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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Implications' and 'Letters to Frege'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction

8210	Deconstructing philosophy gives the history of concepts, and the repressions behind them [Derrida]
	Full Idea: To 'deconstruct' philosophy would be to think the structured genealogy of philosophy's concepts, but at the same time determine what this history has been able to dissimulate or forbid, making itself into history by this motivated repression.
	From: Jacques Derrida (Implications [1967], p.5)
	A reaction: All of this type of philosophy is motivated by what I think of as (I'm afraid!) a rather adolescent belief that we are all being 'repressed', and that somehow, if we think hard enough, we can all become 'free', and then everything will be fine.

8211	The movement of 'différance' is the root of all the oppositional concepts in our language [Derrida]
	Full Idea: The movement of 'différance', as that which produces different things, that which differentiates, is the common root of all the oppositional concepts that mark our language, such as sensible/intelligible, intuition/signification, nature/culture etc.
	From: Jacques Derrida (Implications [1967], p.7)
	A reaction: 'Différance' is a word coined by Derrida, and his most famous concept. At first glance, the concept of a thing which is the source of all differentiation sounds like a fiction.

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox

13365	Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell]
	Full Idea: Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox.
	From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Graham Priest - The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference §2

10711	Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell]
	Full Idea: Russell's paradox showed that we cannot consistently assume what is sometimes called the 'naïve comprehension principle', namely that every property is collectivizing.
	From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 03.6

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets

9127	Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
	Full Idea: Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property.
	From: report of Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 6.1
	A reaction: This is the principle stumbling block to any attempt to explain properties purely in terms of sets. I would say that Russell proved there couldn't be a set for each predicate. You can't glibly equate proper properties with predicates.

18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content

7531	We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]
	Full Idea: I believe Mont Blanc itself is a component part of what is actually asserted in the proposition 'Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high'; we do not assert the thought, which is a private psychological matter, but the object of the thought.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12), quoted by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4
	A reaction: This would appear to be pretty much externalism about concepts, given that Russell would accept that other people know much more about Mont Blanc than he does, and their knowledge is included in what he asserts.