Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Reply to Richards' and 'The Problem of Knowledge'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems

22140	The greatest philosophers are methodical; it is what makes them great [Grice]
	Full Idea: The greatest philosophers have been the greatest, and most self-conscious, methodologists; indeed, I am tempted to regard the fact as primarily accounting for their greatness as philosophers.
	From: H. Paul Grice (Reply to Richards [1986], p.66), quoted by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 3
	A reaction: I agree. Philosophy is nothing if it is not devoted to the attempt to be fully rational, and that implies consistency and coherence. If a thinker doesn't even try to be systematic, I would not consider them to be a philosopher.

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy

19463	Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer]
	Full Idea: In all inductive reasoning we make the assumption that there is a measure of uniformity in nature; or, roughly speaking, that the future will, in the appropriate respects, resemble the past.
	From: A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii)
	A reaction: I would say that nature is 'stable'. Nature changes, so a global assumption of total uniformity is daft. Do we need some global uniformity assumptions, if the induction involved is local? I would say yes. Are all inductions conditional on this?

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique

19461	Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer]
	Full Idea: To know that one exists is not to know anything about oneself any more than knowing that 'this' exists is knowing anything about 'this'.
	From: A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.iii)
	A reaction: Descartes proceeds to define himself as a 'thinking thing', inferring that thinking is his essence. Ayer casts nice doubt on that.

19459	To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer]
	Full Idea: To say 'I am not thinking' is self-stultifying since if it is said intelligently it must be false: but it is not self-contradictory. The proof that it is not self-contradictory is that it might have been false.
	From: A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.iii)
	A reaction: If it doesn't imply a contradiction, then it is not a necessary truth, which is what it is normally taken to be. Is 'This is a sentence' necessarily true? It might not have been one, if the rules of English syntax changed recently.

19460	'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer]
	Full Idea: If there is no experience at all of finding out that one is not conscious, or that one does not exist, ..it is tempting to say that sentences like 'I exist', 'I am conscious', 'I know that I exist' do not express genuine propositions.
	From: A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.iii)
	A reaction: This is, of course, an application of the somewhat discredited verification principle, but the fact that strictly speaking the principle has been sort of refuted does not mean that we should not take it seriously, and be influenced by it.

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification

19464	We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer]
	Full Idea: Why should a hypothesis which has failed the test be discarded unless this shows it to be unreliable; that is, having failed once it is likely to fail again? There is no contradiction in a hypothesis that was falsified being more likely to pass in future.
	From: A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii)
	A reaction: People may become more likely to pass a test after they have failed at the first attempt. Birds which fail to fly at the first attempt usually achieve total mastery of it. There are different types of hypothesis here.

14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction

19462	Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer]
	Full Idea: Inductive reasoning covers all cases in which we pass from a particular statement of fact, or set of them, to a factual conclusion which they do not formally entail. The inference may be to a general law, or by analogy to another particular instance.
	From: A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii)
	A reaction: My preferred definition is 'learning from experience' - which I take to be the most rational behaviour you could possibly imagine. I don't think a definition should be couched in terms of 'objects' or 'particulars'.