28 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
21032 | Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The duty to tell the truth applies only to those who deserve the truth. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: [from Benjamin Constant, in opposition to Kant] I prefer the idea that we should use people 'after our own honour and dignity' (Hamlet), which means speaking the truth even to Donald Trump (for those of you who remember 2018). But not always. |
21033 | Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel] |
Full Idea: A carefully crafted evasion pays homage to truth-telling in a way that an outright lie does not. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: Nicely put. He refers to an incident in Kant's life. I think of the great equivocation controversy at the time of the 1605 Gunpowder Plot. See the porter in Macbeth. All I ask is that people care about the truth. Many people don't. Why? |
13373 | Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A natural principle is the same kind of paradox will have the same kind of solution. Standardly Ramsey's first group are solved by denying the existence of some totality, and the second group are less clear. But denial of the groups sink both. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §5) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This sums up the argument of Priest's paper, which is that it is Ramsey's division into two kinds (see Idea 13334) which is preventing us from getting to grips with the paradoxes. Priest, notoriously, just lives with them. |
13368 | The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: König: there are indefinable ordinals, and the least indefinable ordinal has just been defined in that very phrase. (Recall that something is definable iff there is a (non-indexical) noun-phrase that refers to it). | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3) | |
A reaction: Priest makes great subsequent use of this one, but it feels like a card trick. 'Everything indefinable has now been defined' (by the subject of this sentence)? König, of course, does manage to pick out one particular object. |
13370 | 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Berry: if we take 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words', we can generate a number which is and is not one of these numbers. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3) | |
A reaction: [not enough space to spell this one out in full] |
13369 | By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Richard: φ(x) is 'x is a definable real number between 0 and 1' and ψ(x) is 'x is definable'. We can define a real by diagonalization so that it is not in x. It is and isn't in the set of reals. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3) | |
A reaction: [this isn't fully clear here because it is compressed] |
13366 | The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Burali-Forti: φ(x) is 'x is an ordinal', and so w is the set of all ordinals, On; δ(x) is the least ordinal greater than every member of x (abbreviation: log(x)). The contradiction is that log(On)∈On and log(On)∉On. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §2) |
13367 | The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Mirimanoff: φ(x) is 'x is well founded', so that w is the cumulative hierarchy of sets, V; &delta(x) is just the power set of x, P(x). If x⊆V, then V∈V and V∉V, since δ(V) is just V itself. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §2) |
13371 | If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: In the family of the Liar is the Knower Paradox, where φ(x) is 'x is known to be true', and there is a set of known things, Kn. By knowing a sentence is not in the known sentences, you know its truth. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §4) | |
A reaction: [mostly my wording] |
13372 | There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: There are liar chains which fit the pattern of Transcendence and Closure, as can be seen with the simplest case of the Liar Pair. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §4) | |
A reaction: [Priest gives full details] Priest's idea is that Closure is when a set is announced as complete, and Transcendence is when the set is forced to expand. He claims that the two keep coming into conflict. |
21036 | Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The mere fact that you and I make a deal is not enough to make it fair. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) |
21038 | Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Legal thinkers have debated this question for a long time: can consent create an obligation on its own, or is some element of benefit or reliance required? | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: Clearly mere consent could be under some compulsion, either by the other party, or by some other forces. Keeping a deathbed promise usually brings no benefit, but is a matter of honour. Ah, honour! Can anyone remember what that is? |
21039 | Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Despite a tendency to read consent into moral claims, it is hard to make sense of our morality without acknowledging the independent weight of reciprocity. If my wife is unfaithful I have two different grounds of outrage: our promise, and my loyalty. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: The point is that Hobbes and co over-simplify what a contract is. Compare a contract with a promise. One must be two-sided, the other can be one-sided. |
21030 | The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The Golden Rule depends on contingent facts about how people like to be treated. The categorical imperative asks that we abstract from such contingencies and respect persons as rational beings, regardless of what they might want in particular situations. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: I think the Golden Rule is wrong for a different reason. It assumes that we all want similar things, which we don't. Focus on other people's needs, not yours. |
21031 | Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he is not his own property. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: [Kant lecture note] This is an important qualification to persons as ends. If a person owned themselves, that would separate the person from what they owned. Sandel mentions selling your own organs. Kant is considering prostitution. Why is slavery wrong? |
21035 | Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel] |
Full Idea: It is hard to see how just passing through town is morally akin to ratifying the Constitution. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: They say that philosophical ideas are never refuted, and no progress is made, but this sure put paid to John Locke. |
21037 | A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The fact that a constitution is ratified by the people does not prove that its provisions are just. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: Yes indeed. And the fact that a majority won a referendum does not make their decision wise. Hence all constitutions must be open to evaluation. Gun laws in the US are the obvious example. |
21034 | A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel] |
Full Idea: As Kant sees it, a just constitution aims at harmonising each individual's freedom with that of everyone else. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: [source?] Nice statement of the project. I increasingly see political philosophy as constitution design. I say philosophers have got fifty years to design an optimum constitution, and they should then down tools and promote it, in simple language. |
21049 | Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Liberal freedom developed as an antidote to political theories that consigned persons to destinies fixed by caste or class, station or rank, custom, tradition or inherited status. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 09) | |
A reaction: Virtually all human beings before modern times found that they had been 'assigned destinies'. The huge exception is war, especially civil war, which must be a huge liberation for many people, despite the danger. |
21040 | Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The libertarian view of distributive justice is a free market with formal equality of opportunity. The meritocratic view is a free market with fair equality of opportunity. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: The obvious question is what has to be done, by intervention, to make the market fair. There are two major rival views of equality here. Is the starting point fair, and is the race itself fair? |
21028 | We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel] |
Full Idea: We have identified three ways of approaching the distribution of goods: welfare, freedom and virtue. ...and these are three ways of thinking about justice. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 01) | |
A reaction: Virtue is Sandel's distinctively Aristotelian contribution to the problem. The best known instance of justice is punishment, which is a distribution of harms. |
21027 | Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel] |
Full Idea: To ask whether a society is just is to ask how we distribute the things we prize - income and wealth, duties and rights, powers and opportunities, offices and honours. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 01) | |
A reaction: There is, of course, the prior question of what things should be controlled by a society for distribution. But there is also justice in the promotional and pay structure of institutions within a society, including private institutions. |
21042 | Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Can we ever have a moral responsibility to redress wrongs committed by a previous generation? | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 07) | |
A reaction: Just asking for a friend. It seems to depend on how close we feel to the previous generation. Regretting the crime committed by a beloved parent is one thing. Despising the crime committed by some right bastard who shares my nationality is another. |
21043 | Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Debates about distributive justice are about not only who gets what but also what qualities are worthy of honour and reward. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 07) | |
A reaction: So the 'undeserving poor' get nuffink? Does just being a human being deserve anything? Obviously yes. That said, we can't deny the concept of 'appropriate reward'. |
21052 | Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Justice is not only about the right way to distribute things. It is also about the right way to value things. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 10) | |
A reaction: This is Sandel's distinctively Aristotelian contribution to the justice debate - with which I have great sympathy. And, as he argues, the values of things arise out of assessing their essential natures. |
21048 | Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel] |
Full Idea: For the libertarian free exchange for labour is fair; for Rawls it requires fair background conditions; for Aristotle, for the work to be just it must be suited to the nature of the workers who perform it. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 08) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Aristotle's idea is powerful, and Sandel performs a great service in drawing attention to it. Imagine the key negotiation in an interview being whether this particular work suits your nature! |
21045 | Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel] |
Full Idea: It is not easy to dispense with teleological reasoning in thinking about social institutions and political practices. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 08) | |
A reaction: I think teleological thinking is also indispensable in biology. You can't understand an ear or an eye if you don't know what it is FOR. If it relates to a mind, it is teleological. The eye of a dead person is for nothing. |