5 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
21597 | Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson] |
Full Idea: Russell says the best chance of avoiding vagueness are the logical connectives. ...But the vagueness of 'true' and 'false' infects the logical connectives too. All words are vague. Russell concludes that all language is vague. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923]) by Timothy Williamson - Vagueness 2.4 | |
A reaction: This relies on the logical connectives being defined semantically, in terms of T and F, but that is standard. Presumably the formal uninterpreted syntax is not vague. |
9051 | Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: Russell takes it that logic assumes precision, and since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic at all. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923]) by R Keefe / P Smith - Intro: Theories of Vagueness §1 | |
A reaction: I find this view congenial. It seems to me that the necessary prelude to logic is to do everything you can to eliminate ambiguity and vagueness from the sentences at issue. We want the proposition, or logical form. If there isn't one, forget it? |
9054 | Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell] |
Full Idea: Vagueness and precision alike are characteristics which can only belong to a representation, of which language is an example. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923], p.62) | |
A reaction: Russell was the first to tackle the question of vagueness, and he may have got it right. If we are unable to decide which set an object belongs in (red or orange) that is a problem for our conceptual/linguistic scheme. The object still has a colour! |
14014 | Space alone, and time alone, will fade away, and only their union has an independent reality [Minkowski] |
Full Idea: Henceforth, space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality. | |
From: Hermann Minkowski (Space and Time [1908], Intro) | |
A reaction: Notice the qualification that it is a 'kind of' union. Deep confusion arises from exaggerating the analogy between space and time. Craig Bourne remarks (2006:157) that this shows independence of measurement, not of reality |