Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier' and 'The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding

19261	Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
	Full Idea: What is distinctive about understanding (after truth is satisfied) is the internal seeing or appreciating of explanatory and other coherence-inducing relationships in a body of information that is crucial for understanding.
	From: Jonathan Kvanvig (The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding [2003], 198), quoted by Anand Vaidya - Understanding and Essence 'Distinction'
	A reaction: For me this ticks exactly the right boxes. Coherent explanations are what we want. The hardest part is the ensure their truth. Kvanvig claims this is internal, so we can understand even if, Gettier-style, our external connections are lucky.

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces

12719	Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The notion of force is as clear as that of action and passion, because it is that from which action follows when nothing prevents it.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
	A reaction: For Leibniz, force seems to be a metaphysical notion, rather than a feature of the physical world. I take it to be the bottom level of explanation, and it equates with Aristotelian form and essence.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time

12720	Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Time never exists, since all of its parts never exist together.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
	A reaction: The problem here is that he seems to be admitting that time has 'parts'. Can something have parts and not exist? Events will also fail to exist by this criterion, though we could hardly deny that events (or some such) 'happen'.