Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On the Reality of Accidents' and 'The Intentional Fallacy'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism

19382	Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I consider abstracta not as real things but as abbreviated ways of talking ...and to that extent I am a nominalist, at least provisionally ...It suffices to posit only substances as real things, and, to assert truths about these.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Reality of Accidents [1688]), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz
	A reaction: I am a modern nominalist, in my hostility to a serious ontological commitment to abstracta. You get into trouble, though, if you say there are only objects or substances. Physics says reality may all be 'fields', or something.... 'Truths' is good.

21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions

20400	Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
	Full Idea: Wimsatt and Beardsley claimed that either the intention succeeded, so one does not need to look outside the work for its meaning, or the intention failed, so external evidence does not help.
	From: report of W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946]) by Stephen Davies - The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) 5.3
	A reaction: Actually, the external evidence may tell you much more clearly and accurately what the intention was than the work itself does. The best example may be the title of the work, which is presumably outside the work.

7266	The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: The design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
	A reaction: This famous proposal may have been misunderstood. Note that it is a comment about judging the work, not about understanding it. The idea allows for a work being much more successful than the author's humble intentions (e.g. Pepys).

7267	Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: Poetry differs from practical messages, which are successful if and only if we correctly infer the intention.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
	A reaction: I am not convinced by this claim. It is plausible that a work does much more than it intends (Astaire said he danced "to make a buck"), but it is rather odd to rate very highly a work of which you have missed the point.

7268	The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: We ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic speaker, and if to the author at all, only by an act of biographical inference.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
	A reaction: Wrong. If in Browning's "My Last Duchess" (say), we only inferred the mind of the speaker (and his Duchess), and took no interest in Browning's view of things, we would miss the point. We might end up respecting the Duke, which would be daft.

7269	The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: The intentional fallacy is a romantic one.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §II)
	A reaction: Wrong. Even with those most famous of anonymous artists, the architects and carvers of medieval cathedrals, without some discernment of the purpose you won't get it. The Taj Mahal is a love letter, not a potential ice cream parlour.

7271	Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: The use of biographical evidence need not involve intentionalism, because while it may be evidence of what the author intended, it may also be evidence of the meaning of his words and the dramatic character of his utterance.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §IV)
	A reaction: I am very keen to penetrate the author's intentions, but I have always be doubtful about the use of biography as a means to achieve this. Most of the effort to infer intentions must come from a study of the work itself, not introductions, letters etc.