Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Rechnungsmethoden (dissertation)' and 'Freedom and Reason'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
     From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
     A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Quantity is inconceivable without the idea of addition [Frege]
     Full Idea: There is so intimate a connection between the concepts of addition and of quantity that one cannot begin to grasp the latter without the former.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Rechnungsmethoden (dissertation) [1874], p.2), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics 22 'Quantit'
     A reaction: Frege offers good reasons for making cardinals prior to ordinals, though plenty of people disagree.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Geometry appeals to intuition as the source of its axioms [Frege]
     Full Idea: The elements of all geometrical constructions are intuitions, and geometry appeals to intuition as the source of its axioms.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Rechnungsmethoden (dissertation) [1874], Ch.6), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics
     A reaction: Very early Frege, but he stuck to this view, while firmly rejecting intuition as a source of arithmetic. Frege would have known well that Euclid's assumption about parallels had been challenged.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock]
     Full Idea: According to Hare's universal prescriptivism, moral statements are closer to imperatives than to avowals of emotion; their purpose is to guide action. But unlike imeperatives they are universalisable.
     From: report of Richard M. Hare (Freedom and Reason [1963]) by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 2.9
     A reaction: Why isn't 'everyone ought to support West Ham' a moral judgement?
Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Hare has suggested that a fairly tight form of utilitarianism can be obtained from universalised prescriptivism.
     From: report of Richard M. Hare (Freedom and Reason [1963]) by Philippa Foot - Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? p.191
     A reaction: All the benefits of Bentham, Kant and Hume, in one neat package! Since I take all three of them to be wrong about ethics, that counts against this idea.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Hare, by Nagel]
     Full Idea: Hare has proposed that utilitarianism is the ultimate standard to which we are led by the categorical imperative.
     From: report of Richard M. Hare (Freedom and Reason [1963], p.123-4) by Thomas Nagel - Equality and Partiality
     A reaction: It seems to me better to say that Kant starts (unwittingly) from something like utilitarianism, that is, an assumption that human happiness and welfare have some sort of intrinsic value that cannot be demonstrated. Otherwise evil can be universalised.