3 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
| From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
| A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
| 17535 | Dispositionality has its own distinctive type of modality [Mumford/Anjum] |
| Full Idea: We contend that dispositionality involves a non-alethic, sui generis, irreducible modality. | |
| From: S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Dispositional Modality [2011], 1) | |
| A reaction: This is a lovely bold proposal, and seems to be supported by Werner Heisenberg, in Idea 17534. |
| 3460 | Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle] |
| Full Idea: Putnam proposed the superactor/superspartan objection to behaviourism. | |
| From: report of Hilary Putnam (Brains and Behaviour [1963]) by John Searle - The Rediscovery of the Mind Ch. 2.II | |
| A reaction: This is a beautiful compression of the obvious counterexamples, which are behaviour-wth-no-experience, and experience-with-no-behaviour. Presumably, though, Spartans are disposed to go 'aagh!' when they get home, and there are no 'super' actors. |