20 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
Full Idea: If a plural variable is said to have not a single value but some values (some clothes), then a non-count variable may have, more quirkier still, some value (some clothing, for instance) in ranging arbitrarily over the scattered stuff. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 4.4) | |
A reaction: We seem to need the notion of a sample, or an archetype, to fit the bill. I hereby name them 'sample variables'. Damn - Laycock got there first, on p.137. |
12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
Full Idea: Plurality is a semantical but not also an ontological construction. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4) | |
A reaction: I love it when philososphers make simple and illuminating remarks like this. You could read 500 pages of technical verbiage about plural reference without grasping that this is the underlying issue. Sounds right to me. |
17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
Full Idea: The very words we class as non-count nouns may themselves be used for counting, of kinds or types, and phrases like 'several wines' are perfectly in order. ...Not only do we have 'less cheese', but we also have the non-generic 'fewer cheeses'. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n23) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Laycock generally endorses the thought that what can be counted is not simply distinguished by a precise class of applied vocabulary. He offers lots of borderline or ambiguous cases in his footnotes. |
17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
Full Idea: Some words that seem to be semantically non-count can take syntactically plural forms: 'snows', 'sands', 'waters' and the like. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n24) | |
A reaction: This seems to involve parcels of the stuff. The 'snows of yesteryear' occur at different times. 'Taking the waters' probably involves occasions. The 'Arabian sands' presumably occur in different areas. Semantics won't fix what is countable. |
12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
Full Idea: The central fact about the category of stuff or matter is that it is profoundly antithetical to reference. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is taking 'reference' in the strictly singular classical sense, but clearly we refer to water in various ways. Laycock's challenge is very helpful. We have been in the grips of a terrible orthodoxy. |
12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
Full Idea: The definite descriptions of stuff like water are neither singular descriptions denoting individual mereological aggregates, nor plural descriptions denoting multitudes of discrete units or semantically determined atoms. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Laycock makes an excellent case for this claim, and seems to invite a considerable rethink of our basic ontology to match it, one which he ultimately hints at calling 'romantic'. Nice. Conservatives try to force stuff into classical moulds. |
12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
Full Idea: Suppose that water, qua vapour, mixes with the atmosphere. Is there any abstract metaphysical principle, other than that of atomism, which implies that water must, in any such process, retain its identity? That claim seems indefensible. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 1.2 n22) | |
A reaction: It can't be right that some stuff always loses its identity in a mixture, if the mixture was in a closed vessel, and then separated again. Dispersion is what destroys the identity, not mixing. |
12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
Full Idea: The notion of a part is such that parts must be of the same very general type - concrete, material or physical, for instance - as the wholes of which they are (said to be) parts. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 2.9) | |
A reaction: The phrase 'same very general type' cries out for investigation. Can an army contain someone who isn't much of a soldier? Can the Treasury contain a fear of inflation? |
17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
Full Idea: Work is needed to distinguish abstract nouns ...from the generic uses of what are otherwise concrete nouns. The contrast is that of 'humility is a virtue' and 'water is a liquid'. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n25) | |
A reaction: 'Work is needed' implies 'let me through, I'm an analytic philosopher', but I don't think they will separate very easily. What does 'watery' mean? Does water have concrete virtues? |
12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |
Full Idea: Some people hold that it is reference, in some more or less full-blooded sense, which constitutes our basic intellectual or psychological connection with the world. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is the view which Laycock sets out to challenge, by showing that we talk about stuff like water without any singular reference occurring at all. I think he is probably right. |
8337 | Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes suggested that our ability to recognise a single occurrence as an instance of mental causation is a feature which distinguishes mental causation from physical or 'Humean' causation. | |
From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §9) | |
A reaction: Hume says regularities are needed for mental causation too. Concentrate hard on causing a lightning flash - 'did I do that?' Gradually recovering from paralysis; you wouldn't just move your leg once, and know it was all right! |
8342 | Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie] |
Full Idea: In spite of Mackie's announced aim of analysing singular causal statements, it is doubtful that the entities that he is concerned with can be consistently interpreted as spatio-temporally bounded individual events. | |
From: comment on J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Jaegwon Kim - Causes and Events: Mackie on causation §3 | |
A reaction: This is because Mackie mainly talks about 'conditions'. Nearly every theory I encounter in modern philosophy gets accused of either circular definitions, or inadequate individuation conditions for key components. A tough world for theory-makers. |
8343 | Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie] |
Full Idea: Relations of necessity and sufficiency seem best suited for properties and for property-like entities such as generic states and events; their application to individual events and states is best explained as derivative from properties and generic events. | |
From: comment on J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Jaegwon Kim - Causes and Events: Mackie on causation §4 | |
A reaction: This seems to suggest that necessity must either derive from laws, or from powers. It is certainly hard to see how you could do Mackie's assessment of necessary and sufficient components, without comparing similar events. |
8385 | A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane] |
Full Idea: The details of Mackie's analysis are complex, but the general idea is that the cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect. | |
From: report of J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Tim Crane - Causation 1.3.3 | |
A reaction: Helpful. Why does something have to be 'the' cause? Immediacy is a vital part of it. A house could be a 'fire waiting to happen'. Oxygen is an INUS condition for a fire. |
8335 | Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie] |
Full Idea: A necessary causal condition is closely related to a counterfactual conditional: if no-cause then no-effect, and a sufficient causal condition is closely related to a factual conditional (Goodman's phrase): since cause-here then effect. | |
From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §4) | |
A reaction: The 'factual conditional' just seems to be an assertion that causation occurred (dressed up with the logical-sounding 'since'). An important distinction for Lewis. Sufficiency doesn't seem to need possible-worlds talk. |
8336 | The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie] |
Full Idea: My account shows how a singular causal statement can be interpreted, and how the corresponding sequence can be shown to be causal, even if the corresponding complete laws are not known. | |
From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §9) | |
A reaction: Since the 'complete' laws are virtually never known, it would be a bit much to require that to assert causation. His theory is the 'INUS' account of causal conditions - see Idea 8333. |
8333 | A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie] |
Full Idea: If a short-circuit causes a fire, the so-called cause is, and is known to be, an Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the result. Let us call this an INUS condition. | |
From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §1) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear why it is necessary, given that the fire could have started without the short-circuit. The final situation must certainly be sufficient. If only one situation can cause an effect, then the whole situation is necessary. |
8395 | Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley] |
Full Idea: For general causal statements Mackie favours a nomological account, but for singular causal statements he argued for an analysis in terms of subjunctive conditionals. | |
From: report of J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.2 | |
A reaction: These seem to be consistent, by explaining each by placing it within a broader account of reality. Personally I think Ducasse gives the best account of how you get from the particular to the general (via similarity and utility). |
8334 | The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie] |
Full Idea: We may say not merely that this virus causes yellow fever, but also that it is 'the' cause of yellow fever; but we could only say that sweet-eating causes dental decay, not that it is the cause of dental decay (except in an individual case). | |
From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §3) | |
A reaction: A bit confusing, but there seems to be something important here, concerning the relation between singular causation and law-governed causation. 'The' cause may not be sufficient (I'm immune to yellow fever). So 'the' cause is the only necessary one? |