual theories ignore processes, and treat it in terms of truth and falsity. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 6.1) | |
A reaction: I take the counterfactual theory to be a specialised branch of the project of analytic metaphysics, which seeks the logical form of causation sentences, using possible worlds semantics. In the real word its processes or nothing. |
23013 | The main process theory of causation says it is transference of mass, energy, momentum or charge [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: According to contemporary process theories of causation it consists of the transference of a 'mark', which is always some conserved quantity. Candidates (from science) are mass, energy, momentum and electric charge. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 6.2.2) | |
A reaction: Given my commitment to physicalism, this is my preferred theory of causation. It began with the suggestion of energy-transfer, but has broadened into the present idea. It is an updated version of the Newton view, as the meeting of objects. |
23014 | If causes are processes, what is causation by omission? (Distinguish legal from scientific causes?) [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Process theories of causation face a serious problem, such as killing a plant by failing to water it - a cause by omission. …Defenders of the theory propose two concepts of causation: one for legal and one for scientific contexts. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 6.2.3) | |
A reaction: Not much of a problem, I think. Clearly the scientific concept has priority. The plant died of dehydration, resulting from the consumption and evaporation of the available water. The human causes of that situation are legion. |
23015 | The counterfactual theory of causation handles the problem no matter what causes actually are [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The chief advantage of the counterfactual theory of causation is that it is flexible enough to handle causation no matter what in the world underlies the causal facts in question. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 6.3) | |
A reaction: It has this advantage because it makes no attempt to explain causation, but merely gives an accurate map of the truth and falsity of causal statements. It describes how we think about causation. |
23016 | Counterfactual theories struggle with pre-emption by a causal back-up system [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Counterfactual theories of causation have difficulty accommodating pre-emption, which involves the existence of causal back-up systems that undermine counterfactual dependence. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 6.5) | |
A reaction: E.g. If your stone hadn't broken the window first, my stone would have broken it instead. So in the nearest world the withholding of your stone doesn't save the window. |
23009 | There is no second 'law' of thermodynamics; it just reflects probabilities of certain microstates [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: According to contemporary statistical mechanics the second law of thermodynamics is not really a law at all, but merely reflects to probabilities of certain microstates, conditional on local boundary conditions having certain properties. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.6.1) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of how metaphysicians have been seduced by the 'laws' of nature into falsely inferring all sorts of natural necessities. Entropy is normally assumed to be totally inevitable, because of some natural force. It's just a pattern. |
23002 | In relativity space and time depend on one's motion, but spacetime gives an invariant metric [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: While spatial and temporal distances in relativity depend on one's relative state of motion, spatiotemporal distances within Minkowski spacetime do not. It therefore provides an invariant metric for describing the distances between things. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 4.2) | |
A reaction: I doubt whether this solves all the worries which philosophers have, about relativity giving an account of time which contradicts our concept of time in every other area of our understanding. |
22988 | The block universe theory says entities of all times exist, and time is the B-series [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The standard block universe theory combines EntityEverywhenism with the B-theory of time. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.4) | |
A reaction: This is also known as 'eternalism'. These authors emphasise that there is an ontological commitment to the objects of past and future in eternalism, as well as the B-series view of the moments of time. |
22991 | How can we know this is the present moment, if other times are real? [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: According to the spotlight and growing block views, there is a single objectively present moment, and also other objectively existing moments. But then how do persons in those different moments know which one is present? | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.6) | |
A reaction: [compressed example] This sceptical thought leads either towards Presentism (we know we are present because that's all there is), or Eternalism (there is no present moment, so no problem). A good objection to spotlight and growing block. |
22992 | If we are actually in the past then we shouldn't experience time passing [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: If the past really exists, and we are in it, rather than in the present, then we should rationally conclude that we are not experiencing the passage of time. …But then we have no basis for arguing that time is dynamic. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.6) | |
A reaction: [compressed] It is certainly difficult to conceive how past times and entities could be real in every way, except that the experience of time passing has been removed. But if past people experience passing, they must believe they are present… |
22994 | Erzatz Presentism allows the existence of other times, with only the present 'actualised' [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The 'erzatz presentism' view is that either the past and present exist, or all times exist, but only the present is 'actualised'. Standard Presentism says no times exist other than the present. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.7.2) | |
A reaction: Ersatz presentism is obviously a close relative of the moving spotlight and growing block views. No account seems possible of the distinction between 'exists' and 'actualised' (other than the former being a mere abstract concept). |
22998 | How do presentists explain relations between things existing at different times? [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: A chief challenge facing presentism is how to give an account of cross-temporal relations, which link things that exist with things that do not. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 2.2) | |
A reaction: The problem of whether to keep a dubious death-bed promise is a bit of a puzzle for all of us, whatever our metaphysical view of time. None of us deny the reality of our great-great-grandparents. |
23017 | Presentism needs endurantism, because other theories imply most of the object doesn't exist [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Presentism is more naturally paired with endurantism, since if we pair it with perdurantism or transdurantism we have to say that most of any persisting object does not exist, and while that is not incoherent it is not very attractive. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 7.2.2) | |
A reaction: (I think perdurance is time slices, and transdurance is the complete time worm). My preferred combination is this one: all that exists is the complete objects at the present moment. It also needs strong commitment to the truth of tensed verbs. |
23023 | How can presentists move to the next future moment, if that doesn't exist? [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: If Presentism is true, how do we manage to travel from this moment to the next moment, a moment that is, at present, a future and hence non-existent moment? | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 8.3.1) | |
A reaction: The reply would have to be that the metaphor of 'travel' is inappropriate for the movement through time. Travel needs a succession of existing places. The advancement of time is nothing like that. Nice question, though. |
22995 | Most of the sciences depend on the concept of time [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Without time it is hard to make sense of historical research, evolutionary biology, psychology, chemistry, biology, cosmology, social science, archaeology, practical reason, evidence, human agency and causation. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.8) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I do find it extraordinary that relativistic physicists cheerfully embrace an eternalist theory of time which seems to render nearly all of the other sciences meaningless. |
22993 | For abstractionists past times might still exist, althought their objects don't [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: If past moments are seen as abstract (rather than concrete) it doesn't follow that because past objects no longer exist that therefore past times do not exist. The abstractionist needs to say which times are concretely realised. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.7.2) | |
A reaction: Abstractionists see times as representations of change, rather than as substances. |
23001 | The error theory of time's passage says it is either a misdescription or a false inference [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: According to the cognitive error theory of the passage of time, …it is either our misdescription of our temporal phenomenology, or some mechanism of our brain infers that the phenomenology is caused by time actually passing. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 3.3.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I think I have some sympathy with the misdescription view. If you imaginatively gradually remove all the changing events in your experience, that doesn't end with a raw experience of pure time, because there is no such thing. |
22999 | It is meaningless to measure the rate of time using time itself, and without a rate there is no flow [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: It seems we are forced to measure the rate of time's passing against itself. But that's just not a meaningful rate. So time has no rate. So it doesn't flow. So there is no such thing as temporal passage. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 2.3.1) | |
A reaction: It is suggested that you can exchange dollars one for one, so time might move at one second per second. But you can't exchange your own dollars with yourself at one-for-one. That is meaningless. Time is NOT a substance which flows. |
22986 | The C-series rejects A and B, and just sees times as order by betweenness, without direction [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The C-series sees times not as directed, but as unchanging, and ordered in terms of the betweenness relation. The C-theory also asserts that the A-series and B-series do not exist. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This is McTaggart's idea. Compare this with A-series ordering by past, present and future, and B-series ordering by earlier-than, later-than and simultaneous. The main point is that A and B have a direction, but C does not. |
22996 | The A-series has to treat being past, present or future as properties [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: One of the limitations of the A-series is that temporal passage then presupposes the existence of properties of being present, being past and being future. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Metaphysicians happily talk about 'properties' all the time, and most of them never grasp how ambiguous and obscure that concept is. The idea that my recent scratching of my chin first acquired the 'present' property and then lost it is incoherent. |
23007 | The B-series can have a direction, as long as it does not arise from temporal flow [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The view that time has a direction is entirely consistent with the B-theory of time, as long as time's having a direction is not a matter of it having temporal flow. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.5) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how you could account for an intrinsic direction to time if it is not because of the 'flow'. The B-series seems to invite a reductive account of time's direction (e.g. to entropy). |
23003 | Static theories cannot account for time's obvious asymmetry, so time must be dynamic [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: One argument for the dynamic theory of time is that time is, obviously, asymmetric, and as static theories can't account for this asymmetry, we ought to posit temporal passage to explain it. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5) | |
A reaction: The B-series view (unlike the C-series) asserts that there is an order from past to future, but it offers no explanation of that fact. Physicists love to tell you the order could be in either direction, But why an 'order' at all? |
23004 | The direction of time is either primitive, or reducible to something else [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Primitivism is the view that time has a direction, and that its having that direction is intrinsic to time itself. Reductionism is the view that time has a direction, but its having that direction is reducible to something else. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.3.1) | |
A reaction: The general suggestion for the second theory is that time's direction reduces to some aspect of the laws of nature. I strongly incline to the primitive view. Something's got to be primitive. |
23005 | The kaon does not seem to be time-reversal invariant, unlike the rest of nature [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The laws of nature are time-reversal invariant, with the small exception of the kaon (a type of sub-atomic particle) | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.3.2) | |
A reaction: If that fact about the kaon were very secure indeed, then that would mean the collapse of the claims about the time-invariance of the laws. Since time-invariance is still routinely asserted, I assume it is not secure. |
23006 | Maybe the past is just the direction of decreasing entropy [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: We could say that what we call the past is just the direction towards (for instance) decreasing entropy, and the direction we call the future is the direction towards increasing entropy. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.3.3) | |
A reaction: One problem is that locally entropy can sometimes go the other way, which would imply local pockets with a reversed time's arrow,. |
23010 | We could explain time's direction by causation: past is the direction of causes, future of effects [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: An option for accounting for the direction of time would be to appeal to the direction of causation …to the future is the direction towards which there are effects, and the past is the direction towards which there are causes. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.6.2) | |
A reaction: The obvious problem is that we can no longer pick out a cause by saying it 'precedes' its effect. It is not obvious what other criterion can be used to distinguish them (esp. given Hume's regularity account). |
22989 | Static time theory presents change as one property at t1, and a different property at t2 [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The static theory of time appeals to an 'at-at' notion of change, which analyses change as objects or events having one property at time t1, and a different property at t2. (The worry about this is that it describes variation, but not real change). | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.4) | |
A reaction: I suppose observing a different property at t2 is observing the result of a change, rather than the process. But then the process might be broken down into micro-gradations of properties. Maybe only results can be observed. |
23020 | If a time traveller kills his youthful grandfather, he both exists and fails to exist [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: It is surely true that if a time traveller travels back in time and succeeds in shooting his youthful grandfather then the time traveller both exists and fails to exist. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 8.2) | |
A reaction: This is the best known paradox of time travel. It is a special dramatic case of making any change to the past. If the traveller kills his neighbour's grandfather, his neighbour should vanish. Moving a speck of dust could have enduring results. |
23022 | Presentism means there no existing past for a time traveller to visit [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: A time traveller can only travel to a location if the location exists, But if Presentism is true then past locations do not exist, so time travel to the past is impossible. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 8.3.1) | |
A reaction: Might a time machine actually restore the past time which had ceased to exist? Then the problem is the information needed to achieve that. |
22987 | The past (unlike the future) is fixed, along with truths about it, by the existence of past objects [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: It is the existence of past objects that explains why the past is fixed, and why there are truths about the past, and it is the non-existence of future objects that explains why the future is malleable. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.3) | |
A reaction: The authors label this view 'EntityNowandThenism', and it comes in a section on the 'Temporal Ontology'. |
22990 | The moving spotlight says entities can have properties of being present, past or future [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The moving spotlight theorist maintains that there are special temporal properties that entities possess, namely the properties of being present, being past and being future. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.5.3) | |
A reaction: Are these thought to be intrinsic properties of the objects, or (more plausibly) relational properties, between objects and times? Either view is weird. Does some godlike part of time scurry along, illuminating things, like a mouse under a carpet? |
22997 | The present moment is a matter of existence, not of acquiring a property [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Rather than treating presentness as an acquired property …. presentism equates the metaphysical specialness of the present with existence. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 2.2) | |
A reaction: It seems like common sense to say that the recent scratching of my chin came into existence and then went out of existence (rather than that it acquired and then lost a property). |