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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason' and 'Iteration Again'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size

13547	Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter]
	Full Idea: Weak Limitation of Size: If there are no more Fs than Gs and the Gs form a collection, then Fs form a collection. Strong Limitation of Size: A property F fails to be collectivising iff there are as many Fs as there are objects.
	From: report of George Boolos (Iteration Again [1989]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 13.5

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads

5060	All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads' [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: What (in the analysis of substances) exist ultimately are simple substances - namely, souls, or, if you prefer a more general terms, 'monads', which are without parts.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason [1712], §7)
	A reaction: This seems to me to be atomistic panpsychism. He is opposed to physical atomism, because infinite divisibility seems obvious, but unity is claimed to be equally obvious in the world of the mental. Does this mean bricks are made of souls? Odd.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes

5059	Power rules in efficient causes, but wisdom rules in connecting them to final causes [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In all of nature efficient causes correspond to final causes, because everything proceeds from a cause which is not only powerful, but wise; and with the rule of power through efficient causes, there is involved the rule of wisdom through final causes.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason [1712], §5)
	A reaction: Nowadays this carrot-and-stick view of causation is unfashionable, but I won't rule it out. The deepest 'why?' we can ask won't just go away. This unity by a divine mind strikes me as too simple, but Leibniz is right to try to unify Aristotelian causes.